Intelligent capacities in artificial systems

This paper investigates the nature of dispositional properties in the context ofartificial intelligence systems. We start by examining the distinctive features of natural dispositions according to criteria introduced by McGeer (2018) for distinguishing between object-centered dispositions (i.e., properties like ‘fragility’) and agent-based abilities, including both ‘habits’ and ‘skills’ (a.k.a. ‘intelligent capacities’, Ryle 1949). We then explore to what extent the distinction applies to artificial dispositions in the context of two very different kinds of artificial systems, one based on rule-based classical logic and the other on reinforcement learning. Here we defend three substantive claims. First, we argue that artificial systems are not equal in the kinds of dispositional properties they instantiate. In particular, we show that logical systems instantiate merely object-centered dispositions whereas reinforcement learning systems allow for the instantiation of agent-based abilities. Second, we explore the similarities and differences between the agent-centered abilities of artificial systems and those of humans, especially as relates to the important distinction made in the human case between habits and skills/intelligent capacities. The upshot is that the agent-centered abilities of truly intelligent artificial systems are distinctive enough to constitute a third type of agent-based ability — blended agent-based ability — raising substantial questions as to how we understand the nature of their agency. Third, we explore one aspect of this problem, focussing on whether systems of this type are properly considered ‘responsible agents’, at least in some contexts and for some purposes. The ramifications of our analysis will turn out to be directly relevant to various ethical concerns of artificial intelligence

Scaffolding agency: A proleptic account of the reactive attitudes

This paper examines the methodological claim made famous by P. F. Strawson: that we understand what features are required for responsible agency by exploring our attitudes and practices of holding responsible. What is the presumed metaphysical connection between holding responsible and being fit to be held responsible that makes this claim credible? I propose a non‐standard answer to this question, arguing for a view of responsible agency that is neither antirealist nor straightforwardly realist. It is instead “constructivist.” On the “Scaffolding View” I defend, reactive attitudes play an essential role in developing, supporting, and thereby maintaining the capacities that make for responsible agency. Although this view has relatively novel implications for a metaphysical understanding of capacities, its chief virtue, in contrast with more standard views, is in providing a plausible defense of why so‐called “responsible agents” genuinely deserve to be treated as such.This work was supported by the Australian Research Council [grant number DP140102468] and generous ongoing support from the University Center for Human Values at Princeton University

Managing shame and guilt in addiction:A pathway to recovery

A dominant view of guilt and shame is that they have opposing action tendencies: guilt- prone people are more likely to avoid or overcome dysfunctional patterns of behaviour, making amends for past misdoings, whereas shame-prone people are more likely to persist in dysfunctional patterns of behaviour, avoiding responsibility for past misdoings and/or lashing out in defensive aggression. Some have suggested that addiction treatment should make use of these insights, tailoring therapy according to people's degree of guilt-proneness versus shame-proneness. In this paper, we challenge this dominant view, reviewing empirical findings from others as well as our own to question (1) whether shame and guilt can be so easily disentangled in the experience of people with addiction, and (2) whether shame and guilt have the opposing action tendencies standardly attributed to them. We recommend a shift in theoretical perspective that explains our main finding that both emotions can be either destructive or constructive for recovery, depending on how these emotions are managed. We argue such management depends in turn on a person's quality of self-blame (retributive or 'scaffolding'), impacting upon their attitude towards their own agency as someone with fixed and unchanging dispositions (shame and guilt destructive for recovery) or as someone capable of changing themselves (shame and guilt productive for recovery). With an eye to therapeutic intervention, we then explore how this shift in attitude towards the self can be accomplished. Specifically, we discuss empathy-driven affective and narratively-driven cognitive components of a process that allow individuals to move away from the register of retributive self-blame into a register of scaffolding 'reproach', thereby enabling them to manage their experiences of both shame and guilt in a more generative way.</p

Intelligent capacities in artificial systems

This paper investigates the nature of dispositional properties in the context of artificial intelligence systems. We start by examining the distinctive features of natural dispositions according to criteria introduced by McGeer (2018) for distinguishing between object-centered dispositions (i.e., properties like ‘fragility’) and agent-based abilities, including both ‘habits’ and ‘skills’ (a.k.a. ‘intelligent capacities’, Ryle 1949). We then explore to what extent the distinction applies to artificial dispositions in the context of two very different kinds of artificial systems, one based on rule-based classical logic and the other on reinforcement learning. Here we defend three substantive claims. First, we argue that artificial systems are not equal in the kinds of dispositional properties they instantiate. In particular, we show that logical systems instantiate merely object-centered dispositions whereas reinforcement learning systems allow for the instantiation of agent-based abilities. Second, we explore the similarities and differences between the agent-centered abilities of artificial systems and those of humans, especially as relates to the important distinction made in the human case between habits and skills/intelligent capacities. The upshot is that the agent-centered abilities of truly intelligent artificial systems are distinctive enough to constitute a third type of agent-based ability — blended agent-based ability — raising substantial questions as to how we understand the nature of their agency. Third, we explore one aspect of this problem, focussing on whether systems of this type are properly considered ‘responsible agents’, at least in some contexts and for some purposes. The ramifications of our analysis will turn out to be directly relevant to various ethical concerns of artificial intelligence

