Do actions occur inside the body?

The paper offers a critical examination of Jennifer Hornsby's view that actions are internal to the body. It focuses on three of Hornsby's central claims: (P) many actions are bodily movements (in a special sense of the word “movement”) (Q) all actions are tryings; and (R) all actions occur inside the body. It is argued, contra Hornsby, that we may accept (P) and (Q) without accepting also the implausible (R). Two arguments are first offered in favour of the thesis (Contrary-R): that no actions occur inside the body. Three of Hornsby's arguments in favour of R are then examined. It is argued that we need to make a distinction between the causes and the causings of bodily movements (in the ordinary sense of the word “movement”) and that actions ought to be identified with the latter rather than the former. This distinction is then used to show how Hornsby's arguments for (R) may be resisted

Research ethics in practice: Lessons from studies exploring intimate partner violence in different contexts

Studies researching interpersonal violence (IPV) are associated with a range of ethical challenges. In this paper, lessons are drawn from three case studies exploring the experiences of different groups of survivors and perpetrators of IPV in diverse contexts: refugees in the Thailand-Burma border area; partner-violent adult men and female survivors in Ireland; and, school children in five European countries. The ethical – and associated methodological - challenges faced, and the ways in which they were overcome, are presented. Drawing on the case studies presented, the paper concludes that three key areas require special attention when conducting research in this field: accessing and recruiting participants, researcher skills and experience, and appropriate use of data

Why the idea of framework propositions cannot contribute to an understanding of delusions

One of the tasks that recent philosophy of psychiatry has taken upon itself is to extend the range of understanding to some of those aspects of psychopathology that Jaspers deemed beyond its limits. Given the fundamental difficulties of offering a literal interpretation of the contents of primary delusions, a number of alternative strategies have been put forward including regarding them as abnormal versions of framework propositions described by Wittgenstein in On Certainty. But although framework propositions share some of the apparent epistemic features of primary delusions, their role in partially constituting the sense of inquiry rules out their role in helping to understand delusions

Novel colours and the content of experience

I propose a counterexample to naturalistic representational theories of phenomenal character. The counterexample is generated by experiences of novel colours reported by Crane and Piantanida. I consider various replies that a representationalist might make, including whether novel colours could be possible colours of objects and whether one can account for novel colours as one would account for binary colours or colour mixtures. I argue that none of these strategies is successful and therefore that one cannot fully explain the nature of the phenomenal character of perceptual experiences using a naturalistic conception of representation

Ambiguous figures and the content of experience

Representationalism is the position that the phenomenal character of an experience is either identical with, or supervenes on, the content of that experience. Many representationalists hold that the relevant content of experience is nonconceptual. I propose a counterexample to this form of representationalism that arises from the phenomenon of Gestalt switching, which occurs when viewing ambiguous figures. First, I argue that one does not need to appeal to the conceptual content of experience or to judgements to account for Gestalt switching. I then argue that experiences of certain ambiguous figures are problematic because they have different phenomenal characters but that no difference in the nonconceptual content of these experiences can be identified. I consider three solutions to this problem that have been proposed by both philosophers and psychologists and conclude that none can account for all the ambiguous figures that pose the problem. I conclude that the onus is on representationalists to specify the relevant difference in content or to abandon their position

22q11.2 deletion syndrome

22q11.2 deletion syndrome (22q11.2DS) is the most common chromosomal microdeletion disorder, estimated to result mainly from de novo non-homologous meiotic recombination events occurring in approximately 1 in every 1,000 fetuses. The first description in the English language of the constellation of findings now known to be due to this chromosomal difference was made in the 1960s in children with DiGeorge syndrome, who presented with the clinical triad of immunodeficiency, hypoparathyroidism and congenital heart disease. The syndrome is now known to have a heterogeneous presentation that includes multiple additional congenital anomalies and later-onset conditions, such as palatal, gastrointestinal and renal abnormalities, autoimmune disease, variable cognitive delays, behavioural phenotypes and psychiatric illness - all far extending the original description of DiGeorge syndrome. Management requires a multidisciplinary approach involving paediatrics, general medicine, surgery, psychiatry, psychology, interventional therapies (physical, occupational, speech, language and behavioural) and genetic counselling. Although common, lack of recognition of the condition and/or lack of familiarity with genetic testing methods, together with the wide variability of clinical presentation, delays diagnosis. Early diagnosis, preferably prenatally or neonatally, could improve outcomes, thus stressing the importance of universal screening. Equally important, 22q11.2DS has become a model for understanding rare and frequent congenital anomalies, medical conditions, psychiatric and developmental disorders, and may provide a platform to better understand these disorders while affording opportunities for translational strategies across the lifespan for both patients with 22q11.2DS and those with these associated features in the general population

