The borders that disadvantage migrant women in enjoying human rights

This article launches a frame to investigate the inequalities underlying the human rights violations migrant women may experience. Drawing on intersectionality theory and on Ratna Kapur’s concept of ‘normative boundaries of belonging’, the article puts forward the notion of ‘intersecting borders of inequality’. The notion interrogates three types of borders that may construe migrant women as outsiders or lesser members in society: formal, normative and practical borders. The article demonstrates that scrutinising the ways in which these borders intersect illuminates some of the structures disadvantaging migrant women and invites imagining wider responses to tackle these disadvantages. To illustrate these arguments, the article uses examples of the European Court of Human Rights’ case law

The European Court of Human Rights and Intragroup Religious Diversity: A Critical Review

This Article examines the ways in which one of the most established human rights courts—the European Court of Human Rights—encourages or discourages intragroup religious diversity when dealing with religious freedom claims. In particular, it critically assesses the Court’s attentiveness to internal group diversity by scrutinizing the objective filters that the Court employs to determine whether certain practices “count” as a manifestation of claimants’ religion for legal purposes. The Article argues that, at times, these filters are based on assumptions about religion and religious groups that impede recognition of more lived experiences of religion and internal group diversity. The Article further contends that making objective filters more porous to such experiences and diversity may therefore require reconsidering implicit understandings of religion and eschewing assumptions of orthodoxy about certain religious groups, especially when these assumptions are formulated in ways that fix and naturalize some religious practices as the defining ones for the entire group

The European Court of Human Rights and Intragroup Religious Diversity: A Critical Review

This Article examines the ways in which one of the most established human rights courts—the European Court of Human Rights—encourages or discourages intragroup religious diversity when dealing with religious freedom claims. In particular, it critically assesses the Court’s attentiveness to internal group diversity by scrutinizing the objective filters that the Court employs to determine whether certain practices “count” as a manifestation of claimants’ religion for legal purposes. The Article argues that, at times, these filters are based on assumptions about religion and religious groups that impede recognition of more lived experiences of religion and internal group diversity. The Article further contends that making objective filters more porous to such experiences and diversity may therefore require reconsidering implicit understandings of religion and eschewing assumptions of orthodoxy about certain religious groups, especially when these assumptions are formulated in ways that fix and naturalize some religious practices as the defining ones for the entire group

The protection of women asylum seekers under the European Convention on Human Rights: unearthing the gendered roots of harm

In this article I analyse women asylum seekers’ claims of gendered ill-treatment under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. I argue that the European Court of Human Rights moves away from creating equal conditions of protection for women asylum seekers every time it adopts two modes of reasoning: under scrutinizing the gendered roots of risk of ill-treatment and over scrutinizing individual capacity to deal with the risk. The first mode of reasoning overlooks the social and institutional conditions that render women vulnerable to ill-treatment. The second mode over emphasizes a woman’s ability to protect herself and/or male relatives’ capacity to protect her. The two modes suggest that women asylum seekers risk ill-treatment because of personal failures/limits rather than socio-institutional failures/constraints. These modes of reasoning may oversimplify concrete risks and recreate women’s subordinate status in human rights discourse. To counter these faults, in this article I propose to reappraise the risk of gendered ill-treatment structurally and relationally

Security and Inequality: Unprotected and Targeted?

Nine out of ten persons in Paraguay believe the state does not give priority to the security concerns of the poorest segments of the population.[1] In societies affected by profound social and economic disparities such as ours, is security likely to turn into one of most unfairly distributed goods? Is security sometimes likely to be advanced in benefit of the most favored at the expense of the disfavored? In this paper, I seek to draw attention to (i) the risks that markedly structural inequalities may pose to the democratic legitimacy of the processes by which collective decisions concerning security are made and (ii) the possible unfair implications of such decisions for the most marginalized segments of society. My first claim may well be read within the framework of current efforts examining the democratic authority of laws or policies in contexts of severe socio-economic disadvantages such as the Latin American.[2] [1] United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) National Report on Human Development Paraguay 2008, at 110 [2] I will be applying a familiar analysis that brings inclusion into the democratic assessment exercise. For one of the most prominent critical examinations of criminal laws more generally from a deliberative democratic perspective see e.g., Roberto Gargarella, “De la Justicia Penal a la Justicia Social,” available at http://www.razonpracticayasuntospublicos.com/racionalidad/texto/Edicion%2012/De%20la%20Justicia%20Penal%20a%20la%20Justicia%20Social.pdf Gargarella questions the legitimacy of criminal norms adopted in such contexts, especially those resulting from punitive populist approaches. I am broadly sympathetic to the ideas of inclusion and deliberation underlying this criticism

Cabbage and fermented vegetables : From death rate heterogeneity in countries to candidates for mitigation strategies of severe COVID-19

