Techniques for temporal detection of neural sensitivity to external stimulation

We propose a simple measure of neural sensitivity for characterizing stimulus coding. Sensitivity is defined as the fraction of neurons that show positive responses to n stimuli out of a total of N. To determine a positive response, we propose two methods: Fisherian statistical testing and a data-driven Bayesian approach to determine the response probability of a neuron. The latter is non-parametric, data-driven, and captures a lower bound for the probability of neural responses to sensory stimulation. Both methods are compared with a standard test that assumes normal probability distributions. We applied the sensitivity estimation based on the proposed method to experimental data recorded from the mushroom body (MB) of locusts. We show that there is a broad range of sensitivity that the MB response sweeps during odor stimulation. The neurons are initially tuned to specific odors, but tend to demonstrate a generalist behavior towards the end of the stimulus period, meaning that the emphasis shifts from discrimination to feature learning

Statistical methods for adjusting estimates of treatment effectiveness for patient nonadherence in the context of time-to-event outcomes and health technology assessment: A systematic review of methodological papers

Introduction. Medication nonadherence can have a significant negative impact on treatment effectiveness. Standard intention-to-treat analyses conducted alongside clinical trials do not make adjustments for nonadherence. Several methods have been developed that attempt to estimate what treatment effectiveness would have been in the absence of nonadherence. However, health technology assessment (HTA) needs to consider effectiveness under real-world conditions, where nonadherence levels typically differ from those observed in trials. With this analytical requirement in mind, we conducted a review to identify methods for adjusting estimates of treatment effectiveness in the presence of patient nonadherence to assess their suitability for use in HTA. Methods. A “Comprehensive Pearl Growing” technique, with citation searching and reference checking, was applied across 7 electronic databases to identify methodological papers for adjusting time-to-event outcomes for nonadherence using individual patient data. A narrative synthesis of identified methods was conducted. Methods were assessed in terms of their ability to reestimate effectiveness based on alternative, suboptimal adherence levels. Results. Twenty relevant methodological papers covering 12 methods and 8 extensions to those methods were identified. Methods are broadly classified into 4 groups: 1) simple methods, 2) principal stratification methods, 3) generalized methods (g-methods), and 4) pharmacometrics-based methods using pharmacokinetics and pharmacodynamics (PKPD) analysis. Each method makes specific assumptions and has associated limitations. Five of the 12 methods are capable of adjusting for real-world nonadherence, with only g-methods and PKPD considered appropriate for HTA. Conclusion. A range of statistical methods is available for adjusting estimates of treatment effectiveness for nonadherence, but most are not suitable for use in HTA. G-methods and PKPD appear to be more appropriate to estimate effectiveness in the presence of real-world adherence

Evolution of cooperation in stochastic games

Social dilemmas occur when incentives for individuals are misaligned with group interests 1-7 . According to the 'tragedy of the commons', these misalignments can lead to overexploitation and collapse of public resources. The resulting behaviours can be analysed with the tools of game theory 8 . The theory of direct reciprocity 9-15 suggests that repeated interactions can alleviate such dilemmas, but previous work has assumed that the public resource remains constant over time. Here we introduce the idea that the public resource is instead changeable and depends on the strategic choices of individuals. An intuitive scenario is that cooperation increases the public resource, whereas defection decreases it. Thus, cooperation allows the possibility of playing a more valuable game with higher payoffs, whereas defection leads to a less valuable game. We analyse this idea using the theory of stochastic games 16-19 and evolutionary game theory. We find that the dependence of the public resource on previous interactions can greatly enhance the propensity for cooperation. For these results, the interaction between reciprocity and payoff feedback is crucial: neither repeated interactions in a constant environment nor single interactions in a changing environment yield similar cooperation rates. Our framework shows which feedbacks between exploitation and environment - either naturally occurring or designed - help to overcome social dilemmas