Pons-Altés, J. M. (coord.) (2021). Didàctica, història, cooperació i justícia social. Reconeixement al doctor Antoni Gavaldà. Publicacions URV.

Ressenya del llibre: Pons-Altés, J. M. (coord.) (2021). Didàctica, història, cooperació i justícia social. Reconeixement al doctor Antoni Gavaldà. Publicacions URV.Book review: Pons-Altés, J. M. (coord.) (2021). Didàctica, història, cooperació i justícia social. Reconeixement al doctor Antoni Gavaldà. Publicacions URV

Exploring the Oxygen Order in Hg-1223 and Hg-1201 by 199Hg MAS NMR

We demonstrate the use of a high-resolution solid-state fast (45 kHz) magic angle spinning (MAS) NMR for mapping the oxygen distribution in Hg-based cuprate superconductors. We identify observed three peaks in 199Hg spectrum as belonging to the different chemical environments in the HgO? layer with no oxygen neighbors, single oxygen neighbor, and two oxygen neighbors. We discuss observed differences between Hg-1201 and Hg-1223 materials.Comment: 4 pages, 2 figures included. Submitted to NATO Advanced Research Workshop Proceedings (Miami January 2004

VLBI astrometry of two millisecond pulsars

We present astrometric results on two millisecond pulsars, PSR B1257+12 and PSR J1022+1001, as carried out through VLBI. For PSR B1257+12, a model-independent distance of $710_{\rm -38}^{\rm +43}$ pc and proper motion of ($\mu_{\rm \alpha}=46.44\pm0.08$ mas/yr, $\mu_{\rm \delta}=-84.87\pm0.32$ mas/yr) were obtained from 5 epochs of VLBA and 4 epochs of EVN observations, spanning about 2 years. The two dimensional proper motion of PSR J1022+1001 ($\mu_{\rm \alpha} \sim -10.13$ mas/yr, $\mu_{\delta} \sim 16.89$ mas/yr) was also estimated, using 3 epochs of EVN observations. Based on our results, the X-ray efficiency of PSR B1257+12 should be in the same range as other millisecond pulsars, and not as low as previously thought.Comment: Proceedings of IAUS 291 "Neutron Stars and Pulsars: Challenges and Opportunities after 80 years", J. van Leeuwen (ed.); 3 page

A new function of hydrocarbons in insect communication : maternal care and offspring signalling in the European earwig

International audienc

Strange alliance or a match that was meant to be? Interrelations between public art and the museum

Cher Krause Knight   Harriet F. Senie (eds.), Museums and Public Art?. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2018, hardback £40, pp. xxiv+304 J Pedro Lorente, Public Art and Museums in Cultural Districts, Abingdon, New York: Routledge, 2019, hardback £115, pp.ix+22

Sobre el Premi Nobel d'Economia 2005, concedit a Robert J. Aumann i Thomas C. Schelling

La concessió del Premi Nobel d'Economia 2005 a Robert J. Aumann i Thomas C. Schelling confirma la influència de la teoria de jocs i l'interès social que desperta. L'any 1994, John C. Harsanyi, John F. Nash Jr. i Reinhard Selten compartiren el Premi «per la seva anàlisi pionera de l'equilibri en la teoria de jocs no cooperatius». Aumann i Schelling, guardonats «per haver ampliat la nostra comprensió del conflicte i la cooperació mitjançant l'anàlisi de la teoria de jocs», són dos teòrics que han estudiat les motivacions i conseqüències del paradigma de la racionalitat en l'acció humana. Aquest treball és una breu revisió dels fonaments teòrics de l'estratègia del conflicte i de l'equilibri de la por, elements que han estat presents en situacions com ara la guerra freda i que són a la base de decisions d'alta política mundial. S'analitzen aquestes i altres aportacions dels dos guardonats, les variants del dilema del presoner i la seva aplicació en estratègies tant de política defensiva-ofensiva com d'inversió econòmica , i els raonaments en la presa de decisions d'abast particular.The Nobel Prize for Economics 2005 for Robert J. Aumann and Thomas C. Schelling comes in recognition of the influence of the theory of games and the social interest it arouses. In 1994, John C. Harsanyi, John F. Nash Jr. and Reinhard Selten shared the award for their pioneering analysis of the equilibria in the theory of non-cooperative games. Aumann and Schelling, who received the award for having enhanced our understanding of conflict and cooperation through game theory analysis, are two theoreticians who have studied the motivations and consequences of the paradigm of rationality in human action. This work is a brief review of the theoretical foundations of the conflict and the balance of fear, elements that have been present in situations such as the ColdWar and lie at the heart of decisions in high-level world politics. These, and other contributions by both award-winners are analyzed, as well as the variants of the prisoners dilemma and their application to strategies including defensive- offensive politics, economic investment and reasoning in private decision-making

