Optimization of Optical and Mechanical Properties of Real Architecture for 3-Dimensional Tissue Equivalents: Towards Treatment of Limbal Epithelial Stem Cell Deficiency

Limbal epithelial stem cell (LESC) deficiency can cause blindness. Transplantation of cultured human limbal epithelial cells (hLE) on human amniotic membrane (HAM) can restore vision but clinical graft manufacture can be unreliable. We have developed a reliable and robust tissue equivalent (TE) alternative to HAM, Real Architecture for 3D Tissue (RAFT). Here, we aimed to optimize the optical and mechanical properties of RAFT TE for treatment of LESC deficiency in clinical application. The RAFT TE protocol is tunable; varying collagen concentration and volume produces differing RAFT TEs. These were compared with HAM samples taken from locations proximal and distal to the placental disc. Outcomes assessed were transparency, thickness, light transmission, tensile strength, ease of handling, degradation rates and suitability as substrate for hLE culture. Proximal HAM samples were thicker and stronger with poorer optical properties than distal HAM samples. RAFT TEs produced using higher amounts of collagen were thicker and stronger with poorer optical properties than those produced using lower amounts of collagen. The ‘optimal’ RAFT TE was thin, transparent but still handleable and was produced using 0.6 ml of 3 mg/ml collagen. Degradation rates of the ‘optimal’ RAFT TE and HAM were similar. hLE achieved confluency on ‘optimal’ RAFT TEs at comparable rates to HAM and cells expressed high levels of putative stem cell marker p63α. These findings support the use of RAFT TE for hLE transplantation towards treatment of LESC deficiency

Risk Acceptance Personality Paradigm: How We View What We Don't Know We Don't Know

The purpose of integrated hazard analyses, probabilistic risk assessments, failure modes and effects analyses, fault trees and many other similar tools is to give managers of a program some idea of the risks associated with their program. All risk tools establish a set of undesired events and then try to evaluate the risk to the program by assessing the severity of the undesired event and the likelihood of that event occurring. Some tools provide qualitative results, some provide quantitative results and some do both. However, in the end the program manager and his/her team must decide which risks are acceptable and which are not. Even with a wide array of analysis tools available, risk acceptance is often a controversial and difficult decision making process. And yet, today's space exploration programs are moving toward more risk based design approaches. Thus, risk identification and good risk assessment is becoming even more vital to the engineering development process. This paper explores how known and unknown information influences risk-based decisions by looking at how the various parts of our personalities are affected by what they know and what they don't know. This paper then offers some criteria for consideration when making risk-based decisions

Spurious free dynamic range for a digitizing array

The paper addresses the problem of improving the spurious free dynamic range (SFDR) for digitization by use of sensor arrays. Nonlinearities in the analog-to-digital conversion process give rise to spurious signals (harmonics and intermodulation products) that limit the overall SFDR of the digitization process. When the signal of interest arises from a sensor, such as an antenna or hydrophone, the paper addresses the question of whether array processing (i.e., use of multiple sensors) can improve the resulting SFDR at the beamformer output. The paper argues that significant improvements can be obtained using linear, or more effectively, optimal (minimum variance distortionless response) beamforming.White, L.B.; Feng Rice and Angus Massi

The Integrated Hazard Analysis Integrator

Hazard analysis addresses hazards that arise in the design, development, manufacturing, construction, facilities, transportation, operations and disposal activities associated with hardware, software, maintenance, operations and environments. An integrated hazard is an event or condition that is caused by or controlled by multiple systems, elements, or subsystems. Integrated hazard analysis (IHA) is especially daunting and ambitious for large, complex systems such as NASA s Constellation program which incorporates program, systems and element components that impact others (International Space Station, public, International Partners, etc.). An appropriate IHA should identify all hazards, causes, controls and verifications used to mitigate the risk of catastrophic loss of crew, vehicle and/or mission. Unfortunately, in the current age of increased technology dependence, there is the tendency to sometimes overlook the necessary and sufficient qualifications of the integrator, that is, the person/team that identifies the parts, analyzes the architectural structure, aligns the analysis with the program plan and then communicates/coordinates with large and small components, each contributing necessary hardware, software and/or information to prevent catastrophic loss. As viewed from both Challenger and Columbia accidents, lack of appropriate communication, management errors and lack of resources dedicated to safety were cited as major contributors to these fatalities. From the accident reports, it would appear that the organizational impact of managers, integrators and safety personnel contributes more significantly to mission success and mission failure than purely technological components. If this is so, then organizations who sincerely desire mission success must put as much effort in selecting managers and integrators as they do when designing the hardware, writing the software code and analyzing competitive proposals. This paper will discuss the necessary and sufficient requirements of one of the significant contributors to mission success, the IHA integrator. Discussions will be provided to describe both the mindset required as well as deleterious assumptions/behaviors to avoid when integrating within a large scale system

Timing of Formal Phase Safety Reviews for Large-Scale Integrated Hazard Analysis

Integrated hazard analysis (IHA) is a process used to identify and control unacceptable risk. As such, it does not occur in a vacuum. IHA approaches must be tailored to fit the system being analyzed. Physical, resource, organizational and temporal constraints on large-scale integrated systems impose additional direct or derived requirements on the IHA. The timing and interaction between engineering and safety organizations can provide either benefits or hindrances to the overall end product. The traditional approach for formal phase safety review timing and content, which generally works well for small- to moderate-scale systems, does not work well for very large-scale integrated systems. This paper proposes a modified approach to timing and content of formal phase safety reviews for IHA. Details of the tailoring process for IHA will describe how to avoid temporary disconnects in major milestone reviews and how to maintain a cohesive end-to-end integration story particularly for systems where the integrator inherently has little to no insight into lower level systems. The proposal has the advantage of allowing the hazard analysis development process to occur as technical data normally matures

PERLINDUNGAN HUKUM TERHADAP TENAGA MEDIS DALAM KONFLIK BERSENJATA MENURUT HUKUM HUMANITER INTERNASIONAL

Tujuan penelitian adalah untuk mengetahui dan mendalami tentang perlindungan terhadap tenaga medis dalam konflik bersenjata antar negara dan untuk mengetahui dan memahami sejauh mana perlindungan dan pertanggungjawaban negara-negara peserta konflik bersenjata dalam perlindungan terhadap tenaga medis. Dengan metode penelitian yuridis normatif, kesimpulan yang didapat: 1. Konvensi Jenewa 1949 dan Protokol Tambahan 1977 adalah payung hukum dan juga konsep agar supaya para peserta konflik bersenjata tidak membabibuta dalam melakukan penyerangan. Ada pihak-pihak yang tidak boleh dijadikan sebagai sasaran tembak dalam konflik bersenjata antar Negara. Konvensi Jenewa 1949 dan Protokol Tambahan 1977 secara khusus melindungi orang yang tidak mengambil bagian dalam permusuhan (warga atau penduduk sipil, pekerja kesehatan dan pekerja bantuan kemanusiaan) dan mereka yang tidak lagi terlibat dalam permusuhan, seperti tentara yang terluka, sakit dan kapalnya karam dan tawanan perang. 2. Kedudukan tenaga medis dalam konflik bersenjata melalui beberapa instrumen hukum humaniter internasional dan aturan-aturan di dalam hukum humaniter internasional kebiasaan.   Kata Kunci : perlindungan tenaga medis, konflik bersenjata