Accommodating Asylum Seekers and Refugees in Indonesia: From Immigration Detention to Containment in “Alternatives to Detention”

Considered the last ‘stepping stone’ before Australia, Indonesia plays an important role in immobilising secondary movements of asylum seekers and refugees in Southeast Asia. While migration scholarship has dedicated substantial attention to immigration detention and the deplorable living conditions inside immigration detention centres (IDCs), this article explores “alternatives to detention” (ATD) in two Indonesian localities: the city of Makassar and the province of Aceh. Seeking to contribute to a critical examination of ATD more generally, this article examines individual freedom, mobility, mechanisms of care and aid provision, protection of rights, self-determination, and matters of personal safety. The article illustrates the remaining limitations and the lack of rights that asylum seekers and refugees in Indonesia continue to face outside of IDCs. A durable solution, in the form of integration, is not available to asylum seekers and refugees, as they are prevented from integrating into the local host societies, and their social and economic mobility remains widely restricted. Yet at the same time, despite more physical mobility in ATD, asylum seekers and refugees remain contained within Indonesia as their onward movement remains deterred as well.Considérée comme le dernier tremplin vers l’Australie, l’Indonésie joue un rôle important pour bloquer les mouvements secondaires des demandeurs d’asile et des réfugiés en Asie du Sud-Est. Tandis que les études sur la migration se sont beaucoup focalisées sur la la détention des immigrants et les conditions de vie déplorables dans les les centres de détention des immigrants (CDI), cet article explore des alternatives à la détention (AD) à deux endroits d’Indonésie: la ville de Makassar et la province d’Aceh. À des fins plus générales de contribution critique sur les CDI, il étudie la liberté individuelle, la mobilité, les mécanismes de soins et les dispositions d’aides, la protection des droits, l’autodétermination, et les questions de sécurité personnelle. Il illustre enfin les limites persistantes et le manque de droits auxquels font toujours face, en Indonésie, les demandeurs d’asile et les réfugiés à l’extérieur des CDI. Du fait qu’on les empêche de s’intégrer aux sociétés hôtes locales et que leur mobilité sociale et économique est extrêmement limitée, on ne leur offre pas de solution durable sous la forme d’une intégration. En dépit d’une certaine mobilité physique dans le cadre des AD, les demandeurs d’asile et les réfugiés restent confinés à l’intérieur de l’Indonésie du fait qu’on les décourage également d’aller de l’avant

Book Review: Palmer, Wayne, Indonesia's Overseas Labour Migration Programme, 1969–2010

Book Review of the monograph by Wayne Palmer (2016), Indonesia’s Overseas Labour Migration Programme, 1969–2010. Leiden and Boston: Brill, ISBN13: 978-900-432-544-9, xiv + 202 page

Waiting on the islands of 'stuckedness': managing asylum seekers in island detention camps in Indonesia ; from the late 1970s to the early 2000s

"This article sheds light on the obstructed mobility of asylum seekers who were passing through Indonesia during their search for permanent and eff ective protection, and the politics of their detention. The fl ows of Indochinese asylum seekers who were ‘stored’ in Galang Island between the late 1970s and the mid-1990s, awaiting either their resettlement or repatriation, are compared with more recent arrivals of asylum seekers from the Middle East, many of whom were hosted in open detention facilities on Lombok Island during the mid-2000s. This comparison provides comprehensive background information on how the asylum seekers and their claims for international protection have been handled in Indonesia. Given that Indonesia is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol, Indonesia off ers no formal rights to asylum seekers and refugees within its territory. Instead, Indonesia ‘tolerates’ their presence as long as they are under the auspices of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) or the International Organization for Migration (IOM). Highlighting the diff erences regarding the management of these two distinctive groups of asylum seekers helps to grasp the full scope of ‘stuckedness’ (Hage, 2009) and also helps to understand the varied impacts of obstructed mobility on asylum seekers looking for permanent and eff ective protection." (author's abstract)"Dieser Artikel beleuchtet die eingeschränkte Mobilität von Asylsuchenden auf ihrem Weg durch Indonesien auf der Suche nach dauerhaftem und eff ektivem Schutz sowie die Politik ihrer Inhaftierung. In diesem Kontext werden Asylsuchende aus den Indochina-Staaten, die von den späten 1970er bis Mitte der 1990er Jahre auf der Insel Galang festgehalten waren und dort auf ihre Umsiedlung beziehungsweise Repatriierung warteten, mit den neueren Flüchtlingsankünften aus Nahost verglichen, von denen viele Mitte der 2000er Jahre auf der Insel Lombok in off enen Asylstätten festgehalten wurden. Dieser Vergleich dient in erster Linie dazu, den Umgang Indonesiens mit Asylsuchenden in den letzten drei Jahrzehnten aufzuzeigen. Angesichts der Tatsache, dass Indonesien bisher die Flüchtlingskonvention der Vereinten Nationen (1951) sowie das dazugehörige Protokoll (1967) nicht unterschrieben hat, bietet Indonesien Asylsuchenden und Flüchtlingen keine formellen Rechte. Solange diese sich jedoch beim Flüchtlingshochkommissariat der Vereinten Nationen (UNHCR) oder auch bei der Internationalen Organisation für Migration (IOM) registrieren, toleriert Indonesien ihre Anwesenheit innerhalb seines Territoriums. Unterschiede im Umgang mit diesen beiden Flüchtlingsgruppen verdeutlichen nicht nur das volle Ausmaß des „Festsitzens“ (stuckedness) (Hage, 2009), sondern zeigen auch verschiedene Auswirkungen von eingeschränkter Mobilität auf, wenn es um den Zugang zu dauerhaftem und effektivem Schutz geht." (Autorenreferat

