Posthumanist Education

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Tagging the world : descrying consciousness in cognitive processes

Although having conscious experiences is a fundamental feature of our everyday life, our understanding of what consciousness is is very limited. According to one of the main conclusions of contemporary philosophy of mind, the qualitative aspect of consciousness seems to resist functionalisation, i.e. it cannot be adequately defined solely in terms of functional or causal roles, which leads to an epistemic gap between phenomenal and scientific knowledge. Phenomenal qualities, then, seem to be, in principle, unexplainable in scientific terms. As a reaction to this pessimistic conclusion it is a major trend in contemporary science of consciousness to turn away from subjective experiences and re-define the subject of investigations in neurological and behavioural terms. This move, however, creates a gap between scientific theories of consciousness, and the original phenomenon, which we are so intimately connected with. The thesis focuses on this gap. It is argued that it is possible to explain features of consciousness in scientific terms. The thesis argues for this claim from two directions. On the one hand, a specific identity theory is formulated connecting phenomenal qualities to certain intermediate level perceptual representations which are unstructured for central processes of the embedding cognitive system. This identity theory is hypothesised on the basis of certain similarities recognised between the phenomenal and the cognitive-representational domains, and then utilised in order to uncover further similarities between these two domains. The identity theory and the further similarities uncovered are then deployed in formulating explanations of the philosophically most important characteristics of the phenomenal domain—i.e. why phenomenal qualities resist functionalisation, and why the epistemic gap occurs. On the other hand, the thesis investigates and criticises existing models of reductive explanation. On the basis of a detailed analysis of how successful scientific explanations proceed a novel account of reductive explanation is proposed, which utilises so-called prior identities. Prior identities are prerequisites rather than outcomes of reductive explanations. They themselves are unexplained but are nevertheless necessary for mapping the features to be explained onto the features the explanation relies on. Prior identities are hypothesised in order to foster the formulation of explanatory claims accounting for target level phenomena in terms of base level processes—and they are justified if they help projecting base level explanations to new territories of the target level. The thesis concludes that the identity theory proposed is a prior identity, and the explanations of features of the phenomenal domain formulated with the aid of this identity are reductive explanations proper. In this sense, the thesis introduces the problem of phenomenal consciousness into scientific discourse, and therefore offers a bridge between the philosophy and the science of consciousness: it offers an approach to conscious experience which, on the one hand, tries to account for the philosophically most important features of consciousness, whereas, on the other hand, does it in a way which smoothly fits into the everyday practice of scientific research

Empirische Prüfung vollständiger Hypothesen: zur Feinstruktur empirischer Bestätigung in der Wissenschaft

Carrier M. Empirische Prüfung vollständiger Hypothesen: zur Feinstruktur empirischer Bestätigung in der Wissenschaft. In: Nida-Rümelin J, ed. Rationalität, Realismus, Revision: Vorträge des 3. internationalen Kongresses der Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie vom 15. bis zum 18. September 1997 in München. Perspektiven der analytischen Philosophie ; 23. Berlin [u.a.]: de Gruyter; 2000: 443-450

'Wer denkt: Geist oder Gehirn?'

Replik auf Kuno Kirschfeld In ldquo;Wer denkt, der Mensch oder sein Gehirn?rdquo; spricht Kuno Kirschfeld der Philosophie ab, Klärendes zur Frage nach der Funktionsweise menschlichen Denkens beitragen zu können. Julian Nida-Rümelin hält zum einen die von Kirschfeld unterstützte These für falsch, wonach der Philosophie einerseits und den Naturwissenschaften andererseits zwei miteinander unvereinbare Denkkulturen zugrunde lägen. Vor allem aber geht es dem Autor um die Widerlegung des für Kirschfelds Argumentation zentralen naturalistischen Dogmas, wonach alle Entitäten und Ereignisse mit empirischen, naturwissenschaftlichen Methoden beschreib- und erklärbar seien. Seine anti-naturalistische Position exemplifiziert Nida-Rümelin anhand einer Kritik am Libet-Experiment und einer Verteidigung des Konzepts der Willensfreiheit. Stellungnahme zur Replik von Julian Nida-Rümelin Das Abwägen verschiedener Möglichkeiten vor einer Entscheidung ist Verarbeitung von Information. Um verarbeitet werden zu können, muss Information zunächst gespeichert vorliegen, was nur in einem materiellen, physikalischen Substrat möglich ist, nicht etwa im ldquo;Geistrdquo;, dem Bewusstsein. Auch die Verarbeitung selbst erfordert ein solches Substrat, im leeren Raum ist sie nicht möglich. Das gilt für alle Denkprozesse, sie können nur in der neuralen Maschinerie unseres Gehirns ablaufen. Ergebnisse von Denkprozessen können uns sodann bewusst werden, aber eben erst in Folge dieser neuralen Prozesse. Weder der ldquo;Geistrdquo;, noch das Bewusstsein können denken, um dann auf das Gehirn einzuwirken. Response to Kuno Kirschfeld In ldquo;Who decides ndash; humans or their brains?rdquo;, Kuno Kirschfeld denies that philosophy is able to advance our understanding of the functioning of human thinking. According to Nida-Rümelin, this point of view is based on a false opposition between two different and incompatible ways of thinking, underlying philosophy on the one hand and natural sciences on the other. Furthermore the author criticizes the naturalistic dogma according to which every single event is explainable by the means of empirical natural sciences and which is central for Kirschfeld's argument. Nida-Rümelin defends the concept of free will against naturalistic attempts to deny it showing that deliberation, the weighing of reasons, is essential to human nature. Consciousness cannot contribute to our thinking Deliberating before taking a decision is information processing. To do so requires the information to be stored, which is possible in a physical substrate only, not in the mind. Processing also needs such a substrate, both cannot occur in empty space. This holds for thinking in general, because all thinking is information processing. This implies that any thinking happens in the neural machinery of our brain, without contribution of our consciousness. Results of these processes may later become conscious. Conclusion: Consciousness cannot contribute to our thinking, and then affect the brain