Direct magnetic resonance arthrography of the knee: utility of axial traction

The purpose of this study was to determine the impact of axial traction during acquisition of direct magnetic resonance (MR) arthrography examination of the knee in terms of joint space width and amount of contrast material between the cartilage surfaces. Direct knee MR arthrography was performed in 11 patients on a 3-T MR imaging unit using a T1-weighted isotropic gradient echo sequence in a coronal plane with and without axial traction of 15kg. Joint space widths were measured at the level of the medial and the lateral femorotibial joint with and without traction. The amount of contrast material in the medial and lateral femorotibial joint was assessed independently by two musculoskeletal radiologists in a semiquantitative manner using three grades (‘absence of surface visualization, ‘partial surface visualization or ‘complete surface visualization'). With traction, joint space width increased significantly at the lateral femorotibial compartment (mean = 0.55mm, p = 0.0105) and at the medial femorotibial compartment (mean = 0.4mm, p = 0.0124). There was a trend towards an increased amount of contrast material in the femorotibial compartment with axial traction. Direct MR arthrography of the knee with axial traction showed a slight and significant increase of the width of the femorotibial compartment with a trend towards more contrast material between the articular cartilage surface

Plasticity facilitates sustainable growth in the commons

In the commons, communities whose growth depends on public goods, individuals often rely on surprisingly simple strategies, or heuristics, to decide whether to contribute to the common good (at risk of exploitation by free-riders). Although this appears a limitation, here we show how four heuristics lead to sustainable growth by exploiting specific environmental constraints. The two simplest ones --contribute permanently or switch stochastically between contributing or not-- are first shown to bring sustainability when the public good efficiently promotes growth. If efficiency declines and the commons is structured in small groups, the most effective strategy resides in contributing only when a majority of individuals are also contributors. In contrast, when group size becomes large, the most effective behavior follows a minimal-effort rule: contribute only when it is strictly necessary. Both plastic strategies are observed in natural systems what presents them as fundamental social motifs to successfully manage sustainability

Effects of inhomogeneous activity of players and noise on cooperation in spatial public goods games

We study the public goods game in the noisy case by considering the players with inhomogeneous activity teaching on a square lattice. It is shown that the introduction of the inhomogeneous activity of teaching of the players can remarkably promote cooperation. By investigating the effects of noise on cooperative behavior in detail, we find that the variation of cooperator density $\rho_C$ with the noise parameter $\kappa$ displays several different behaviors: $\rho_C$ monotonically increases (decreases) with $\kappa$; $\rho_C$ firstly increases (decreases) with $\kappa$ and then it decreases (increases) monotonically after reaching its maximum (minimum) value, which depends on the amount of the multiplication factor $r$, on whether the system is homogeneous or inhomogeneous, and on whether the adopted updating is synchronous or asynchronous. These results imply that the noise plays an important and nontrivial role in the evolution of cooperation.Comment: 4 pages, 4 figure

Promote cooperation by localised small-world communication

The emergence and maintenance of cooperation within sizable groups of unrelated humans offer many challenges for our understanding. We propose that the humans' capacity of communication, such as how many and how far away the fellows can build up mutual communications, may affect the evolution of cooperation. We study this issue by means of the public goods game (PGG) with a two-layered network of contacts. Players obtain payoffs from five-person public goods interactions on a square lattice (the interaction layer). Also, they update strategies after communicating with neighbours in learning layer, where two players build up mutual communication with a power law probability depending on their spatial distance. Our simulation results indicate that the evolution of cooperation is indeed sensitive to how players choose others to communicate with, including the amount as well as the locations. The tendency of localised communication is proved to be a new mechanism to promote cooperation.Comment: 6 pages, 4 figure

Community projects: an experimental analysis of a fair implementation process

We define and experimentally test a public provision mechanism that meets three basic ethical requirements and allows community members to influence, via monetary bids, which of several projects is implemented. For each project, participants are assigned personal values, which can be positive or negative. We provide either public or private information about personal values. This produces two distinct public provision games, which are experimentally implemented and analyzed for various projects. In spite of the complex experimental task, participants do not rely on bidding their own personal values as an obvious simple heuristic whose general acceptance would result in fair and efficient outcomes. Rather, they rely on strategic underbidding. Although underbidding is affected by projects’ characteristics, the provision mechanism mostly leads to the implementation of the most efficient project

Evolutionary dynamics for persistent cooperation in structured populations

The emergence and maintenance of cooperative behavior is a fascinating topic in evolutionary biology and social science. The public goods game (PGG) is a paradigm for exploring cooperative behavior. In PGG, the total resulting payoff is divided equally among all participants. This feature still leads to the dominance of defection without substantially magnifying the public good by a multiplying factor. Much effort has been made to explain the evolution of cooperative strategies, including a recent model in which only a portion of the total benefit is shared by all the players through introducing a new strategy named persistent cooperation. A persistent cooperator is a contributor who is willing to pay a second cost to retrieve the remaining portion of the payoff contributed by themselves. In a previous study, this model was analyzed in the framework of well-mixed populations. This paper focuses on discussing the persistent cooperation in lattice-structured populations. The evolutionary dynamics of the structured populations consisting of three types of competing players (pure cooperators, defectors, and persistent cooperators) are revealed by theoretical analysis and numerical simulations. In particular, the approximate expressions of fixation probabilities for strategies are derived on one-dimensional lattices. The phase diagrams of stationary states, and the evolution of frequencies and spatial patterns for strategies are illustrated on both one-dimensional and square lattices by simulations. Our results are consistent with the general observation that, at least in most situations, a structured population facilitates the evolution of cooperation. Specifically, here we find that the existence of persistent cooperators greatly suppresses the spreading of defectors under more relaxed conditions in structured populations compared to that obtained in well-mixed populations