Marshall University Music Department Presents Monty Cole, clarinet, Jean Roberts, piano

https://mds.marshall.edu/music_perf/1204/thumbnail.jp

Dystonia Associated with Idiopathic Slow Orthostatic Tremor

Background: We aimed to characterize the clinical and electrophysiological features of patients with slow orthostatic tremor. Case Report: The clinical and neurophysiological data of patients referred for lower limb tremor on standing were reviewed. Patients with symptomatic or primary orthostatic tremor were excluded. Eight patients were identified with idiopathic slow 4–8 Hz orthostatic tremor, which was associated with tremor and dystonia in cervical and upper limb musculature. Coherence analysis in two patients showed findings different to those seen in primary orthostatic tremor. Discussion: Slow orthostatic tremor may be associated with dystonia and dystonic tremor

Blame the victims? Refugees, state capacity, and non-state actor violence

Existing research argues that refugee inflows may increase the risk of domestic conflict, particularly civil war that, by definition, involves the state as an actor. However, many of the postulated mechanisms linking refugees to a higher risk of such conflict pertain to tensions with locals, which do not necessarily involve any grievances against government authorities. We contend that it is more likely to identify an association between refugees and non-state actor violence, i.e., armed violence between organized non-state groups, neither of which pertains to the state. We also claim that the extent to which refugees are associated with a higher likelihood of non-state conflict depends on the capacity of governments to manage and mitigate risks. We report evidence that refugee populations can be linked to an increased risk of non-state conflict, as well as for a mitigating effect of state capacity on the risk of non-state conflicts in the presence of refugees. We do not find a clear effect of refugee populations on civil war, suggesting that the link depends on existing conflict cleavages relevant to mobilizing refugees or locals. Our research helps to shed light on the relevant security consequences of managing refugee populations. Despite the common arguments portraying refugees as security risks in developed countries, the risk of non-state conflict applies primarily to weak states that have been forced to shoulder a disproportionate burden in hosting refugees

Increased Intraepidermal Nerve Fiber Degeneration and Impaired Regeneration Relate to Symptoms and Deficits in Parkinson's Disease

Background: Previous studies have shown cutaneous small fiber pathology in patients with Parkinson's disease (PD). These studies have focused on nerve degeneration, but recent reports suggest that nerve regeneration may also be important in PD pathology.Objective: To establish the extent of intraepidermal nerve fiber (IENF) degeneration and regeneration and its relationship to clinical and neurological deficits in Parkinson's disease (PD).Methods: Twenty-three PD patients and 10 age-matched controls underwent skin biopsy and assessment of somatic and autonomic symptoms and deficits. We have assessed Intraepidermal Nerve Fiber Density (IENFD) using standard PGP9.5 staining and GAP-43 to assess Mean Axonal Length (MAL) and Intraepidermal Total Nerve Fiber Length (IETNFL).Results: IENFD (p < 0.0001), MAL (p < 0.0001), IETNFL/Area (p = 0.009), and IETNFL/Length (p = 0.04) were significantly reduced in patients with PD compared to controls. IENFD correlated significantly with disease duration (p = 0.03), cumulative levodopa dose (p = 0.02), Unified Parkinson's Disease Rating Scale, Part III (UPDRS-III) (p = 0.01), Schwab and England Activities of Daily Living (ADL) (p = 0.03), NSP (p = 0.03), and 30:15 ratio (p = 0.03). IETNFL/Area correlated with the Autonomic Scale for Outcomes in Parkinson's Disease (SCOPA-AUT) (p = 0.03) and Diabetic Neuropathy Symptom score (DNS) (p = 0.04) and IETNFL/Length correlated with DNS (p = 0.03). MAL correlated with SCOPA-AUT (p = 0.01), DNS (p = 0.02), and DB-HRV (p = 0.02).Conclusion: Increased IENF degeneration and impaired regeneration correlates with somatic and autonomic symptoms and deficits in patients with PD

