Krivica brez žrtev kot politična razsežnost aisthesis pri Jacquesu Rancièru

The article considers the political dimension of harm within the wider conceptual field of aisthesis as conceptualized by Jacques Rancière. Within humanistic and postmodern perspectives, harm has always been thought of as indivisible from the image of the victim, whose main characteristic is that he passively suffers his harm. Within this same perspective, harm also cannot be thought of, because of its particularity, as universal and thus political. On the contrary, Rancière thinks of harm as the moment of the establishment of politics, which is not linked to any image of victim. For Rancière, harm never represents the consequence of a particular accident, but rather indicates the structural fact that the political community as a barred community is established by the existence of the “part of those who have no part,” and that part is identified with the whole community.Članek se ukvarja s premislekom politične razsežnosti pojma krivice znotraj širšega konceptualnega polja aisthesis pri Jacquesu Rancièru. V nasprotju s humanističnim in postmodernističnim mišljenjem krivice, ki le-to mislita kot neločljivo od podob žrtve, katere ključna poteza je pasivno utrpevanje krivice, in ki je zaradi njene partikularnosti ni mogoče misliti kot univerzalno in politično, za Rancièra krivica predstavlja moment vzpostavitve politike, ki ni vezana na nobeno podobo žrtve. Krivica za Rancièra ni posledica partikularnega naključja, temveč označuje strukturno dejstvo, da politično skupnost kot razcepljeno konstituira nek »del tistih, ki so brez deleža«, ki je celota skupnosti

Materialistična teorija sreče

If we had to identify the most controversial concept today, “happiness” would certainly figure among the main candidates for this role. On the one hand, “happiness” has represented one of the main ethical axes in the history of philosophy – from Greek eudaimonia to Bentham’s “greatest happiness for the greatest number of people.” Ethics was almost inextricably connected with the search for happiness, which was already in Greek synonymous for the “good life”. On the other hand, capitalism today, notwithstanding the general apathy and despair due to the permanent crises of the capitalist system (climate change, pandemics, financial crises, etc.), still legitimises itself with, if not guarantees, at least a promise of happiness. Despite different historical contexts which again and again gave meaning to the concept of happiness, a common denominator can still be identified, which today, in the era of late capitalism, has even gained the status of a cornerstone of our hegemonic image of happiness. Happiness is a question of being. The evocation of happiness usually raises the question of whether one is happy or not, what it means to be happy, and how we become so. Happiness is thus inextricably connected to the question of identity: it is the sensual expression of our being, of what we supposedly are. In contrast to this “ontologisation of happiness”, the article tries to show not only that there is a materialist concept of happiness, but also that the latter bases itself on the primacy of the verb “having” instead of “being”. From a materialist perspective, happiness is something that we have or encounter, and not something that we are. Two references are crucial in this articulation: first, Benjamin’s formulation of happiness from his last essay “On the concept of history”, and second, the Freudian-Lacanian theory of repetition.Če bi iskali kandidata za najbolj kontroverzen pojem danes, bi »sreča« nedvomno bila med favoriti za zasedbo tega mesta. Po eni strani je sreča v zgodovini filozofije predstavljala eno osrednjih etičnih torišč – od Grške eudaimonie do Benthamovega imperativa »največja sreča za največje število ljudi«. Etika je bila skoraj neločljivo povezana z iskanjem sreče, ki je že pri Grkih delovala kot sinonim »dobrega življenja«. Po drugi strani kapitalizem danes, kljub splošni apatiji in brezupnosti ljudi zaradi permanentnih kriz kapitalističnega sistema (podnebne spremembe, pandemija, finančna kriza itd.), samega sebe še vedno v precejšnji meri legitimira, če že na z zagotovilom, pa vsaj z obljubo sreče. Navkljub različnim zgodovinskim kontekstom, iz katerih je pojem sreče vedno znova dobival svoj pomen, pa vendarle lahko med vsemi temi razlikami izluščimo nek skupni imenovalec, ki je danes, v dobi poznega kapitalizma, celo pridobil status temeljnega kamna naše hegemone predstave o sreči. Sreča zadeva vprašanje biti. Ob evokaciji sreče se običajno poraja vprašanje, ali je nekdo srečen in kaj pomeni biti srečen oziroma kako to postanemo. Sreča je tako neločljivo povezana z vprašanjem identitete: je tako rekoč čutni izraz kvalitet naše biti, tega, kar domnevno smo. V nasprotju s to »ontologizacijo sreče« si članek prizadeva pokazati ne samo, da obstaja materialistični pojem sreče, temveč tudi, da ta pojem temelji na primatu glagola »imeti« nad glagolom »biti«. Z materialistične perspektive je sreča nekaj, kar lahko imamo oziroma nas doleti, ne pa nekaj, kar smo. Pri tem sta ključni dve referenci: prvič, Benjaminova formulacija sreče iz njegovega zadnjega teksta »O pojmu zgodovine«, in, drugič, freudovsko-lacanovska teorija ponavljanja

