Contingent judicial deference: theory and application to usury laws

Legislation is less likely to be enforced when courts disagree with it. Building on this premise, we propose a model of Bayesian adjudicators that use their own prior knowledge to evaluate the appropriateness of legislation. The model yields a non-monotonic relation between written rules and effectively enforced rules. Hence the enactment of legislation prohibiting something raises the probability that courts will allow related things not expressly forbidden. Moreover, legal uncertainty is greater with legislation that commands little deference from courts than with legislation that commands none. We discuss examples of effects of legislated prohibitions (and, in particular, usury laws) that are consistent with the model

Valine 738 and lysine 735 in the fifth transmembrane domain of rTas1r3 mediate insensitivity towards lactisole of the rat sweet taste receptor

BACKGROUND: The sweet taste inhibitor lactisole acts on the human sweet taste receptor heteromer TAS1R2-TAS1R3 but not on its rodent counterpart. Recently, it was shown that the lactisole sensitivity of the human sweet taste receptor involves the part of TAS1R3 encompassing the seven transmembrane regions but not the huge N-terminal domain. Using mutational analysis we investigated which amino acid residues distinguish lactisole insensitive rat from sensitive human T1R3 receptors. RESULTS: The functional analysis of specific receptor mutants in HEK293T cells revealed that the exchange of valine 738 in the fifth transmembrane domain of rTas1r3 by an alanine is sufficient to confer lactisole sensitivity to the rat sweet taste receptor. The sensitivity of this receptor mutant is ~2 fold lower than the sensitivity of the human sweet taste receptor. Additional substitution of lysine 735 by phenylalanine in rTas1r3 results in a rat sweet taste receptor that is as sensitive to lactisole as its human counterpart. The exchange of valine 738 to alanine was accompanied by a ~50% reduction in receptor efficacy. This effect was seen with all six different sweet compounds examined. CONCLUSION: The lactisole insensitivity of rat sweet taste receptor is caused by only two amino acids in transmembrane region five, which is critical for the interaction of lactisole with the sweet taste receptor. The observation that the mutant receptor simultaneously displays a generally reduced sensitivity towards all agonists suggests that the lactisole insensitivity of the rodent receptor might be more likely caused by the inaccessibility of the lactisole binding site rather then by its direct disruption

Proton transport chains in glucose metabolism: mind the proton

The Embden–Meyerhof–Parnas (EMP) pathway comprises eleven cytosolic enzymes interacting to metabolize glucose to lactic acid [CH3CH(OH)COOH]. Glycolysis is largely considered as the conversion of glucose to pyruvate (CH3COCOO-). We consider glycolysis to be a cellular process and as such, transporters mediating glucose uptake and lactic acid release and enable the flow of metabolites through the cell, must be considered as part of the EMP pathway. In this review, we consider the flow of metabolites to be coupled to a flow of energy that is irreversible and sufficient to form ordered structures. This latter principle is highlighted by discussing that lactate dehydrogenase (LDH) complexes irreversibly reduce pyruvate/H+ to lactate [CH3CH(OH)COO-], or irreversibly catalyze the opposite reaction, oxidation of lactate to pyruvate/H+. However, both LDH complexes are considered to be driven by postulated proton transport chains. Metabolism of glucose to two lactic acids is introduced as a unidirectional, continuously flowing pathway. In an organism, cell membrane-located proton-linked monocarboxylate transporters catalyze the final step of glycolysis, the release of lactic acid. Consequently, both pyruvate and lactate are discussed as intermediate products of glycolysis and substrates of regulated crosscuts of the glycolytic flow

The economics of arbitration: rational choice and value creation

Este texto analisa a arbitragem e suas relações com a jurisdição a partir do conceito de custo de transação. Seu objetivo é mostrar como a arbitragem é capaz de reduzir os custos de transação de um determinado ambiente normativo e contribuir para aperfeiçoar as instituições. Os custos relacionados ao uso da arbitragem e da jurisdição funcionam como um preço: quanto maior o custo, menor a procura por eles (e viceversa). Potencialmente, a arbitragem pode permitir a redução dos custos de transação em razão (a) da relativa agilidade com que é concluída, (b) da relativa imparcialidade do árbitro e (c) da especialização dos árbitros. Além disso, a utilização da arbitragem pode criar melhores incentivos para o adimplemento das obrigações contratuais. Isso porque a inclusão da cláusula arbitral em um contrato dá às partes a possibilidade de regular o ambiente normativo a que se submeterão em caso de disputas. A falta de clareza sobre a legalidade dos procedimentos arbitrais aumenta os custos de transação impostos pelo ambiente normativo. Quanto maior o grau de incerteza, tanto maiores serão os incentivos para que os indivíduos alterem seus padrões negociais ou simplesmente reduzam sua participação em atividades econômicas, reduzindo-se, conseqüentemente, o potencial de geração de riqueza para a sociedade.This article examines the institute of arbitration and its relationship with court activities from the perspective of transactions costs. Its objective is to show how arbitration can reduce the transactions costs in a certain normative environment and contribute to institutional improvement. The costs related to the use arbitration and court proceedings work like a price mechanism: the bigger the cost, the lower the demand (and vice-versa). The institute of arbitration can potentially engender a reduction of transactions costs because of (a) the relative quickness with which it is carried out, (b) the relative neutrality of arbiters, and (c) the specialization of arbiters. Moreover, the use of arbitration can create better incentives for the fulfillment of contractual promises. This is so because the use of an arbitration clause in a contract allows the parties to regulate the normative environment to which they will be bound in case of a dispute. The lack of clarity about the lawfulness of arbitration proceedings increases the transactions costs imposed by the normative framework. Higher levels of uncertainty create incentives for the individuals to change their negotiating patterns or simply to reduce their participation in economic activities, thereby reducing the potential for generating wealth for society

Layered effects on soil displacement around a penetrometer

The interpretation of cone penetration test (CPT) data is important for the in-situ characterisation of soils. Interpretation of CPT data remains a predominately empirical process due to the lack of a rigorous model that can relate soil properties to penetrometer readings. Interpretation is especially difficult in layered soils, where penetrometer response can be affected by several horizons of soil with different properties. This paper aims to provide some insight into the mechanisms of soil displacement that occur as a penetrometer is pushed into layered soils. Data is presented from centrifuge modelling of probe penetration in layered soils in an axisymmetric container where soil deformation patterns around the probe can be measured. Results obtained from uniform soil tests are also presented to illustrate the effects of soil density and stress level (i.e. centrifuge acceleration). A large influence zone is found to relate to the higher penetration resistance obtained in a denser soil. Differing soil displacement patterns at low and high stresses are related to the tendency of the soil to dilate, with the well-known consequence of a non-linear increase of penetration resistance with stress level. Layered soil tests show a clear difference of soil deformation patterns compared to uniform tests, especially for vertical displacements. The peak value of vertical displacement of the soil occurs at dense-over-loose interfaces, while a local minimum occurs at loose-over-dense interfaces. Parameters are proposed to quantitatively evaluate the layered effects on soil deformations and a deformation mechanism is described for penetration in layered soils based on the transition of displacement profiles