Lessons Not Learned

In July 1936, Spain descended into chaos and civil war. Fascists in the military, Catholic Church, and aristocracy rebelled against a government elected to reform centuries old power structures. The United States reacted in surprise and joined France and Britain, staunchly refusing to be involved. For six months, the Department of State impeded attempts to material assist the Spanish government, until Congress passed an updated neutrality law prohibiting trade with Spain or the rebels. Congress again renewed and updated the law a year later. Yet in spring of 1939, at the end of the war, Franklin D. Roosevelt told his ambassador to Spain he regretted not assisting the Spanish government. The president, however, unfairly critiqued himself. The United States never debated involvement. “Foreign Relations of the United States” (FRUS), the State Department’s official edited record of diplomatic reporting, has no record of diplomatic reporting warning of imminent war, despite ample indications. Bowers provided timely reports during the first six months of the war on assisting Americans in Spain and the diplomatic community’s activities. He did not report his observations of German and Italian military activity, atrocities committed by the fascists, or the consequences of prohibiting supplies from reaching Spanish government forces. It is impossible to know how broader reporting might have changed decisions in Washington. This thesis does not argue American intervention could or would have changed the outcome of the war. This thesis argues that Bowers had a responsibility for fuller diplomatic vi reporting to inform better policy decisions in Washington and that lessons American learned post World War II resulting in intervention, globalist international policies, and diplomats opining on policy and recommending changes rather than just reporting, could have been learned from the Spanish Civil War

Across the Seas: Australia’s Response to Refugees — A History, by Klaus Neumann

Book Review:   Across the Seas: Australia’s Response to Refugees — A HistoryBy Klaus Neumann Carlton, AUS: Black, 2015, 352 pp

Risking another Rohingya refugee crisis in the Andaman Sea

Kutupalong -which, located near Cox's Bazar in Bangladesh, is the biggest refugee camp in the world with an estimated 700,000 inhabitants- has just witnessed its first coronavirus death. The 71-year-old victim was among at least 29 Rohingya refugees in the camp who had recently tested positive for the virus. The death of the refugee has increased concerns that the deadly virus could spread rapidly through refugee camps in Bangladesh, which are home to an estimated 1 million refugees. Observers also fear that the coronavirus outbreak could create panic in the camps and induce more Rohingya to seek refuge in Indonesia and Malaysia by crossing the Andaman Sea in boats. Malaysia and Indonesia are refusing to allow the passengers of any such boats to disembark over fears that they could be carrying the virus. According to official statements, Malaysia has turned back 22 boats since May 2020. In the second week of June, 269 Rohingya were detained in Malaysia after their vessel had reportedly been intentionally damaged, thus thwarting efforts to push it back to sea. These recent events have exacerbated fears that the current situation could turn into another Andaman Sea refugee crisis. (Autorenreferat

Indonesian International Students in Australia during the COVID-19-Pandemic: Coming Out Stronger?

Australia is a sought-after destination for international students, including from countries of the Global South such as Indonesia. Prior to the pandemic, the tertiary education of international students was its second largest export. At the onset of the pandemic, Australia's Prime Minister told international students they should return home immediately, warning them that they would not be supported by the government if they chose to stay. Throughout 2020 and 2021, Australian media outlets offered shocking reports and images of international students who had lost their homes and were queuing at soup kitchens. Experts feared that these images and the overall treatment of international students would do long-lasting damage not only to the education sector but also to Australia's people-to-people relations overseas. In this article, we explore the destinies of postgraduate students from Indonesia during the pandemic in Australia. As Indonesia's closest neighbor, Australia is the preferred destination for Indonesian students studying abroad and Australia has targeted Indonesia as a growth market in recent years. Based on qualitative interview data, we offer a picture of how this cohort of international students "muddled through" the pandemic. We ask what damage may have been done by the Australian government's closure of its international borders and strict pandemic restrictions to its reputation as a welcoming country and center of educational excellence. What consequences might there be for this vital Indonesia-Australia relationship, in particular, and for the future of student and broader university engagement between the two countries? Our findings show a much more optimistic outlook than expected