Fluctuations in Overlapping Generations Economies

In the present paper stationary pure-exchange overlapping generations economies with l goods per date and m consumers per generation are considered. It is shown that for an open and dense set of utility functions there exist endowment vectors such that n-cycles exist for n ≤ l +1 and l ≤ m. The approach to existence of endogenous fluctuations is basic in the sense that the prime ingredients are the implicit function theorem and linear algebra. Moreover the approach is applied to show that for an open and dense set of utility functions there exist endowment vectors such that sunspot equilibria, where prices at every date only depends on the state at that date, exist.cycles; overlapping generations economies; sunspot equilibria

Ordering Pareto-Optima Through Majority Voting

A commodity is shared between some individuals; some selection procedure is used to choose allocations. In order to reflect that laws and rules rather than allocations are implemented and that they involve an element of randomness because of incomplete information, selection procedures are taken to be probability measures over the set of allocations. Illustrations and interpretations of the selection procedures are given.Pareto-optimal allocations; infra-majority voting

Equilibrium Data Sets and Compatible Utility Rankings

Sets consisting of finite collections of prices and endowments such that total resources are constant, or collinear, or approximately collinear, can always be viewed as subsets of some equilibrium manifold. The additional requirement that such collections of price-endowment data are compatible with some individual preference rankings is reduced to the existence of solutions to some set of linear inequalities and equalities. This characterization enables us to give simple proofs of the contractibility of the set whose elements are finite equilibrium data collections compatible with given individual preference rankings and the path-connectedness of the set made of finite equilibrium data set.

Voting in assemblies of shareholders and incomplete markets

An economy with two dates is considered, on state at the first date and a finite number of states at the last date. Shareholders determine production plans b voting -one share, one vote- and at r-majority stable equilibria, alternative production plans are supported by at most rx100 percent of the shareholders.general equilibrium; incomplete markets; firms; voting

Portfolio diversification and internalization of production externalities through majority voting

In absence of markets for externalities, the authors look for governances and conditions under which majority voting among shareholders is likely to give rise to efficient internalization. The central and natural role played by a governance of stakeholders is underlined and benchmarked.Production externalities; majority voting; portfolio diversification; general equilibrium; stakeholder governance; mean voter

Production in incomplete markets: Expectations matter for political stability.

In the present paper we study voting-based corporate control in a general equilibrium model with incomplete financial markets. Since voting takes place in a multi-dimensional setting, super-majority rules are needed to ensure existence of equilibrium. In a linear–quadratic setup we show that the endogenization of voting weights (given by portfolio holdings) can give rise to – through self-fulfilling expectations – dramatical political instability, i.e. Condorcet cycles of length two even for very high majority rules.

Production in Incomplete Markets: Expectations Matter for Political Stability

In the present paper we study voting-based corporate control in a general equilibrium model with incomplete financial markets. Since voting takes place in a multi-dimensional setting, super-majority rules are needed to ensure existence of equilibrium. In a linear-quadratic setup we show that the endogenization of voting weights (given by portfolio holdings) can give rise to - through self-fulfilling expectations - dramatical political instability, i.e. Condorcet cycles of length two even for very high majority rules.incomplete markets; super majority voting; political (in)stability; selfulfilling expectations

General Equilibrium without Utility Functions: How far to go?

How far can we go in weakening the assumptions of the general equilibrium model? Existence of equilibrium, structural stability and finiteness of equilibria of regular economies, genericity of regular economies and an index formula for the equilibria of regular economies have been known not to require transitivity and completeness of consumers’ preferences. We show in this paper that if consumers’ non-ordered preferences satisfy a mild version of convexity already considered in the literature, then the following properties are also satisfied: 1) the smooth manifold structure and the diffeomorphism of the equilibrium manifold with a Euclidean space; 2) the diffeomorphism of the set of no-trade equilibria with a Euclidean space; 3) the openness and genericity of the set of regular equilibria as a subset of the equilibrium manifold; 4) for small trade vectors, the uniqueness, regularity and stability of equilibrium for two version of tatonnement; 5) the pathconnectedness of the sets of stable equilibria.general equilibrium; equilibrium manifold; natural projection; demand functions

Competition in Soccer Leagues

In the present paper a model of competition between sports clubs in a sports league is presented. Clubs are endowed with initial players but at a cost clubs are able to sell their initial players and buy new players. The results are that: if the quality of players is one-dimensional, then equilibria in pure strategies exist, and; if the quality of players is multi-dimensional, then there need not exist equilibria in pure strategies, but equilibria in mixed strategies exist. Equilibria in mixed strategies resemblance signings on deadline day in european soccer.competition between sports clubs; dimension of quality of players; equilibrium in pure strategies; equilibrium in mixed strategies