Can There Be Post-Persons and What Can We Learn From Considering Their Possibility?

Many prominent bioethicists have recently raised the question of the possibility of moral status enhancement. In this paper I discuss the arguments advanced by Nicholas Agar for the possible existence of the postpersons. I argue that in spite of the many limitations and shortcomings of Agar’s account, there are no conclusive reasons to rule out the possibility of moral status enhancement. However, if post-persons are as they are described by Agar, the fact of their possibility is less interesting and ethically relevant than it might seem. Most importantly, the account of post-persons given by Agar is rather an outcome of some implausible assumptions. I propose that Agar conflates the ethical with the scientific and dismisses the importance of phenomenology in framing our ethical outlook. Also, he seems to follow the assumption made by many utilitarian ethicists that such features as sentience and cognitive capacities have some universal relevance. This accounts for the delusion that we can view our moral attitudes from the point of view of the Universe

Minds, brains, and hearts : an empirical study on pluralism concerning death determination

Copyright: This record is sourced from MEDLINE/PubMed, a database of the U.S. National Library of MedicineSeveral authors in bioethics literature have expressed the view that a whole brain conception of death is philosophically indefensible. If they are right, what are the alternatives? Some authors have suggested that we should go back to the old cardiopulmonary criterion of death and abandon the so-called Dead Donor Rule. Others argue for a pluralist solution. For example, Robert Veatch has defended a view that competent persons should be free to decide which criterion of death should be used to determine their death. However, there is very little data on people's preferences about death determination criteria. We conducted online vignette-based survey with Latvian participants (N = 1416). The data suggest that the pluralist solution fits best with the way our study participants think about death determination-widely differing preferences concerning death determination criteria were observed. Namely, most participants choose one of the three criteria discussed in the literature: whole brain, higher brain, and cardiopulmonary. Interestingly, our data also indicate that study participants tend to prefer less restrictive criteria for determination of their own deaths than for determination of deaths of their closest relatives. Finally, the preferences observed in our sample are largely in accord with the Dead Donor Rule for organ procurement for transplantation.publishersversionPeer reviewe

In defense of a pluralistic policy on the determination of death

Publisher Copyright: © 2018 E-flow Walter de Gruyter. All rights reserved.In his paper “The challenge of brain death for the sanctity of life ethic”, Peter Singer advocates two options for dealing with death criteria in a way that is compatible with efficient organ transplantation policy. He suggests that we should either (a) redefine death as cortical death or (b) go back to the old cardiopulmonary criterion and scrap the Dead Donor Rule. We welcome Singer’s line of argument but raise some concerns about the practicability of the two alternatives advocated by him. We propose adding a third alternative that also – as the two previous alternatives – preserves and extends the possibility of organ transplantation without using anyone without their consent. Namely, we would like to draw readers’ attention to a proposal by Robert Veatch, formulated 42 years ago in his 1976 book “Death, dying, and the biological revolution” and developed further in his later publications. Veatch argues for a conscience clause for the definition of death that would permit people to pick from a reasonable range of definitional options. This autonomy-based option, we believe, is more likely to be practicable than the two options advocated by Singer. Furthermore, we present data from a study with Lithuanian participants that suggest that there is quite pronounced variation of preferences concerning death determination.publishersversionPeer reviewe

The Sex Doula Programme

The Welfare-Funded Sex Doula Programme is a proposed sexual needs service that advances the sexual citizenship of disabled people by providing specially trained ‘sex doulas’ to meet the various, often complex, sexual needs of disabled people. Conceived as providing disabled individuals with practical sexual support services, the role of the sex doula includes advocacy, counselling, therapy, and practical relief from sexual tension. The programme constitutes a robust, comprehensive, and theoretically cohesive welfare service that seeks to provision access to sexual citizenship for disabled people. Grounded in Aristotelian concepts of flourishing, the programme identifies sexual citizenship as a fundamental basic need and seeks to ensure that disabled people have the opportunity to achieve the same level of sexuality as able-bodied people. Work advancing the programme includes both philosophical and theoretical arguments showing how the programme is justified under several moral frameworks, and claims made therein have resulted in velitation in the literature regarding the potential of such a programme to violate individuals’ negative rights

