Facility location with double-peaked preference

We study the problem of locating a single facility on a real line based on the reports of self-interested agents, when agents have double-peaked preferences, with the peaks being on opposite sides of their locations. We observe that double-peaked preferences capture real-life scenarios and thus complement the well-studied notion of single-peaked preferences. We mainly focus on the case where peaks are equidistant from the agents' locations and discuss how our results extend to more general settings. We show that most of the results for single-peaked preferences do not directly apply to this setting; this makes the problem essentially more challenging. As our main contribution, we present a simple truthful-in-expectation mechanism that achieves an approximation ratio of 1+b/c for both the social and the maximum cost, where b is the distance of the agent from the peak and c is the minimum cost of an agent. For the latter case, we provide a 3/2 lower bound on the approximation ratio of any truthful-in-expectation mechanism. We also study deterministic mechanisms under some natural conditions, proving lower bounds and approximation guarantees. We prove that among a large class of reasonable mechanisms, there is no deterministic mechanism that outperforms our truthful-in-expectation mechanism

Register Loading via Linear Programming

We study the following optimization problem. The input is a number k and a directed graph with a specified “start ” vertex, each of whose vertices may have one “memory bank requirement”, an integer. There are k “registers”, labeled 1...k. A valid solution associates to the vertices with no bank requirement one or more “load instructions ” L[b,j], for bank b and register j, such that every directed trail from the start vertex to some vertex with bank requirement c contains a vertex u that has been associated L[c,i] (for some register i ≤ k) and no vertex following u in the trail has been associated an L[b,i], for any other bank b. The objective is to minimize the total number of associated load instructions. We give a k(k +1)-approximation algorithm based on linear programming rounding, with (k+1) being the best possible unless Vertex Cover has approximation 2−ǫ for ǫ> 0. We also present a O(klogn) approximation, with n being the number of vertices in the input directed graph. Based on the same linear program, another rounding method outputs a valid solution with objective at most 2k times the optimum for k registers, using 2k−1 registers. This version of the paper corrects some minor errors that made it in the final Algorithmica paper.

Problem Specific MOEA/D for Barrier Coverage with Wireless Sensors

Barrier coverage with wireless sensors aims at detecting intruders who attempt to cross a specific area, where wireless sensors are distributed remotely at random. This paper considers limited-power sensors with adjustable ranges deployed along a linear domain to form a barrier to detect intruding incidents. We introduce three objectives to minimize: 1) total power consumption while satisfying full coverage; 2) the number of active sensors to improve the reliability; and 3) the active sensor nodes' maximum sensing range to maintain fairness. We refer to the problem as the tradeoff barrier coverage (TBC) problem. With the aim of obtaining a better tradeoff among the three objectives, we present a multiobjective optimization framework based on multiobjective evolutionary algorithm (MOEA)/D, which is called problem specific MOEA/D (PS-MOEA/D). Specifically, we define a 2-tuple encoding scheme and introduce a cover-shrink algorithm to produce feasible and relatively optimal solutions. Subsequently, we incorporate problem-specific knowledge into local search, which allows search procedures for neighboring subproblems collaborate each other. By considering the problem characteristics, we analyze the complexity and incorporate a strategy of computational resource allocation into our algorithm. We validate our approach by comparing with four competitors through several most-used metrics. The experimental results demonstrate that PS-MOEA/D is effective and outperforms the four competitors in all the cases, which indicates that our approach is promising in dealing with TBC

Strategyproof Mechanisms for Group-Fair Obnoxious Facility Location Problems

We study the group-fair obnoxious facility location problems from the mechanism design perspective where agents belong to different groups and have private location preferences on the undesirable locations of the facility. Our main goal is to design strategyproof mechanisms that elicit the true location preferences from the agents and determine a facility location that approximately optimizes several group-fair objectives. We first consider the maximum total and average group cost (group-fair) objectives. For these objectives, we propose deterministic mechanisms that achieve 3-approximation ratios and provide matching lower bounds. We then provide the characterization of 2-candidate strategyproof randomized mechanisms. Leveraging the characterization, we design randomized mechanisms with improved approximation ratios of 2 for both objectives. We also provide randomized lower bounds of 5/4 for both objectives. Moreover, we investigate intergroup and intragroup fairness (IIF) objectives, addressing fairness between groups and within each group. We present a mechanism that achieves a 4-approximation for the IIF objectives and provide tight lower bounds

Altruism in Facility Location Problems

We study the facility location problems (FLPs) with altruistic agents who act to benefit others in their affiliated groups. Our aim is to design mechanisms that elicit true locations from the agents in different overlapping groups and place a facility to serve agents to approximately optimize a given objective based on agents’ costs to the facility. Existing studies of FLPs consider myopic agents who aim to minimize their own costs to the facility.We mainly consider altruistic agents with well-motivated group costs that are defined over costs incurred by all agents in their groups. Accordingly, we define Pareto strategyproofness to account for altruistic agents and their multiple group memberships with incomparable group costs. We consider mechanisms satisfying this strategyproofness under various combinations of the planner’s objectives and agents’ group costs. For each of these settings, we provide upper and lower bounds of approximation ratios of the mechanisms satisfying Pareto strategyproofness

Facility Location Games with Ordinal Preferences

We consider a new setting of facility location games with ordinal preferences. In such a setting, we have a set of agents and a set of facilities. Each agent is located on a line and has an ordinal preference over the facilities. Our goal is to design strategyproof mechanisms that elicit truthful information (preferences and/or locations) from the agents and locate the facilities to minimize both maximum and total cost objectives as well as to maximize both minimum and total utility objectives. For the four possible objectives, we consider the 2-facility settings in which only preferences are private, or locations are private. For each possible combination of the objectives and settings, we provide lower and upper bounds on the approximation ratios of strategyproof mechanisms, which are asymptotically tight up to a constant. Finally, we discuss the generalization of our results beyond two facilities and when the agents can misreport both locations and preferences