Kriza in izredno stanje

In the article, the author continues the discussion on the transformation of the notion of crisis from its cyclic nature to the point of considering it an irreversible phenomenon. He does so relying upon Jameson’s reading of Arrighi’s theory of crisis within systemic cycles of accumulation. In this context, the article shows again that financial and debt crisis, which began in 2008, mark the limit of cyclic repetition of the crisis insofar as, due to different causes, a new productive cycle of accumulation cannot appear any more. The article here introduces a new concept called post-productive capitalism with which author tries to grasp precisely the difference between today’s crisis and its appearances in past historical periods. At this basis, the article further shows the difference between ancient, modern and postmodern appearances of crisis ascribing them their own corresponding temporalities (contingency, cyclic nature, a-cyclic nature). In the concluding part the article connects these theses also with Benjaminian-Agambenian theory of the state of exception and shows which type of the state of exception fits today’s postmodern form of crisis.Avtor v članku nadaljuje razpravo o transformaciji pojma krize od cikličnega k nepovratnemu, in sicer v smeri Jamesonovega branja Arrighijeve teorije krize znotraj sistemskih ciklov akumulacije. V tem kontekstu znova pokaže, da finančna in dolžniška kriza, ki se je začela leta 2008, označujeta mejo cikličnega ponavljanja krize, saj zaradi različnih vzrokov nov produktivni cikel akumulacije kapitala ni mogoč. Na tej točki avtor uvede nov koncept, imenovan postproduktivni kapitalizem, s katerim poskuša konceptualizirati natanko razliko današnje krize glede na krize v preteklih zgodovinskih obdobjih. Na tej osnovi članek nadalje pokaže razliko med antičnim, modernim in postmodernim pojavom krize, pri čemer vsakemu od treh pripiše ustrezajočo časovnost (naključnost, cikličnost, a-cikličnost). V sklepnem delu pa članek te nastavke poveže še z Benjaminovo-Agambenovo teorijo izrednega stanja in pokaže, kateri tip izrednega stanja ustreza današnji postmoderni obliki krize

Sekvenca, hipoteza, zgodovina: Ideja komunizma v luči singularne univerzalnosti procesa resnice

The article tries to examine the element of “historical belonging” to the body-truth within the Idea of communism as developed by Alain Badiou. From the perspective of Badiou's concept of the singular universality, a question arises regarding the relation between singular sequences that determine a temporal period of this “historical belonging” to the body-truth. With the help of a parallel reading of some aspects of Badiou's and Agamben's philosophical projects, the article claims that both Badiou's singular universality and Immanuel Kant's judgement of taste have the identical structure. From this perspective, the seemingly marginal role of Kant's philosophy within Badiou's and Agamben's works emerges as in fact the central point within the development of the political thought of both philosophers, without which it is impossible to understand Badiou's reintroduction of the concept of history within his philosophy. From this perspective, the communist sequence emerges as a specific temporality that places itself on the cut of diachrony and synchrony, and as such presents itself neither as pure repetition of previous sequences nor without any relation to them.Članek se ukvarja s premislekom elementa zgodovinske pripadnosti telesu resnici znotraj Ideje komunizma, kakor jo razvija Alain Badiou. V luči Badioujevega pojmovanja singularne univerzalnosti procesa resnice se postavlja vprašanje razmerja med singularnimi sekvencami, ki določajo časovni interval zgodovinske pripadnosti telesu resnice. Ob vzporednem branju nekaterih segmentov Badioujeve filozofije in filozofije Giorgia Agambena, avtor razvija tezo, da ima singularna univerzalnost enako strukturo kot Kantova sodba okusa. Navidez obrobno mesto, ki ga Kant zavzema tako v Badioujevem kot v Agambenovem opusu, se s tega vidika izkaže za osrednjo točko v razvoju politične misli obeh avtorjev, brez katere ni mogoče pojasniti Badioujevega ponovnega uvajanja pojma zgodovine znotraj svoje filozofije. Sekvenca komunizma se v tej luči izkaže kot specifična temporalnost, ki se umešča na presek med diahronijo in sinhronijo, kot taka pa ni niti element čistega zgodovinskega ponavljanja predhodnih sekvenc, niti ni brez razmerja z njimi

Movement, Embrace: Adriana Cavarero with Bracha Lichtenberg Ettinger (and the Death Drive)

An experience of helplessness during the production of a collective autobiographical narrative offers an opportunity to explore points of convergence between Cavarero’s postural philosophy and Ettinger’s martixial borderlinking. The narrative is treated as a live scene which enfolds the movement of the drive conceptualized in such a way as to avoid the prioritization of death over life. Five successive moves, inspired by Ettinger’s rotation of the phallic prism, illuminate affinities between the two thinkers. The first rotation explores the matrixial and relational qualities which com-pose the scene. The second rotation approaches death from a notional beginning, prioritising the presence of the mother and her dissymmetrical relationship to the infant. The third rotation emphasizes the transformational character of Ettinger’s matrixial movement and border-crossing, especially when examined in conjunction with Cavarero’s maternal inclination. In the fourth rotation we show how inclination (clinamen) in Lacanian psychoanalysis is linked to the disappearance of the mother from the scene. The (re)introduction of the mother disrupts the Lacanian logic with the possibility of a beginning just as immanent as desire and lack. Movement, qua embrace and unity-disunity (fifth rotation), becomes an indispensable component of feminist ontology which captures the immanence of sharing in the martixial-maternal plane