Truth-telling and the Asymmetry of the Attitude to Truth-telling to Dying Patients in Latvia

This article deals with concerns related to truth-telling in interaction between the doctor and the dying patient, exploring such issues as conflicting duties of veracity and non-maleficence, truthfulness and deception, and reasons behind physicians' decisions either to withhold or to disclose information about patients' diagnoses and prognoses. It focuses on various attitudes to truth-telling to dying patients, such as symmetry and asymmetry, both of which can be positive and negative. The empirical part of the article reports on the methods and results of the qualitative study carried out in Latvia during the summer of 2012. This study was based on the assessment of three case scenarios from the quantitative instrument designed by Dalla-Vorgia et al. in 1992. By means of semi-structured and focus-group interviews, evidence was gathered about physicians' and medical students' attitudes towards truth-telling, which allows the drawing of conclusions about the presence of asymmetry and symmetry in both cases. Additionally, an insight about the standards used for making decisions in case scenarios was gained and the origins of these standards were explored, revealing the aftermath of a gradual evolution from the ethics of the Soviet era to modern standards of medical ethics

Rationality and Motivation: Moral Psychology in Plato's Socratic Dialogues

Racionalitāte un motivācija: Morālā psiholoģija Platona sokratiskajos dialogos Promocijas darbs Anotācija Promocijas darbs "Racionalitāte un motivācija: Morālā psiholoģija Platona sokratiskajos dialogos" ir veltīts dažu Sokrata morālpsiholoģijas būtiskāko aspektu analīzei. Īpaša uzmanība tiek pievērsta diviem ar rīcības motivāciju saistītiem aspektiem: (1) Doksiskajai kompetencei, t.i., tam, ko mēs par saviem uzskatiem, un (2) Orektiskajai kompetencei, t.i., tam, ko mēs zinām par savām vēlmēm. Darba nosaukumā uz šiem diviem kompetenču laukiem norāda darba nosaukumā lietotie vārdi 'racionalitāte' un 'motivācija'. Darbā tiek analizēta Sokrata vēlmes koncepcija un tās saistība ar Sokrata mīlestības izpratni, Sokrata izpratni par technē. Darbā tiek analizēti tādi Platona sacerējumi kā "Līsids", "Dzīres", "Gorgijs" un "Valsts" I grāmata. Tiek aplūkots arī jautājums Sokrata psiholoģiskā egoisma un viņa ētikas izpratnes savietojamību. Darbu veido 7 nodaļas. Atslēgvārdi: Sokrats, vēlmes, motivācija, labums, egoisms, morālā psiholoģija"Rationality and Motivation: Moral Psychology in Plato's Socratic Dialogues" Annotation The dissertation "Rationality and Motivation: Moral Psychology in Plato's Socratic Dialogues" is a philosophical study of Socratic views in moral psychology. Particular attention is paid to what the author calls (1) Doxastic competence and (2) Orectic competence. It is argued that according to Socrates these two different epistemic relations are important aspects of our self-understanding. The doxastic competence refers to our knowledge of our beliefs and the orectic competence refers to our knowledge of our desires. The author discusses the way how Socratic theory of desire is connected with his theory of love and his theory of craft (technē). The author relies mostly on the views expressed in Plato's "Lysis", "Symposium", "Gorgias" and the I Book of "Republic". According to the view expressed in the essay Socratic theory of action is a variety of psychological egoism. It is argued, that this view is compatible with Socratic views about the importance of virtues. Keywords: Socrates, desires, motivation, good, egoism, moral psychology

The case for pluralism in death determination

Materials and dat

Bioethics in Latvia: Current Situation

10.1353/asb.2015.0038Asian Bioethics Review75457-46