A Recombination-Based Tabu Search Algorithm for the Winner Determination Problem

Abstract. We propose a dedicated tabu search algorithm (TSX_WDP) for the winner determination problem (WDP) in combinatorial auctions. TSX_WDP integrates two complementary neighborhoods designed re-spectively for intensification and diversification. To escape deep local optima, TSX_WDP employs a backbone-based recombination opera-tor to generate new starting points for tabu search and to displace the search into unexplored promising regions. The recombination operator operates on elite solutions previously found which are recorded in an global archive. The performance of our algorithm is assessed on a set of 500 well-known WDP benchmark instances. Comparisons with five state of the art algorithms demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach

Facilitated sequence assembly using densely labeled optical DNA barcodes:A combinatorial auction approach

<div><p>The output from whole genome sequencing is a set of contigs, i.e. short non-overlapping DNA sequences (sizes 1-100 kilobasepairs). Piecing the contigs together is an especially difficult task for previously unsequenced DNA, and may not be feasible due to factors such as the lack of sufficient coverage or larger repetitive regions which generate gaps in the final sequence. Here we propose a new method for scaffolding such contigs. The proposed method uses densely labeled optical DNA barcodes from competitive binding experiments as scaffolds. On these scaffolds we position theoretical barcodes which are calculated from the contig sequences. This allows us to construct longer DNA sequences from the contig sequences. This proof-of-principle study extends previous studies which use sparsely labeled DNA barcodes for scaffolding purposes. Our method applies a probabilistic approach that allows us to discard “foreign” contigs from mixed samples with contigs from different types of DNA. We satisfy the contig non-overlap constraint by formulating the contig placement challenge as a combinatorial auction problem. Our exact algorithm for solving this problem reduces computational costs compared to previous methods in the combinatorial auction field. We demonstrate the usefulness of the proposed scaffolding method both for synthetic contigs and for contigs obtained using Illumina sequencing for a mixed sample with plasmid and chromosomal DNA.</p></div

The Duo-Item Bisection Auction

This paper proposes an iterative sealed-bid auction for selling multiple heterogeneous items to bidders interested in buying at most one item. It generalizes the single item bisection auction (Grigorieva et al. Econ Theory, 30:107–118, 2007) to the environment with multiple heterogeneous items. We focus on the case with two items for sale. We show that the auction elicits a minimal amount of information on preferences required to find the Vickrey–Clark–Groves outcome (Clarke, Public Choice, XI:17–33, 1971; Groves, Econometrica, 61:617–631, 1973; Vickrey, J Finance, 16:8–37, 1961), when there are two items for sale and an arbitrary number of bidders