Tesnoba in ontologija: k lacanovski materialistični metapsihologiji afekta

Notwithstanding the fact that already in his early essay “The Logical Time” Lacan suggested that the “ontological form of anxiety” is the constitutive element in the process of the constitution of subjectivity, thus far there have only been rare attempts at inquiring into the relation between the affect of anxiety and Lacan’s critique of classical ontology, which this article will try to explore. Specifically, my argument will be that Lacanian anxiety, unlike, for instance, its Heideggerian variation, is inextricably connected with the third dimension of being, which amounts to what Lacan in Seminar XI labelled “the unrealized,” i.e. to the peculiar structure of the unconscious, which distorts the classical ontological opposition between being and non-being. For Lacan, the unconscious, rather than referring simply to repressed unconscious content, is instead structured around a “pre-ontological” gap (Lacan) or “ontological negativity” (Zupančič). While anxiety notoriously “does not deceive,” it does not deceive only regarding the subject’s encounter with the real, but also – and most importantly – regarding the specific ontological structure of the unconscious, which includes the negativity as its own “material cause”. In this respect, anxiety might be regarded as an “ontological” or even objective material affect – yet not in a posthumanist sense of the affect of being/matter, but rather as the affective correlate or material signal for the fracture of being itself. In short, without this specific ontological gap/negativity, there would only be fear and frustration, not anxiety, which brings anxiety into the domain of metapsychology.Kljub temu, da Lacan že v svojem zgodnjem spisu »Logični čas« trdi, da je »ontološka oblika tesnobe« konstitutivni element v procesu konstitucije subjektivnosti, smo bili do sedaj priče le redkim poskusom raziskave razmerja med afektom tesnobe in Lacanovo kritiko klasične ontologije, ki ga pričujoči članek poskuša raziskati. Natančneje, članek poskuša pokazati, da je lacanovska tesnoba, za razliko od njenega Heideggerjevega pojmovanja, neločljivo povezana s tretjo dimenzijo biti, ki se nanaša na tisto, kar Lacan v Seminarju XI imenuje »nerealizirano«, se pravi, na posebno strukturo nezavednega, ki zamaje klasično ontološko nasprotje med bitjo in ne-bitjo. Za Lacana se nezavedno ne nanaša preprosto na potlačeno nezavedno vsebino, ampak je strukturirano okrog »predontološke« zevi (Lacan) oziroma »ontološke negativnosti« (Zupančič). Za tesnobo, ki po Lacanu »ne vara«, lahko rečemo, da ne vara tako glede subjektovega soočenja z realnim, kot tudi, kar je še pomembneje, glede specifične strukture nezavednega, ki vključuje negativnost kot svoj lasten »materialni vzrok«. S tega vidika lahko rečemo, da je tesnoba »ontološki« oziroma celo objektivni materialni afekt, vendar ne v posthumanističnem smislu afekta same biti/materije, temveč prej v smislu afektivnega korelata oziroma materialnega signala za razpoko v sami biti. Brez te specifične ontološke zevi/negativnosti, bi obstajala zgolj strah in frustracija, nikakor pa tesnoba. To pa je tudi tisto, kar tesnobo pripelje v domeno metapsihologije

Dnevnika Antona Kufola, poskus primerjalne analize

Diplomska naloga obravnava dva dnevnika župnika Antona Kufola, ki sta nastala v obdobju med letoma 1938 in 1947. Dnevnika prikazujeta vsakdan župnika v Nadiških dolinah, ki je priča in deležnik fašističnega preganjanja in vojnih razmer ter je po kapitulaciji Italije 8. septembra 1943 priča zapletenim razmeram v Beneški Sloveniji, kjer se srečajo skupine nemških vojakov, enote Italijanske socialne republike ter slovenski in italijanski partizani različnih pripadnosti. Delo poskuša narediti primerjalno analizo teh dveh dnevnikov, ki sta nastala istočasno, hkrati pa z različnimi niansami in besedami opisujeta dogajanje, ki mu je bil priča avtor.The thesis discusses the vicar Anton Kufol\u27s two diaries, which were written between 1938 and 1947. The diaries describe the everyday life of a vicar in the Valli del Natisone (Natisone Valleys). He was a witness and a participant of the fascist persecution and war circumstances, and after the surrender of Italy on 8th September 1943 witnessed the complicated circumstances in Slavia Friuliana, which was the meeting point of German troops, Italian Social Republic units, and Slovenian and Italian partisans of various affiliations. The thesis strives to carry out a comparative analysis of the two diaries, which were written at the same time, but use different tones and words to describe the events the author witnessed