Chasing unicorns: The European single safe asset project

© 2018, © The Author(s) 2018. For the past 20 years, Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) institutions have sought to engineer a single safe asset that would provide a credible store of value for capital market participants. Before 2008, the European Central Bank used shadow banking to create a single safe asset that we term shadow money, and in doing so also erased borders between Euro area government bond markets. Lacking appropriate ECB support, shadow euros could not withstand the pressures of the global financial crisis and brought down several periphery euro government bonds with them. Two new plans, the Capital Markets Union and the Sovereign Bond-Backed Securities, again turn to shadow banking, this time by using securitization to generate an entirely private safe asset or a public–private safe asset. Such plans cannot solve the enduring predicament of EMU’s bond markets architecture: that Member States have competed for investors (liquidity) since the introduction of the euro, betraying a deep hostility towards collective political solutions to the single safe asset problem. Technocratic-led, market-based initiatives need to persuade EMU states that there is little threat to their ability to issue debt in liquid markets. Without ECB interventions, market-based engineering of single safe assets runs the danger of repeatedly destabilizing national bond markets

Neoliberal growth models, monetary union and the Euro Crisis : a post-Keynesian perspective

The paper offers an account of the Euro crisis based on post-Keynesian monetary theory and its typology of demand regimes. Neoliberalism has transformed social and financial relations in Europe but it has not given rise to a sustained profit-led growth process. Instead, growth has relied either on financial bubbles and rising household debt (‘debt-driven growth’) or on net exports (‘export-driven growth’). In Europe the financial crisis has been amplified by an economic policy architecture (the Stability and Growth Pact) that aimed at restricting the role of fiscal policy and monetary policy. This neoliberal economic policy regime in conjunction with the separation of monetary and fiscal spheres has turned the financial crisis of 2007 into a sovereign debt crisis in southern Europe

The FLASHForward Facility at DESY

The FLASHForward project at DESY is a pioneering plasma-wakefield acceleration experiment that aims to produce, in a few centimetres of ionised hydrogen, beams with energy of order GeV that are of quality sufficient to be used in a free-electron laser. The plasma wave will be driven by high-current density electron beams from the FLASH linear accelerator and will explore both external and internal witness-beam injection techniques. The plasma is created by ionising a gas in a gas cell with a multi-TW laser system, which can also be used to provide optical diagnostics of the plasma and electron beams due to the <30 fs synchronisation between the laser and the driving electron beam. The operation parameters of the experiment are discussed, as well as the scientific program.Comment: 19 pages, 9 figure

Investigating the potentially contradictory microfoundations of financialization

The existing academic literature on financialization points to multiple instances in which firms attempt to demonstrate the vitality of their stock-market position in ways which ultimately prove to be self-harming. I demonstrate, in the first instance as a matt er of immanent logic, that these actions are linked to the interplay of contradictory tendencies in the microfoundations of financialization. Under conditions of financialization, firms create additional sources of credit to capitalize their productive activities by driving their stock price into greater increases than the market average, thereby generating capital gains. Yet, the more it becomes public knowledge that the financing tricks used to inflate the stock price provide no productive benefit to the firm, the more it would seem to create incentives for fund managers to hold portfolios that replicate the stock market as a whole. In this way, they will minimize their exposure to financial misrepresentation. Such a stance undermines financialized business models, but it does in any case conform to fund managers' basic theoretical training, which revolves around the logical demonstration that an individual stock cannot systematically out-perform the market average. I review the available empirical studies of fund manager decision-making to show that they find against the existence of a simple performativity loop operating between finance theory and fund manager behaviour. However, on many points the empirical evidence does confirm the theoretically derived conclusion concerning the potentially contradictory microfoundations of financialization. Fund managers often do act in a way which is consistent with finance theory's core claim that an index-tracking strategy represents the only equilibrium portfolio, even if this is only rarely as a result of the direct performativity of the theory

Shadow money and the public money supply: the impact of the 2007-2009 financial crisis on the monetary system

This article explores the effects of the political reactions to the 2007–2009 financial crisis on the monetary system. It chimes in with the view that shadow banks create ‘shadow money’, i.e. private substitutes for bank deposits. The article analyses how the three main forms of shadow money – money market fund shares, overnight repurchase agreements and asset-backed commercial papers – were affected by the short-term government intervention and medium-term regulation during and after the 2007–2009 financial crisis in the United States. The analysis reveals that the measures taken between 2007 and 2014 integrated some shadow money forms in the public money supply. In the year after the Lehman collapse, the initially private shadow money supply was either publicly backstopped or de-monetised as it had broken par to bank deposits. The public backstops took on the form of emergency facilities established by the Federal Reserve and guarantees proclaimed by the Treasury. Those backstops imply that the public institutional framework to protect bank deposits was extended to some forms of shadow money during the crisis. This tendency has continued in post-crisis regulation. Accordingly, the 2007–2009 financial crisis has triggered a paradigmatic change in the monetary system, attributable to the political decisions of US authorities

Hawtreyan 'credit deadlock' or Keynesian 'liquidity trap'? Lessons for Japan from the great depression

This paper outlines the ideas of Ralph Hawtrey and Lauchlin Currie on the need for monetised fiscal deficit spending in 1930s USA to combat the deep depression into which the economy had been allowed to sink. In such exceptional circumstances of 'credit deadlock' in which banks were afraid to lend and households and business afraid to borrow, the deadlock could best be broken through the spending of new money into circulation via large fiscal deficits. This complementarity of fiscal and monetary policy was shown to be essential, and as such indicates the potential power of monetary policy - in contrast to the Keynesian "liquidity trap" view that it is powerless This lesson was not learned by the Japanese authorities in their response to the asset price collapse of 1991-92, resulting in a lost decade as ballooning fiscal deficits were neutralised throughout the 1990s by unhelpfully tight monetary policy with the Bank of Japan refusing to monetise the deficits

International money markets: eurocurrencies

Eurocurrencies are international markets for short-term wholesale bank deposits and loans. They emerged in Western Europe in the late 1950s and rapidly reached a global scale. A Eurocurrency is a form of bank money: an unsecured short-term bank debt denominated in a currency (for instance, US dollars) but issued by banks operating offshore, in a geographical location or a legal space situated outside of the jurisdiction of the national authorities presiding over that currency (for instance, the Federal Reserve). In Eurocurrency markets, banks intermediate mainly between foreign residents. They borrow funds by "accepting" foreign currency deposits and lend foreign currency-denominated funds by "placing" deposits with other banks, by granting short-term loans or investing in other liquid assets. Historically, Eurodollars accounted for the largest share of Eurocurrencies, although other international currencies (Deutsche Marks, Japanese yens, and especially Euros since 1999) played an important role. Eurocurrency markets were a manifestation of financial integration and interdependence in a globalizing economy and performed critical functions in the distribution and creation of international liquidity. At the same time, their fast growth was a recurrent source of concerns for central bankers and policymakers due to their implications for macroeconomic policies and financial stability. This chapter analyzes different aspects of the historical development of Eurocurrency markets and their role in the international monetary and financial system. The first part discusses theoretical interpretations, presents estimates of markets' size, describes their structure, and explains the determinants of their growth. The second part analyzes the spread between Eurodollar rates and other US money market rates, the role of arbitrage, the evolution of risk factors, and the causes of historical episodes of stress and contagion in the interbank market. The last part discusses political economy issues, such as the role of governments and market forces in the emergence of Eurodollars in the 1950s and the failed attempts to impose multilateral controls on Eurocurrency markets in the 1970s