Ex-post Implementation with Interdependent Valuations

We consider a social choice setting with multidimensional signals and interdependent valuations. Such frameworks have been recently and increasingly used in order to study multi-object auctions. We obtain concise characterizations of ex-post implementable (not necessarily efficient) social choice functions in terms of affine functions that associate a weight to each agent and to each alternative. These characterizations can greatly reduce the complexity of the search for a constrained efficient (i.e., second best) mechanism in the generic cases where efficient outcomes cannot be implemented.

Long Range Effects in Gravity Theories with Vainshtein Screening

In this paper we study long range modifications of gravity in the consistent framework of bigravity, which introduces a second massive spin-2 field and allows to continuously interpolate between the regime of General Relativity (mediated by a massless spin-2 field) and massive gravity (mediated by a massive spin-2 field). In particular we derive for the first time the equations for light deflection in this framework and study the effect on the lensing potential of galaxy clusters. By comparison of kinematic and lensing mass reconstructions, stringent bounds can be set on the parameter space of the new spin-2 fields. Furthermore, we investigate galactic rotation curves and the effect on the observable dark matter abundance within this framework.Comment: 32 pages, 9 figures; v2: minor changes to the body of the text; improved motivation of the framework and discussion of bullet cluster section; updated Fig. 9; content matches published versio

Mixed Bundling Auctions

We study multi-object auctions where agents have private and additive valuations for heterogeneous objects. We focus on the revenue properties of a class of dominant strategy mechanisms where a weight is assigned to each partition of objects. The weights influence the probability with which partitions are chosen in the mechanism. This class contains efficient auctions, pure bundling auctions, mixed bundling auctions, auctions with reserve prices and auctions with pre-packaged bundles. For any number of objects and bidders, both the pure bundling auction and separate, efficient auctions for the single objects are revenue-inferior to an auction that involves mixed bundling

Functional hybrid rubisco enzymes with plant small subunits and algal large subunits: engineered rbcS cDNA for expression in chlamydomonas.

There has been much interest in the chloroplast-encoded large subunit of ribulose-1,5-bisphosphate carboxylase/oxygenase (Rubisco) as a target for engineering an increase in net CO(2) fixation in photosynthesis. Improvements in the enzyme would lead to an increase in the production of food, fiber, and renewable energy. Although the large subunit contains the active site, a family of rbcS nuclear genes encodes the Rubisco small subunits, which can also influence the carboxylation catalytic efficiency and CO(2)/O(2) specificity of the enzyme. To further define the role of the small subunit in Rubisco function, small subunits from spinach, Arabidopsis, and sunflower were assembled with algal large subunits by transformation of a Chlamydomonas reinhardtii mutant that lacks the rbcS gene family. Foreign rbcS cDNAs were successfully expressed in Chlamydomonas by fusing them to a Chlamydomonas rbcS transit peptide sequence engineered to contain rbcS introns. Although plant Rubisco generally has greater CO(2)/O(2) specificity but a lower carboxylation V(max) than Chlamydomonas Rubisco, the hybrid enzymes have 3-11% increases in CO(2)/O(2) specificity and retain near normal V(max) values. Thus, small subunits may make a significant contribution to the overall catalytic performance of Rubisco. Despite having normal amounts of catalytically proficient Rubisco, the hybrid mutant strains display reduced levels of photosynthetic growth and lack chloroplast pyrenoids. It appears that small subunits contain the structural elements responsible for targeting Rubisco to the algal pyrenoid, which is the site where CO(2) is concentrated for optimal photosynthesis.This work was supported in part by Grant DE-FG02-00ER15044 from the United States Department of Energy

Modeling the impact of gold mining on ecosystem servicesin Ghana´S Southern water basins

Dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Science in Geospatial TechnologiesAll natural resources are more or less limited and they can be overused and destroyed. While nature degradation occurs, political decisions are often short-sighted and profit-oriented, the importance of ecosystems is often unknown or less important than other interests for the decisionmaker. In this work, we apply GIS technics and InVEST models within a gold mining area in the southern water basins in Ghana. The aim was to identify the impact of mining activities on ecosystem services. The research was done with freely available datasets. It was possible to model and map water and soil pollution and to identify differences between regions were gold mining is taking place and regions without it. Gold mining was identified as a threat to the quality of the habitat and the water and soil quality regulation ecosystem services. This work may contribute to mitigate the negative effects of gold mining activities

Mixed Bundling Auctions

We study multi-object auctions where agents have private and additive valuations for heterogeneous objects. We focus on the revenue properties of a class of dominant strategy mechanisms where a weight is assigned to each partition of objects. The weights influence the probability with which partitions are chosen in the mechanism. This class contains efficient auctions, pure bundling auctions, mixed bundling auctions, auctions with reserve prices and auctions with pre-packaged bundles. For any number of objects and bidders, both the pure bundling auction and separate, efficient auctions for the single objects are revenue-inferior to an auction that involves mixed bundling.

An optimal Voting System when Voting is costly

We consider the design of an optimal voting system when voting is costly. For a private values model with two alternatives we show the optimality of a voting system that combines three elements: (i) there is an arbitrarily chosen default decision and non-participation is interpreted as a vote in favor of the default; (ii) voting is sequential; (iii) not all voters are invited to participate in the vote. We show the optimality of such a voting system by first arguing that it is first best, that is, it maximizes welfare when incentive compatibility constraints are ignored, and then showing that individual incentives and social welfare are sufficiently aligned to make the first best system incentive compatible. The analysis in this paper involves some methods that are new to the theory of mechanism design, and it is also a purpose of this paper to explore these new methods.Voting; mechanism design; committees.