Assessment of a critical area for a give-way ship in a collision encounter

Evasive action in ship-ship encounter has to be carried out on time and in line with the international convention on collision regulation – COLREG. The convention not only includes a set of rules defining types of relations between encountering ships but also indicates appropriate action to be taken in a given encounter. One of such encounters is crossing, where, in case of a collision situation, a give-way ship has to take an appropriate action in due time. However, a stand-on vessel is also given an opportunity to manoeuver, if it is made clear to her that the other ship is not fulfilling her obligations. However, it is difficult to specify, at which point in time in the course of an encounter, the stand-on ship has to take an action in order to avoid collision. It is understandable, as this parameter depends on numerous factors, both endogenous (e.g. ship characteristics, her maneuverability), and exogenous (e.g. type of encounter, weather conditions). Therefore in this paper we make an attempt towards the definition of the critical area for a maneuver of a stand-on ship, in the situation where the give-way vessel does not take an action. This is determined with the use of a hydrodynamic model of ship motion, and series of simulations conducted for several types of encountering ships under various conditions. Once determined, the critical area demarcates the no-go area around the own ship, where any other ships on collision courses must not enter. Otherwise a collision cannot be avoided by an action of one ship alone

Assessment of a critical area for a give-way ship in a collision encounter

International audience(Recommandation COB n° 2002-01 relative à la déclaration par les mandataires sociaux des transactions effectuées sur les titres de leur société, Bull. COB, févr. 2002, p. 17 ; T. Brocas et A. Tolila, Une nouvelle recommandation de la COB en matière de transparence financière, Les Echos, 9 avr. 2002, p. 55

Towards an evidence-based probabilistic risk model for ship-grounding accidents

AbstractMost of the risk models for ship-grounding accidents do not fully utilize available evidence, since it is based on accident statistics and expert opinions. The major issue with such kinds of models is their limitation in supporting the process of risk-management with respect to grounding accidents, since they do not reflect the reality to the extent required. This paper presents an evidence-based and expert-supported approach to structure a model assessing the probability of ship-grounding accidents, to make it more suitable for risk-management purposes. The approach focuses on using evidential data of ship-grounding accidents extracted from the actual accident and incident reports as well as the judgement elicited from the experts regarding the links and probabilities not supported by the reports. The developed probabilistic model gathers, in a causal fashion, the evidential contributing factors in ship-grounding accidents. The outcome of the model is the probability of a ship-grounding accident given the prior and posterior probabilities of the contributing factors. Moreover, the uncertainties associated with the elements of the model are clearly communicated to the end-user adopting a concept of strength-of-knowledge. The model can be used to suggest proper risk-control-measures to mitigate the risk. By running uncertainty and sensitivity analyses of the model, the areas that need more research for making educated decisions are defined. The model suggests the high-level critical parameters that need proper control measures are complexity of waterways, traffic situations encountered, and off-coursed ships. The critical area that calls for more investigation is the onboard presence of a sea-pilot

An analysis of ship escort and convoy operations in ice conditions

Winter navigation is a complex but common operation in the Northern Baltic Sea areas. In Finnish waters, the safety of the wintertime maritime transportation system is managed through the Finnish–Swedish winter navigation system. This system results in different operational modes of ship navigation, with vessels either navigating independently or under icebreaker assistance. A recent risk analysis indicates that during icebreaker assistance, convoys operations are among the most hazardous, with convoy collisions the most important risk events. While the accident likelihood per exposure time is rather low, accidents occur almost every winter. Even though these typically lead to less serious consequences, accidents leading to ship loss and oil pollution have occurred and may occur in the future. One aspect of ship convoy navigation in ice conditions is the distance kept between the icebreaker and the ships in the convoy, a form of the well-known ship domain concept. While operational experience naturally is a valuable source of information for decision making about the distance of navigation in convoys, systematic analyses are lacking. The aim of this paper is to investigate selected operational aspects of convoy navigation in ice conditions in the Finnish waters of the Gulf of Finland, based on data of the Automatic Identification System and sea ice hindcast data. Focus is on obtaining qualitative and quantitative knowledge concerning distances between vessels in escort and convoy operations and the respective transit speeds, conditional to ice conditions. Such empirical knowledge can support operational decision making, contributing to wintertime maritime safety.Peer reviewe

Towards the Development of a Risk Model for Unmanned Vessels Design and Operations

An unmanned merchant vessel seems to be escaping from the stage of idea exploration. Once the concept proofs its safety, it may become a part of maritime reality. Although the safety aspect of such a ship has been addressed by a handful of scholars, the problem remains open. This is mainly due to lack of knowledge regarding actual operational circumstances and design of unmanned ships, which are yet to be developed. In the attempt of bridging this gap, the risk analysis associated with unmanned ships needs to be carried out, where all relevant hazards and consequences are assessed and quantified in systematic manner. In this paper we present the results of a first step of such analysis, namely the hazard analysis associated with the unmanned ships. The list of hazards covers various aspects of unmanned shipping originating from both design and operational phases of vessel’s life. Subsequently the hazards and related consequences are organized in a casual manner, resulting in the development of a structure of a risk model

Estimating Operability of Ships in Ridged Ice Fields

A method for estimating ship's resistance caused by sea ice ridge keels is revised and used as a part of a method for predicting performance of ships in ridged ice conditions. The resistance method is based on a continuum plasticity model of ridge rubble and is simple to compute. The performance prediction method combines deterministic simulations of ship motion with probabilistic modelling of ridged ice fields. Performance estimates given by the model are distribution of attainable mean speeds for given ice conditions and probability of the ship being able to operate independently. A comprehensive sensitivity analysis was performed to gain insight into the model and identify possible problematic parameters. The sensitivity analysis covered both the ice conditions and modelling assumptions. Two data-sets were used to test the simulation method. One set included the depth profile of sea ice, machinery data and the speed of a ship operating in ridged ice. The resistance method was able to predict the meanspeed over 3km well. The second data-set consisted of a history of ship's speeds and positions from AIS data and ice conditions estimated by a numerical ice model HELMI, developed in the Finnish Meteorological Institute. Observed mean speeds were mostly well within the distributions of mean speeds simulated by the transit simulation model. Predictions of independent operation were also promising.Peer reviewe

Proceedings of the Second FAROS Public Workshop, 30th September 2014, Espoo, Finland

FAROS is an EC FP7 funded, three year project to develop an approach to incorporate human factors into Risk-Based Design of ships. The project consortium consists of 12 members including industry, academia and research institutes. The second FAROS Public Workshop was held in Dipoli Congress Centre in Otaniemi, Espoo, Finland, on the 30th of September 2014. The workshop included keynotes from industry, papers on risk models for aspects such as collision and grounding, fire and the human element, descriptions of parametric ship models and the overall approach being adopted in the FAROS project

Towards a probabilistic model for predicting ship besetting in ice in Arctic waters

International audienc