US power plant sites at risk of future sea-level rise

Unmitigated greenhouse gas emissions may increase global mean sea-level by about 1 meter during this century. Such elevation of the mean sea-level enhances the risk of flooding of coastal areas. We compute the power capacity that is currently out-of-reach of a 100-year coastal flooding but will be exposed to such a flood by the end of the century for different US states, if no adaptation measures are taken. The additional exposed capacity varies strongly among states. For Delaware it is 80% of the mean generated power load. For New York this number is 63% and for Florida 43%. The capacity that needs additional protection compared to today increases by more than 250% for Texas, 90% for Florida and 70% for New York. Current development in power plant building points towards a reduced future exposure to sea-level rise: proposed and planned power plants are less exposed than those which are currently operating. However, power plants that have been retired or canceled were less exposed than those operating at present. If sea-level rise is properly accounted for in future planning, an adaptation to sea-level rise may be costly but possible

Measuring the Effects of the Clean Air Act Amendments on Ambient PM\u3csub\u3e10\u3c/sub\u3e Concentrations: The Critical Importance of a Spatially Disaggregated Analysis

We examine the effects of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAAs) on ambient concentrations of PM10 in the United States between 1990 and 2005. We find that non-attainment designation has no effect on the \u27average monitor\u27 in non-attainment counties, after controlling for weather and socioeconomic characteristics at the county level. In sharp contrast, if we allow for heterogeneous treatment by type of monitor and county, we do find that the 1990 CAAAs produced substantial effects. Our best estimate suggests that PM10 concentrations at monitors with concentrations above the national annual standard dropped by between 7µg/m3 and 9µg/m3, which is roughly equivalent to a 11-14% drop. We also show that monitors which were in violation of the daily standard experience two fewer days in violation of the daily standard the following year. Empirical results suggest that this treatment effect is independent of whether the EPA has finalized the non-attainment designation

Climate, extreme heat, and electricity demand in California

Climate projections from three atmosphere-ocean climate models with a range of low to mid-high temperature sensitivity forced by the Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change SRES higher, middle, and lower emission scenarios indicate that, over the 21st century, extreme heat events for major cities in heavily air-conditioned California will increase rapidly. These increases in temperature extremes are projected to exceed the rate of increase in mean temperature, along with increased variance. Extreme heat is defined here as the 90 percent exceedance probability (T90) of the local warmest summer days under the current climate. The number of extreme heat days in Los Angeles, where T90 is currently 95 F (32 C), may increase from 12 days to as many as 96 days per year by 2100, implying current-day heat wave conditions may last for the entire summer, with earlier onset. Overall, projected increases in extreme heat under the higher A1fi emission scenario by 2070-2099 tend to be 20-30 percent higher than those projected under the lower B1 emission scenario, ranging from approximately double the historical number of days for inland California cities (e.g. Sacramento and Fresno), up to four times for previously temperate coastal cities (e.g. Los Angeles, San Diego). These findings, combined with observed relationships between high temperature and electricity demand for air-conditioned regions, suggest potential shortfalls in transmission and supply during T90 peak electricity demand periods. When the projected extreme heat and peak demand for electricity are mapped onto current availability, maintaining technology and population constant only for demand side calculations, we find the potential for electricity deficits as high as 17 percent. Similar increases in extreme heat days are suggested for other locations across the U.S. southwest, as well as for developing nations with rapidly increasing electricity demands. Electricity response to recent extreme heat events, such as the July 2006 heat wave in California, suggests that peak electricity demand will challenge current supply, as well as future planned supply capacities when population and income growth are taken into account

Less global inequality can improve climate outcomes

Two of the biggest global challenges we face today are mitigating climate change and economic inequality. Some research suggests these goals are in conflict, based largely on the observation that a dollar spent at higher income levels is less carbon intensive than at lower income levels. We put this concern to rest. We quantify this effect in its most extreme manifestation, both within countries and between countries. We use a wide range of income elasticities of emissions (0.7–1.0) and scenarios from the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSP) with the highest (SSP4) and lowest (SSP5) between-country inequality. Within countries, even with assumptions of low elasticities (0.7) and aggressive inequality reduction (Gini coefficient of 0.55 to 0.30), emissions would realistically increase by less than 8%, which would likely occur over several decades. Income convergence between countries may reduce the emissions intensity of global income growth, because the energy intensity reductions from income growth in emerging economies, such as India and China, offsets the energy increasing effect of higher growth in developing countries. Given these findings, it seems a distraction for future research to dwell on this narrow framing when there are deeper under-explored linkages and synergies between reducing income inequality and climate change, such as the effect of reducing inequality on social norms, consumption and on political mobilization around climate policy

Climatic risks and impacts in South Asia: extremes of water scarcity and excess

This paper reviews the current knowledge of climatic risks and impacts in South Asia associated with anthropogenic warming levels of 1.5°C to 4°C above pre-industrial values in the 21st century. It is based on the World Bank Report “Turn Down the Heat, Climate Extremes, Regional Impacts and the Case for Resilience” (2013). Many of the climate change impacts in the region, which appear quite severe even with relatively modest warming of 1.5–2°C, pose significant hazards to development. For example, increased monsoon variability and loss or glacial meltwater will likely confront populations with ongoing and multiple challenges. The result is a significant risk to stable and reliable water resources for the region, with increases in peak flows potentially causing floods and dry season flow reductions threatening agriculture. Irrespective of the anticipated economic development and growth, climate projections indicate that large parts of South Asia’s growing population and especially the poor are likely to remain highly vulnerable to climate change

Path dependence in energy systems and economic development

Energy systems are subject to strong and long-lived path dependence, owing to technological, infrastructural, institutional and behavioural lock-ins. Yet, with the prospect of providing accessible cheap energy to stimulate economic development and reduce poverty, governments often invest in large engineering projects and subsidy policies. Here, I argue that while these may achieve their objectives, they risk locking their economies onto energy-intensive pathways. Thus, particularly when economies are industrializing, and their energy systems are being transformed and are not yet fully locked-in, policymakers should take care before directing their economies onto energy-intensive pathways that are likely to be detrimental to their long-run prosperity

Higher temperatures increase suicide rates in the United States and Mexico

Linkages between climate and mental health are often theorized but remain poorly quantified. In particular, it is unknown whether the rate of suicide, a leading cause of death globally, is systematically affected by climatic conditions. Using comprehensive data from multiple decades for both the United States and Mexico, we find that suicide rates rise 0.7% in US counties and 2.1% in Mexican municipalities for a 1 °C increase in monthly average temperature. This effect is similar in hotter versus cooler regions and has not diminished over time, indicating limited historical adaptation. Analysis of depressive language in >600 million social media updates further suggests that mental well-being deteriorates during warmer periods. We project that unmitigated climate change (RCP8.5) could result in a combined 9–40 thousand additional suicides (95% confidence interval) across the United States and Mexico by 2050, representing a change in suicide rates comparable to the estimated impact of economic recessions, suicide prevention programmes or gun restriction laws