Competing risks and deposit insurance governance convergence

Why do policies often seem to converge across countries at the same time? This question has been studied extensively in the diffusion literature. However, past research has not examined complex choice environments, especially where there are many alternatives. This article fills this gap in the literature. I show how Fine and Gray's Competing Risks Event History Analysis can be used to tease apart the causes of policy convergence. I apply the method to an examination of the reasons why, from the mid-1990s to 2007, many countries created independent deposit insurers. I find an interaction between international recommendations and regional peers' choices, particularly in the European Union. However, convergence appears to slow under the particular conditions of a banking crisis, regardless of how well independence is promoted. Possibly due to electoral incentives, democracies seem to have been more likely to create independent insurers. Ultimately, I demonstrate how competing risks analysis can help enable future research on policy choices, complementing methods previously applied in political economy. © The Author(s) 2013

Framing the Narrative: Female Fighters, External Audience Attitudes, and Transnational Support for Armed Rebellions

Female combatants play a central role in rebel efforts to cultivate and disseminate positive narratives regarding the movement and its political goals. Yet, the effectiveness of such strategies in shaping audience attitudes or generating tangible benefits for the group remains unclear. We propose and test a theory regarding the channels through which female fighters advance rebel goals. We argue that female fighters positively influence audience attitudes toward rebel groups by strengthening observers’ beliefs about their legitimacy and their decision to use armed tactics. We further contend that these effects directly help them secure support from transnational non-state actors and indirectly promote state support. We assess our arguments by combining a novel survey experiment in two countries with analyses of new cross-national data on female combatants and information about transnational support for rebels. The empirical results support our arguments and demonstrate the impact of gender framing on rebel efforts to secure support

You Can?t Win If You Don?t Fight: The Role of Regime Type in Counterinsurgency Outbreaks and Outcomes

What effect, if any, does democracy have on outcomes of counterinsurgency wars? Previous studies have provided inconclusive answers mainly because of the challenges involved in testing the question empirically: First, insurgencies are not accidental and the anticipated outcomes also affect whether they break out in the first place. Second, regimes are non-random and their determinants can also affect insurgency incidence and its outcomes. Moreover, different aspects of democracy can have opposite effects on the government's chances of winning. I address these challenges by conducting a critical test to distinguish between different causal mechanisms. I find that domestic institutions that are associated with public goods provision make insurgency onsets less likely. I also show that once we control for this selection effect, domestic political institutions do not influence insurgency outcomes

SDM:A New Data Set on Self-determination Movements with an Application to the Reputational Theory of Conflict

This dataset, of self-determination movements (SDMs) with universal coverage for the period from 1945 to 2012, corrects the selection bias that characterizes previous efforts to code SDMs and significantly expands coverage relative to the extant literature. For a random sample of cases, we add information on state–movement interactions and several attributes of SDM groups. The data can be used to study the causes of SDMs, the escalation of self-determination (SD) conflicts over time, and several other theoretical arguments concerning separatist conflict that have previously been tested with incomplete or inferior data.The creators request that the associated paper is cited in place of this dataset

Pitfalls of Professionalism? Military Academies and Coup Risk

Military academies tend to be strongly linked to the professionalization of the armed forces. This explains why many countries in the world have created such institutions. The following article studies a potential negative externality stemming from military schools: increased coup risk. We argue that military academies may create, inculcate, and strengthen cohesive views that could conflict with incumbent policies, and that these schools establish networks among military officers that may facilitate coordination necessary for plotting a putsch. We also contend and empirically demonstrate that these negative side effects of military academies are in particular pronounced in nondemocracies, that is, military academies have diverse effects across regime types. This work has significant implications for our understanding civil–military relations. Furthermore, we contribute to the literature on military education and professionalization, as we suggest that military academies are important vehicles through which coups can emerge predominantly in authoritarian states

Elections and Ethnic Civil War

Existing research on how democratization may influence the risk of civil war tends to consider only changes in the overall level of democracy and rarely examines explicitly the postulated mechanisms relating democratization to incentives for violence. The authors argue that typically highlighted key mechanisms imply that elections should be especially likely to affect ethnic groups’ inclination to resort to violence. Distinguishing between types of conflict and the order of competitive elections, the authors find that ethnic civil wars are more likely to erupt after competitive elections, especially after first and second elections following periods of no polling. When disaggregating to the level of individual ethnic groups and conflicts over territory or government, the authors find some support for the notion that ethno-nationalist mobilization and sore-loser effects provoke postelectoral violence. More specifically, although large groups in general are more likely to engage in governmental conflicts, they are especially likely to do so after noncompetitive elections. Competitive elections, however, strongly reduce the risk of conflict. </jats:p