Planar Anchoring Strength And Pitch Measurements In Achiral And Chiral Chromonic Liquid Crystals Using 90-Degree Twist Cells

Chromonic liquid crystals are formed by molecules that spontaneously assemble into anisotropic structures in water. The ordering unit is therefore a molecular assembly instead of a molecule as in thermotropic liquid crystals. Although it has been known for a long time that certain dyes, drugs, and nucleic acids form chromonic liquid crystals, only recently has enough knowledge been gained on how to control their alignment so that studies of their fundamental liquid crystal properties can be performed. In this article, a simple method for producing planar alignment of the nematic phase in chromonic liquid crystals is described, and this in turn is used to create twisted nematic structures of both achiral and chiral chromonic liquid crystals. The optics of 90-degree twist cells allows the anchoring strength to be measured in achiral systems, which for this alignment technique is quite weak, about 3 x 10(-7) J/m2 for both disodium cromoglycate and Sunset Yellow FCF. The addition of a chiral amino acid to the system causes the chiral nematic phase to form, and similar optical measurements in 90-degree twist cells produce a measurement of the intrinsic pitch of the chiral nematic phase. From these measurements, the helical twisting power for L-alanine is found to be (1.1 +/- 0.4) x 10(-2) mu m(-1) wt%(-1) for 15 wt% disodium cromoglycate

Theories of Reference: What Was the Question?

The new theory of reference has won popularity. However, a number of noted philosophers have also attempted to reply to the critical arguments of Kripke and others, and aimed to vindicate the description theory of reference. Such responses are often based on ingenious novel kinds of descriptions, such as rigidified descriptions, causal descriptions, and metalinguistic descriptions. This prolonged debate raises the doubt whether different parties really have any shared understanding of what the central question of the philosophical theory of reference is: what is the main question to which descriptivism and the causal-historical theory have presented competing answers. One aim of the paper is to clarify this issue. The most influential objections to the new theory of reference are critically reviewed. Special attention is also paid to certain important later advances in the new theory of reference, due to Devitt and others

Rawls and Political Realism: Realistic Utopianism or Judgement in Bad Faith?

Political realism criticises the putative abstraction, foundationalism and neglect of the agonistic dimension of political practice in the work of John Rawls. This paper argues that had Rawls not fully specified the implementation of his theory of justice in one particular form of political economy then he would be vulnerable to a realist critique. But he did present such an implementation: a property-owning democracy. An appreciation of Rawls s specificationist method undercuts the realist critique of his conception of justice as fairness

Colour relationalism and the real deliverances of introspection

Colour relationalism holds that the colours are constituted by relations to subjects. Anti-relationalists have claimed that this view stands in stark contrast to our phenomenally-informed, pre-theoretic intuitions. Is this claim right? Cohen and Nichols’ recent empirical study suggests not, as about half of their participants seemed to be relationalists about colour. Despite Cohen and Nichols’ study, we think that the anti-relationalist’s claim is correct. We explain why there are good reasons to suspect that Cohen and Nichols’ experimental design skewed their results in favour of relationalism. We then run an improved study and find that most of our participants seem to be anti-relationalists. We find some other interesting things too. Our results suggest that the majority of ordinary people find it no less intuitive that colours are objective than that shapes are objective. We also find some evidence that when those with little philosophical training are asked about the colours of objects, their intuitions about colour and shape cases are similar, but when asked about people’s colour ascriptions, their intuitions about colour and shape cases differ