A BARGAINING APPROACH TO COORDINATION IN NETWORKS

This paper presents a model in which players interact via the formation of costly links and the benefits of bilateral interactions are determined by a coordination game. A novel contribution of this paper is that the fraction of the cost borne by each player involved in a bilateral link is not fixed exogenously, but results from bargaining. We analyze the model both in a static and a dynamic setting. Whereas the static game has multiplicity of equilibria, we show that only one is stochastically stable.Coordination; Nash bargaining solution; Risk-dominance; Stochastic stability

NETWORK FORMATION AND COORDINATION: BARGAINING THE DIVISION OF LINK COSTS

This paper presents a model of network formation with costly links. We endogenize the amount of cost born by each player involved in a bilateral link by considering that these shares result from bargaining. We analyze this feature in a context of coordination games. We show that, if the cost of the link is not too high, the complete network arises and players coordinate on the same action. If this cost is higher than the risk-dominance premium the efficient action is selected; instead, if it is lower, the risk-dominant action prevails.Coordination, Nash bargaining solution, Markov process

Voting in small networks with cross-pressure

We present a model of participation in elections in small networks, in which citizens su¤er from cross-pressures if voting against the alternative preferred by some of their social contacts. We analyze how the existence of cross-pressures may shape voting decisions, and so, political outcomes; and how candidates may exploit this e¤ect to their interest.Network; Voting; Cross-Cutting.

Bounded Confidence under Preferential Flip: A Coupled Dynamics of Structural Balance and Opinions

In this work we study the coupled dynamics of social balance and opinion formation. We propose a model where agents form opinions under bounded confidence, but only considering the opinions of their friends. The signs of social ties -friendships and enmities- evolve seeking for social balance, taking into account how similar agents' opinions are. We consider both the case where opinions have one and two dimensions. We find that our dynamics produces the segregation of agents into two cliques, with the opinions of agents in one clique differing from those in the other. Depending on the level of bounded confidence, the dynamics can produce either consensus of opinions within each clique or the coexistence of several opinion clusters in a clique. For the uni-dimensional case, the opinions in one clique are all below the opinions in the other clique, hence defining a "left clique" and a "right clique". In the two-dimensional case, our numerical results suggest that the two cliques are separated by a hyperplane in the opinion space. We also show that the phenomenon of unidimensional opinions identified by DeMarzo, Vayanos and Zwiebel (Q J Econ 2003) extends partially to our dynamics. Finally, in the context of politics, we comment about the possible relation of our results to the fragmentation of an ideology and the emergence of new political parties.Comment: 8 figures, PLoS ONE 11(10): e0164323, 201

Coordination in Evolving Networks with Endogenous Decay

This paper studies an evolutionary model of network formation with endogenous decay, in which agents benefit both from direct and indirect connections. In addition to forming (costly) links, agents choose actions for a coordination game that determines the level of decay of each link. We address the issues of coordination (long-run equilibrium selection) and network formation by means of stochastic stability techniques. We find that both the link cost and the trade-off between efficiency and risk-dominance play a crucial role in the long-run behavior of the system

Voting in small networks with cross-pressure

We present a model of participation in elections in small networks, in which citizens suþer from cross-pressures if voting against the alternative preferred by some of their social contacts. We analyze how the existence of cross-pressures may shape voting decisions, and so, political outcomes; and how candidates may exploit this eþect to their interest

Can there be a Market for Cheap-Talk Information? An Experimental Investigation

This paper reports on experiments testing the viability of markets for cheap talk information. We find that the poor quality of the information transmitted leads to a collapse of information markets. The reasons for this are surprising given the previous experimental results on cheap-talk games. Our subjects provide low-quality information even when doing so does not increase their monetary payoff

Dirty neighbors — Pollution in an interlinked world

We apply a network approach to analyze individual and aggregate consumption that generates predominately local pollution (e.g., noise, water and air quality, waste disposal sites). This allows us to relate the individual pollution levels to network centralities and to determine the effects of transfers among agents on the aggregate contamination. We then apply our theoretical framework to analyze the European data on fossil fuel energy consumption and discuss the impact of EU redistributive transfer policies on the aggregate level of pollution

Acousto-optic interaction in biconical tapered fibers: shaping of the stopbands

The effect of a gradual reduction of the fiber diameter on the acousto-optic (AO) interaction is reported. The experimental and theoretical study of the intermodal coupling induced by a flexural acoustic wave in a biconical tapered fiber shows that it is possible to shape the transmission spectrum, for example, substantially broadening the bandwidth of the resonant couplings. The geometry of the taper transitions can be regarded as an extra degree of freedom to design the AO devices. Optical bandwidths above 45 nm are reported in a tapered fiber with a gradual reduction of the fiber down to 70 μm diameter. The effect of including long taper transition is also reported in a double-tapered structure. A flat attenuation response is reported with 3-dB stopband bandwidth of 34 nm

On the notion of perfect Bayesian equilibrium

Often, perfect bayesian equilibrium is loosely defined by stating that players should be sequentially rational given some beliefs in which Bayes rule is applied whenever possible. We show that there are games in which it is not clear what whenever possible means. Then, we provide a simple definition of perfect bayesian equilibrium for general extensive games that refines both weak perfect equilibrium and subgame perfect equilibrium