16 research outputs found

    Social dilemmas among unequals

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    This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Nature Research via the DOI in this record.Direct reciprocity is a powerful mechanism for evolution of cooperation, based on repeated interactions. It requires that interacting individuals are sufficiently equal, such that everyone faces similar consequences when they cooperate or defect. Yet inequality is ubiquitous among humansand is generally considered to undermine cooperation and welfar. Most previous models of reciprocity neglect inequality. They assume that individuals are the same in all relevant aspects. Here we introduce a general framework to study direct reciprocity among unequals. Our model allows for multiple sources of inequality. Subjects can differ in their endowments, their productivities, and in how much they benefit from public goods. We find that extreme inequality prevents cooperation. But if subjects differ in productivity, some endowment inequality can be necessary for cooperation to prevail. Our mathematical predictions are supported by a behavioral experiment where we vary the subjects’ endowments and their productivities. We observe that overall welfare is maximized when the two sources of heterogeneity are aligned, such that more productive individuals receive higher endowments. In contrast, when endowments and productivities are misaligned, cooperation quickly breaks down. Our findings have implications for policy-makers concerned with equity, efficiency, and public goods provisioning.European Research Council Start GrantGraph GamesAustrian Science Fund (FWF)Office of Naval ResearchJohn Templeton FoundationISTFELLOW program

    The Good, the Bad, and the Rare: Memory for Partners in Social Interactions

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    For cooperation to evolve via direct reciprocity, individuals must track their partners' behavior to avoid exploitation. With increasing size of the interaction group, however, memory becomes error prone. To decrease memory effort, people could categorize partners into types, distinguishing cooperators and cheaters. We explored two ways in which people might preferentially track one partner type: remember cheaters or remember the rare type in the population. We assigned participants to one of three interaction groups which differed in the proportion of computer partners' types (defectors rare, equal proportion, or cooperators rare). We extended research on both hypotheses in two ways. First, participants experienced their partners repeatedly by interacting in Prisoner's Dilemma games. Second, we tested categorization of partners as cooperators or defectors in memory tests after a short and long retention interval (10 min and 1 week). Participants remembered rare partner types better than they remembered common ones at both retention intervals. We propose that the flexibility of responding to the environment suggests an ecologically rational memory strategy in social interactions

    Emergence of unusual coexistence states in cyclic game systems

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    Evolutionary games of cyclic competitions have been extensively studied to gain insights into one of the most fundamental phenomena in nature: biodiversity that seems to be excluded by the principle of natural selection. The Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS) game of three species and its extensions [e.g., the Rock-Paper-Scissors-Lizard-Spock (RPSLS) game] are paradigmatic models in this field. In all previous studies, the intrinsic symmetry associated with cyclic competitions imposes a limitation on the resulting coexistence states, leading to only selective types of such states. We investigate the effect of nonuniform intraspecific competitions on coexistence and find that a wider spectrum of coexistence states can emerge and persist. This surprising finding is substantiated using three classes of cyclic game models through stability analysis, Monte Carlo simulations and continuous spatiotemporal dynamical evolution from partial differential equations. Our finding indicates that intraspecific competitions or alternative symmetry-breaking mechanisms can promote biodiversity to a broader extent than previously thought
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