Managing shame and guilt in addiction: A pathway to recovery

A dominant view of guilt and shame is that they have opposing action tendencies: guilt- prone people are more likely to avoid or overcome dysfunctional patterns of behaviour, making amends for past misdoings, whereas shame-prone people are more likely to persist in dysfunctional patterns of behaviour, avoiding responsibility for past misdoings and/or lashing out in defensive aggression. Some have suggested that addiction treatment should make use of these insights, tailoring therapy according to people’s degree of guilt-proneness versus shame-proneness. In this paper, we challenge this dominant view, reviewing empirical findings from others as well as our own to question (1) whether shame and guilt can be so easily disentangled in the experience of people with addiction, and (2) whether shame and guilt have the opposing action tendencies standardly attributed to them. We recommend a shift in theoretical perspective that explains our main finding that both emotions can be either destructive or constructive for recovery, depending on how these emotions are managed. We argue such management depends in turn on a person’s quality of self-blame (retributive or ‘scaffolding’), impacting upon their attitude towards their own agency as someone with fixed and unchanging dispositions (shame and guilt destructive for recovery) or as someone capable of changing themselves (shame and guilt productive for recovery). With an eye to therapeutic intervention, we then explore how this shift in attitude towards the self can be accomplished. Specifically, we discuss empathy-driven affective and narratively-driven cognitive components of a process that allow individuals to move away from the register of retributive self-blame into a register of scaffolding ‘reproach’, thereby enabling them to manage their experiences of both shame and guilt in a more generative way

What is epistemic blame?

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Recent Advances in the Diagnosis and Treatment of Influenza Pneumonia

A potentially fatal complication of influenza infection is the development of pneumonia, caused either directly by the influenza virus, or by secondary bacterial infection. Pneumonia related to the 2009 influenza A pandemic was found to be underestimated by commonly used pneumonia severity scores in many cases, and to be rapidly progressive, leading to respiratory failure. Confirmation of etiology by laboratory testing is warranted in such cases. Rapid antigen and immunofluorescence testing are useful screening tests, but have limited sensitivity. Confirmation of pandemic H1N1 influenza A infection can only be made by real-time reverse-transcriptase polymerase chain reaction (rRT-PCR) or viral culture. The most effective preventive measure is annual influenza vaccination in selected individuals. Decisions to administer antiviral medications for influenza treatment or chemoprophylaxis should be based upon clinical and epidemiological factors, and should not be delayed by confirmatory laboratory testing results. Neuraminidase inhibitors (NI) are the agents of choice

Common genetic variation in the <em>HLA</em> region is associated with late-onset sporadic Parkinson's disease

Parkinson’s diseas

Extensive innate immune gene activation accompanies brain aging, increasing vulnerability to cognitive decline and neurodegeneration: a microarray study

BACKGROUND: This study undertakes a systematic and comprehensive analysis of brain gene expression profiles of immune/inflammation-related genes in aging and Alzheimer’s disease (AD). METHODS: In a well-powered microarray study of young (20 to 59 years), aged (60 to 99 years), and AD (74 to 95 years) cases, gene responses were assessed in the hippocampus, entorhinal cortex, superior frontal gyrus, and post-central gyrus. RESULTS: Several novel concepts emerge. First, immune/inflammation-related genes showed major changes in gene expression over the course of cognitively normal aging, with the extent of gene response far greater in aging than in AD. Of the 759 immune-related probesets interrogated on the microarray, approximately 40% were significantly altered in the SFG, PCG and HC with increasing age, with the majority upregulated (64 to 86%). In contrast, far fewer immune/inflammation genes were significantly changed in the transition to AD (approximately 6% of immune-related probesets), with gene responses primarily restricted to the SFG and HC. Second, relatively few significant changes in immune/inflammation genes were detected in the EC either in aging or AD, although many genes in the EC showed similar trends in responses as in the other brain regions. Third, immune/inflammation genes undergo gender-specific patterns of response in aging and AD, with the most pronounced differences emerging in aging. Finally, there was widespread upregulation of genes reflecting activation of microglia and perivascular macrophages in the aging brain, coupled with a downregulation of select factors (TOLLIP, fractalkine) that when present curtail microglial/macrophage activation. Notably, essentially all pathways of the innate immune system were upregulated in aging, including numerous complement components, genes involved in toll-like receptor signaling and inflammasome signaling, as well as genes coding for immunoglobulin (Fc) receptors and human leukocyte antigens I and II. CONCLUSIONS: Unexpectedly, the extent of innate immune gene upregulation in AD was modest relative to the robust response apparent in the aged brain, consistent with the emerging idea of a critical involvement of inflammation in the earliest stages, perhaps even in the preclinical stage, of AD. Ultimately, our data suggest that an important strategy to maintain cognitive health and resilience involves reducing chronic innate immune activation that should be initiated in late midlife