Bidding among friends and enemies

We consider an auction setting in which bidders, even if they fail to obtain the good, care about the price paid by the winner. We study the impact of these price externalities on the first-price auction and the second-price auction in a symmetric information framework. We establish a distinction between price externalities that do not depend on the identity of the winner and price externalities that depend on the identity of the winner. We prove that the outcome of the first-price auction is not affected by the first type of price externalities while the outcome of the second-price auction is. In contrast, the second type of price externalities affects the outcome of both auction formats. In any case, in comparison with the first-price auction, the second-price auction exacerbates the effects of price externalities whatever their types are. The two auction formats are generically not equivalent

Illinois Water Quality and the Clean Water Act

This report contains the conclusions of a study performed by the Environmental Law and Policy Center of the Midwest ("ELPC") on the water quality of Illinois' rivers, lakes and streams, and Illinois' implementation of the Clean Water Act. The Lumpkin Foundation of Mattoon, Illinois provided funding for the study. Because the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency ("IEPA") is responsible for implementing the Clean Water Act in Illinois and for preparing most of the key reports relating to Illinois water quality, our research necessarily focused on the work of that agency. ELPC studied the publicly available IEPA data on a number of key indicators of water quality and the strength of a number of elements of IEPA's water pollution control efforts. Within the resources available for this study, ELPC also looked, for comparison purposes, at data from federal agencies and selected data collected by pollution control agencies of other states. Further, ELPC conducted interviews with federal and state officials and others with knowledge relating to the relative strengths and weaknesses of the Illinois water quality program. The study considered the following areas: Illinois Water Quality; Amount and Kind of Water Quality Data Collected; Strength of Water Quality Standards; Adequacy of Permit Conditions For Preventing Violations of Water Quality Standards; Permit Enforcement; Illinois' Stormwater and Combined Sewer Overflow Programs; Illinois' Non-Point Source Programs. Project Team: Howard Learner, Executive Director; Ann Alexander, Staff Attorney; Faith Bugel, Staff Attorney; Albert Ettinger, Senior Staff Attorney*; Shannon Fisk, Staff Attorney. * Principal Autho

On Quantum Algorithms for Noncommutative Hidden Subgroups

Quantum algorithms for factoring and discrete logarithm have previously been generalized to finding hidden subgroups of finite Abelian groups. This paper explores the possibility of extending this general viewpoint to finding hidden subgroups of noncommutative groups. We present a quantum algorithm for the special case of dihedral groups which determines the hidden subgroup in a linear number of calls to the input function. We also explore the difficulties of developing an algorithm to process the data to explicitly calculate a generating set for the subgroup. A general framework for the noncommutative hidden subgroup problem is discussed and we indicate future research directions.Comment: 13 pages, no figures, LaTeX2

Takeover contests, toeholds and deterrence.

We consider a setting in which two potential buyers, one with a prior toehold and one without, compete in a takeover modeled as an ascending auction with participating costs. The toeholder is more aggressive during the takeover process because she is also a seller of her own shares. The non-toeholder anticipates this extra-aggressiveness of the toeholder. Thus, he is deterred from participating unless he has a high valuation for the target company. This leads to large inefficiency losses. For many configurations, expected target returns are first increasing then decreasing in the size of the toehold.deterrence; toeholds; ascending auctions; Takeovers;

Auctions and shareholdings.

Nous étudions l'impact des participations au capital sur les enchères à valeurs privées indépendantes. Le revenu de l'enchère décroît lorsque les acheteurs ont des participations croisées et croît lorsqu'ils détiennent une partie du capital du vendeur. Dans tous les cas de participations capitalistiques, les formats d'enchères ne sont plus équivalents. L'enchère au second prix est plus sensible, à la hausse ou à la baisse, que l'enchère au premier prix, à la présence de participations.This paper examines how shareholdings affect auctions' revenue and efficiency with independent private values. Two types of shareholdings are analyzed: vertical (resp: horizontal) toeholds cover situations in which bidders own a fraction of the seller's profit (resp: a share of their competitor's profit). Expected revenue is an increasing (resp: decreasing) function of vertical (resp: horizontal) toeholds. With both types of toeholds, auction formats are not revenue equivalent. Expected revenue is affected to a greater extent by the presence of toeholds in the second-price auction than in the first-price auction.revenue comparison; toeholds; private values; Auctions;

Towards a theory of deception

This paper proposes an equilibrium approach to belief manipulation and deception in which agents only have coarse knowledge of their opponent�s strategy. Equilibrium requires the coarse knowledge available to agents to be correct, and the inferences and optimizations to be made on the basis of the simplest theories compatible with the available knowledge. The approach can be viewed as formalizing into a game theoretic setting a well documented bias in social psychology, the Fundamental Attribution Er- ror. It is applied to a bargaining problem, thereby revealing a deceptive tactic that is hard to explain in the full rationality paradigm

The antisaccade task as a research tool in psychopathology: A critical review

The antisaccade task is a measure of volitional control of behavior sensitive to fronto-striatal dysfunction. Here we outline important issues concerning antisaccade methodology, consider recent evidence of the cognitive processes and neural mechanisms involved in task performance, and review how the task has been applied to study psychopathology. We conclude that the task yields reliable and sensitive measures of the processes involved in resolving the conflict between volitional and reflexive behavioral responses, a key cognitive deficit relevant to a number of neuropsychiatric conditions. Additionally, antisaccade deficits may reflect genetic liability for schizophrenia. Finally, the ease and accuracy with which the task can be administered, combined with its sensitivity to fronto-striatal dysfunction and the availability of suitable control conditions, may make it a useful benchmark tool for studies of potential cognitive enhancers