Efficiency Guarantees in Auctions with Budgets

In settings where players have a limited access to liquidity, represented in the form of budget constraints, efficiency maximization has proven to be a challenging goal. In particular, the social welfare cannot be approximated by a better factor then the number of players. Therefore, the literature has mainly resorted to Pareto-efficiency as a way to achieve efficiency in such settings. While successful in some important scenarios, in many settings it is known that either exactly one incentive-compatible auction that always outputs a Pareto-efficient solution, or that no truthful mechanism can always guarantee a Pareto-efficient outcome. Traditionally, impossibility results can be avoided by considering approximations. However, Pareto-efficiency is a binary property (is either satisfied or not), which does not allow for approximations. In this paper we propose a new notion of efficiency, called \emph{liquid welfare}. This is the maximum amount of revenue an omniscient seller would be able to extract from a certain instance. We explain the intuition behind this objective function and show that it can be 2-approximated by two different auctions. Moreover, we show that no truthful algorithm can guarantee an approximation factor better than 4/3 with respect to the liquid welfare, and provide a truthful auction that attains this bound in a special case. Importantly, the liquid welfare benchmark also overcomes impossibilities for some settings. While it is impossible to design Pareto-efficient auctions for multi-unit auctions where players have decreasing marginal values, we give a deterministic $O(\log n)$-approximation for the liquid welfare in this setting

Statistical Arbitrage Mining for Display Advertising

We study and formulate arbitrage in display advertising. Real-Time Bidding (RTB) mimics stock spot exchanges and utilises computers to algorithmically buy display ads per impression via a real-time auction. Despite the new automation, the ad markets are still informationally inefficient due to the heavily fragmented marketplaces. Two display impressions with similar or identical effectiveness (e.g., measured by conversion or click-through rates for a targeted audience) may sell for quite different prices at different market segments or pricing schemes. In this paper, we propose a novel data mining paradigm called Statistical Arbitrage Mining (SAM) focusing on mining and exploiting price discrepancies between two pricing schemes. In essence, our SAMer is a meta-bidder that hedges advertisers' risk between CPA (cost per action)-based campaigns and CPM (cost per mille impressions)-based ad inventories; it statistically assesses the potential profit and cost for an incoming CPM bid request against a portfolio of CPA campaigns based on the estimated conversion rate, bid landscape and other statistics learned from historical data. In SAM, (i) functional optimisation is utilised to seek for optimal bidding to maximise the expected arbitrage net profit, and (ii) a portfolio-based risk management solution is leveraged to reallocate bid volume and budget across the set of campaigns to make a risk and return trade-off. We propose to jointly optimise both components in an EM fashion with high efficiency to help the meta-bidder successfully catch the transient statistical arbitrage opportunities in RTB. Both the offline experiments on a real-world large-scale dataset and online A/B tests on a commercial platform demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed solution in exploiting arbitrage in various model settings and market environments.Comment: In the proceedings of the 21st ACM SIGKDD international conference on Knowledge discovery and data mining (KDD 2015

A Model of Vertical Oligopolistic Competition

This paper develops a model of successive oligopolies with endogenous market entry, allowing for varying degrees of product differentiation and entry costs in both markets. Our analysis shows that the downstream conditions dominate the overall profitability of the two-tier structure while the upstream conditions mainly affect the distribution of profits. We compare the welfare effects of upstream versus downstream deregulation policies and show that the impact of deregulation may be overvalued when ignoring feedback effects from the other market. Furthermore, we analyze how different forms of vertical restraints influence the endogenous market structure and show when they are welfare enhancing

A model to assess the technological level of small businesses

none2In this paper we present a three-dimensional framework (named Cu- be of Corporate Technological Level – CCTL) to evaluate the technological po- sition of small enterprises from different points of view. This framework has been developed from existing tools with similar goals, already proposed by oth- er authors. Compared to existing ones, this framework differs primarily for the inclusion of a collaborative perspective. It reflects the distinctive features of the latest interactive and web 2.0 tools (chat, blogs, forums, ...), that allow compa- nies to manage their relationships with the external stakeholders of the supply chain. The proposed framework has been applied to a sample of small business- es to test its validity. Some business cases with different positions in the Cube are described.This paper is the joint effort of the authors. Francesca Maria Cesaroni developed sections 1, 2 and 5 and Domenico Consoli sections 3 and 4.openF.M.Cesaroni; D.ConsoliCesaroni, FRANCESCA MARIA; D., Consol

License prices for financially constrained firms

It is often alleged that high auction prices inhibit service deployment. We investigate this claim under the extreme case of financially constrained bidders. If demand is just slightly elastic, auctions maximize consumer surplus if consumer surplus is a convex function of quantity (a common assumption), or if consumer surplus is concave and the proportion of expenditure spent on deployment is greater than one over the elasticity of demand. The latter condition appears to be true for most of the large telecom auctions in the US and Europe. Thus, even if high auction prices inhibit service deployment, auctions appear to be optimal from the consumers’ point of view

Big data: Finders keepers, losers weepers?

This article argues that big data’s entrepreneurial potential is based not only on new technological developments that allow for the extraction of non-trivial, new insights out of existing data, but also on an ethical judgment that often remains implicit: namely the ethical judgment that those companies that generate these new insights can legitimately appropriate (the fruits of) these insights. As a result, the business model of big data companies is essentially founded on a libertarian-inspired ‘finders, keepers’ ethic. The article argues, next, that this presupposed ‘finder, keepers’ ethic is far from unproblematic and relies itself on multiple unconvincing assumptions. This leads to the conclusion that the conduct of companies working with big data might lack ethical justification

Presynaptic actions of 4-Aminopyridine and γ-aminobutyric acid on rat sympathetic ganglia in vitro

Responses to bath-applications of 4-aminopyridine (4-AP) and -aminobutyric acid (GABA) were recorded intracellularly from neurones in the rat isolated superior cervical ganglion. 4-aminopyridine (0.1–1.0 mmol/l) usually induced spontaneous action potentials and excitatory postsynaptic potentials (EPSPs), which were blocked by hexamethonium. Membrane potential was unchanged; spike duration was slightly increased. Vagus nerve B-and C-fibre potentials were prolonged. In 4-AP solution (0.1–0.3 mmol/l), GABA (0.1 mmol/l), 3-aminopropanesulphonic acid or muscimol evoked bursts of spikes and EPSPs in addition to a neuronal depolarization. These bursts, which were not elicited by glycine, glutamate, taurine or (±)-baclofen, were completely antagonised by hexamethonium, tetrodotoxin or bicuculline methochloride. It is concluded that: (a) 4-AP has a potent presynaptic action on sympathetic ganglia; (b) presynaptic actions of GABA can be recorded postsynaptically in the presence of 4-AP; and (c) the presynaptic GABA-receptors revealed in this condition are similar to those on the postsynaptic membrane

Second-price auctions with private entry costs

We study asymmetric second-price auctions under incomplete information. The bidders have potentially different, commonly-known, valuations for the object and private information about their entry costs. The seller, however, does not benefit from these entry costs. We calculate the equilibrium strategies of the bidders and analyze the optimal design for the seller in this environment