390 research outputs found
On the Equivalence between Welfarism and Equality of Opportunity
A welfarist way of allocating resources consists in 1) equipping individuals with comparable indices of their well-being and 2) applying a unique aggregation rule to individual well-being levels. An equality of opportunity way of allocating resources consists in 1) making the distinction between personal characteristics which are under and beyond individualsâ control, and 2) decreasing inequalities due to differences in characteristics beyond individualsâ control. We show that under the proviso that indifferent individuals should not influence social judgements, welfarist and equal opportunity judgements on resource allocation are equivalent.Welfare, Opportunity, Equality
Social Orderings for the Assignment of Indivisible Objects
In the assignment problem of indivisible objects with money, we study social ordering functions which satisfy the requirement that social orderings should be independent of changes in preferences over infeasible bundles. We combine this axiom with efficiency, consistency and equity axioms. Our result is that the only social ordering function satisfying those axioms is the leximin function in money utility.Indivisible Good, Social Ordering Function, Leximin
Analyzing the Impact of Incentive Programs on Retention of Family Practice Providers in Rural Nebraska
Rural populations in Nebraska are generally older, less affluent and suffer from more chronic diseases than their urban counterparts. To address these disparities, the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services Office of Rural Health oversees incentive programs that compensate providers for costs associated with education in exchange for time worked in shortage areas. This report examines the impact that these incentive programs have on the retention of family medicine providers in Nebraska using survival analysis methodologies. The findings of this report indicate a positive correlation between participation in incentive programs and workforce retention of family medicine providers.
Advisor: Yunwoo Na
On a Three-Alternative Condorcet Jury Theorem
We investigate whether the simple plurality rule aggregates information efficiently in a large election with three alternatives. The environment is the same as in the Condorcet Jury Theorem (Condorcet (1785)). Voters have common preferences that depend on the unknown state of nature, and they receive imprecise private signals about the state of nature prior to voting. With two alternatives and strategic voters, the simple plurality rule aggregates information efficiently in elections with two alternatives (e.g., Myerson (1998)). We show that there always exists an efficient equilibrium under the simple plurality rule when there are three alternatives as well. We characterize the set of inefficient equilibria with two alterna- tives and the condition under which they exist. There is only one type of inefficient equilibrium with two alternatives. In this equilibrium, voters vote unresponsively because they all vote for the same alternative. Under the same condition, the same type of equilibrium exists with three alternatives. However, we show that the number and types of coordination failures increase with three alternatives, and that this leads to the existence of other types of inefficient equilibria as well, including those in which voters vote informatively.efficient information aggregation, simple plurality rule, Poisson games, Condorcet Jury Theorem
Fair Production and Allocation of an Excludable Nonrival Good
We study fairness in economies with one private good and one partially excludable nonrival good. A social ordering function determines for each profile of preferences an ordering of all conceivable allocations. We propose the following Free Lunch Aversion condition: if the private good contributions of two agents consuming the same quantity of the nonrival good have opposite signs, reducing that gap improves social welfare. This condition, combined with the more standard requirements of Unanimous Indifference and Responsiveness, delivers a form of welfare egalitarianism in which an agent's welfare at an allocation is measured by the quantity of the nonrival good that, consumed at no cost, would leave her indifferent to the bundle she is assigned.
Compensation and responsibility
This a chapter for the Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare. It deals with the theory of fairness applied to situations when individuals are partly responsible for their characteristics.fairness, responsibility, equal opportunity, compensation, handicap, talent, effort
Welfare Egalitarianism in Non-Rival Environments
We study equity in economies where a set of agents commonly own a technology producing a non-rival good from their private contributions. A social ordering function associates to each economy a complete ranking of the allocations. We build social ordering functions satisfying the property that individual welfare levels exceeding a legitimate upper bound should be reduced. Combining that property with efficiency and robustness properties with respect to changes in the set of agents, we obtain a kind of welfare egalitarianism based on a constructed numerical representation of individual preferences.
On the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules
efficient information aggregation, scoring rules, Poisson games, approval voting
Endogenous Affirmative Action: Gender Bias Leads to Gender Quotas
The adoption of gender quotas in electoral lists, like the recent âparity lawâ in France, can be fully rationalized on the basis of the self interest of male incumbent politicians. This paper explains why the parity law was approved in its form and, at the same time, why it has not been very effective. The existence of a votersâ bias in favor of male candidates is sufficient to convince the incumbents to advocate for equal gender representation in party lists, because it raises the incumbentsâ chances of being reelected. The existence of male bias in the French electorate is empirically confirmed in this paper. We also show that parity law may have assembly composition effects and policy effects that vary with the electoral system.
Malemort-sur-CorrĂšze â Rue de la LibĂ©ration
Dans le cadre du projet de construction de deux bĂątiments commerciaux au 23 de lâavenue de la LibĂ©ration Ă la sortie est du bourg de Malemort, un diagnostic archĂ©ologique a Ă©tĂ© prescrit. Cet amĂ©nagement intervient au nord de la riviĂšre CorrĂšze, Ă 160 m du cours dâeau et en bordure immĂ©diate de la plaine alluviale. Du matĂ©riel archĂ©ologique protohistorique avait Ă©tĂ© identifiĂ© Ă faible distance, ainsi quâune nĂ©cropole antique et des vestiges de la pĂ©riode mĂ©diĂ©vale. Du 1er au 3 avril 2015, sept..
- âŠ