Sobre el Premi Nobel d'Economia 2005, concedit a Robert J. Aumann i Thomas C. Schelling

La concessió del Premi Nobel d'Economia 2005 a Robert J. Aumann i Thomas C. Schelling confirma la influència de la teoria de jocs i l'interès social que desperta. L'any 1994, John C. Harsanyi, John F. Nash Jr. i Reinhard Selten compartiren el Premi «per la seva anàlisi pionera de l'equilibri en la teoria de jocs no cooperatius». Aumann i Schelling, guardonats «per haver ampliat la nostra comprensió del conflicte i la cooperació mitjançant l'anàlisi de la teoria de jocs», són dos teòrics que han estudiat les motivacions i conseqüències del paradigma de la racionalitat en l'acció humana. Aquest treball és una breu revisió dels fonaments teòrics de l'estratègia del conflicte i de l'equilibri de la por, elements que han estat presents en situacions com ara la guerra freda i que són a la base de decisions d'alta política mundial. S'analitzen aquestes i altres aportacions dels dos guardonats, les variants del dilema del presoner i la seva aplicació en estratègies tant de política defensiva-ofensiva com d'inversió econòmica , i els raonaments en la presa de decisions d'abast particular.The Nobel Prize for Economics 2005 for Robert J. Aumann and Thomas C. Schelling comes in recognition of the influence of the theory of games and the social interest it arouses. In 1994, John C. Harsanyi, John F. Nash Jr. and Reinhard Selten shared the award for “their pioneering analysis of the equilibria in the theory of non-cooperative games”. Aumann and Schelling, who received the award “for having enhanced our understanding of conflict and cooperation through game theory analysis”, are two theoreticians who have studied the motivations and consequences of the paradigm of rationality in human action. This work is a brief review of the theoretical foundations of the conflict and the balance of fear, elements that have been present in situations such as the ColdWar and lie at the heart of decisions in high-level world politics. These, and other contributions by both award-winners are analyzed, as well as the variants of the prisoner’s dilemma and their application to strategies including defensive- offensive politics, economic investment and reasoning in private decision-making

SiO masers from AGB stars in the vibrationally excited v=1,v=2, and v=3 states

The v=1 and v=2 J=1-0 (43 GHz), and v=1 J=2-1 (86 GHz) SiO masers are intense in AGB stars and have been mapped using VLBI showing ring-like distributions. Those of the v=1, v=2 J=1-0 masers are similar, but the spots are rarely coincident, while the v=1 J=2-1 maser arises from a well separated region farther out. These relative locations can be explained by models tools that include the overlap of two IR lines of SiO and H2O. The v=3 J=1-0 line is not directly affected by any line overlap and its spot structure and position, relative to the other lines, is a good test to the standard pumping models. We present single-dish and simultaneous VLBI observations of the v=1, v=2, and v=3 J=1-0 maser transitions of 28SiO in several AGB stars. The spatial distribution of the SiO maser emission in the v=3 J=1-0 transition from AGB stars is systematically composed of a series of spots that occupy a ring-like structure. The overall ring structure is extremely similar to that found in the other 43 GHz transitions and is very different from the structure of the v=1 J=2-1 maser. The positions of the individual spots of the different 43 GHz lines are, however, very rarely coincident, which in general is separated by about 0.3 AU (between 1 and 5 mas). These results are very difficult to reconcile with standard pumping models, which predict that the masers of rotational transitions within a given vibrational state require very similar excitation conditions, while the transitions of different vibrational states should appear in different positions. However, models including line overlap tend to predict v=1, v=2, v=3 J=1-0 population inversion to occur under very similar conditions, while the requirements for v=1 J=2-1 appear clearly different, and are compatible with the observational results.Comment: 9 pages, 4 figures accepted by A&

A commentary on standardization in the Semantic Web, Common Logic and MultiAgent Systems

Given the ubiquity of the Web, the Semantic Web (SW) offers MultiAgent Systems (MAS) a most wide-ranging platform by which they could intercommunicate. It can be argued however that MAS require levels of logic that the current Semantic Web has yet to provide. As ISO Common Logic (CL) ISO/IEC IS 24707:2007 provides a firstorder logic capability for MAS in an interoperable way, it seems natural to investigate how CL may itself integrate with the SW thus providing a more expressive means by which MAS can interoperate effectively across the SW. A commentary is accordingly presented on how this may be achieved. Whilst it notes that certain limitations remain to be addressed, the commentary proposes that standardising the SW with CL provides the vehicle by which MAS can achieve their potential.</p