Large differences in COVID-19 death rates exist between countries and between regions of the same country. Some very low death rate countries such as Eastern Asia, Central Europe, or the Balkans have a common feature of eating large quantities of fermented foods. Although biases exist when examining ecological studies, fermented vegetables or cabbage have been associated with low death rates in European countries. SARS-CoV-2 binds to its receptor, the angiotensin-converting enzyme 2 (ACE2). As a result of SARS-CoV-2 binding, ACE2 downregulation enhances the angiotensin II receptor type 1 (AT(1)R) axis associated with oxidative stress. This leads to insulin resistance as well as lung and endothelial damage, two severe outcomes of COVID-19. The nuclear factor (erythroid-derived 2)-like 2 (Nrf2) is the most potent antioxidant in humans and can block in particular the AT(1)R axis. Cabbage contains precursors of sulforaphane, the most active natural activator of Nrf2. Fermented vegetables contain many lactobacilli, which are also potent Nrf2 activators. Three examples are: kimchi in Korea, westernized foods, and the slum paradox. It is proposed that fermented cabbage is a proof-of-concept of dietary manipulations that may enhance Nrf2-associated antioxidant effects, helpful in mitigating COVID-19 severity.Peer reviewe

Nrf2-interacting nutrients and COVID-19 : time for research to develop adaptation strategies

There are large between- and within-country variations in COVID-19 death rates. Some very low death rate settings such as Eastern Asia, Central Europe, the Balkans and Africa have a common feature of eating large quantities of fermented foods whose intake is associated with the activation of the Nrf2 (Nuclear factor (erythroid-derived 2)-like 2) anti-oxidant transcription factor. There are many Nrf2-interacting nutrients (berberine, curcumin, epigallocatechin gallate, genistein, quercetin, resveratrol, sulforaphane) that all act similarly to reduce insulin resistance, endothelial damage, lung injury and cytokine storm. They also act on the same mechanisms (mTOR: Mammalian target of rapamycin, PPAR gamma:Peroxisome proliferator-activated receptor, NF kappa B: Nuclear factor kappa B, ERK: Extracellular signal-regulated kinases and eIF2 alpha:Elongation initiation factor 2 alpha). They may as a result be important in mitigating the severity of COVID-19, acting through the endoplasmic reticulum stress or ACE-Angiotensin-II-AT(1)R axis (AT(1)R) pathway. Many Nrf2-interacting nutrients are also interacting with TRPA1 and/or TRPV1. Interestingly, geographical areas with very low COVID-19 mortality are those with the lowest prevalence of obesity (Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia). It is tempting to propose that Nrf2-interacting foods and nutrients can re-balance insulin resistance and have a significant effect on COVID-19 severity. It is therefore possible that the intake of these foods may restore an optimal natural balance for the Nrf2 pathway and may be of interest in the mitigation of COVID-19 severity

Opening up the European Convention human rights subject : an inclusive multilayered framework for adjudicating religious and cultural claims

Like many courts in Europe and elsewhere, the European Court of Human Rights (the "Court" or the "Strasbourg Court") has been grappling with the challenges posed by contemporary cultural and religious diversity. Applicants from a variety of cultural and religious backgrounds have increasingly brought longstanding conceptions underlying the Court's legal reasoning under growing pressure: from Sikh men wanting to wear the turban to Roma members seeking to preserve their travelling lifestyle and Muslim women battling headscarf bans. Three provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights ("ECHR") have been the site where this pressure has been most vividly felt: non-discrimination (Article 14 ECHR), freedom of religion (Article 9 ECHR), and the right to respect for one’s cultural lifestyle (Article 8 ECHR). For the most part, however, the Court has failed to rise to the challenge. At times, these types of claims have been met with neglect; at others, with trivialization and even delegitimation. This dissertation addresses these shortcomings in the legal reasoning of the European Court of Human Rights. The research is motivated by two sets of questions. At a descriptive level, the questions are: What are the assumptions or conceptions implicitly defining the European Convention human rights subject ("ECHR subject"), against which religious and cultural claimants are judged? In particular, which experiences, features or views are regarded as essential or "universal" in the construction of this subject and which ones are marginalized as invisible, negligible or "particular"? Moreover, what kinds of consequences do these assumptions carry for religious and cultural applicants and their groups? Do they create exclusions and hierarchies between them? If so, what forms or shapes do such exclusions and hierarchies take and at what levels do they occur (e.g., within groups, across groups)? At a normative level, the research questions are: Should the Court avoid these exclusions and hierarchies – or open up these "universals"? If so, on what basis and how exactly might the Court do this? The dissertation proceeds in three major parts, each of which identifies "universals" in the ECHR subject at a different level. First, it identifies exclusions and hierarchies within the abstract category of "human". It argues that the Court has, to some extent, opened up the abstract universal human rights subject by acknowledging the constructed vulnerability of some groups. Yet traces of invulnerability foreclose fuller inclusion of cultural and religious group members. Second, the dissertation identifies exclusions and hierarchies within the religious and cultural ECHR subject, that is to say, across different religious and cultural groups. The dissertation argues that operating as one of the "universals" of freedom of religion is a Protestant, belief- centered notion of religion, which favors internal and disembodied forms of religious subjectivity over external and embodied ones. The dissertation further unveils one of the "universals" embedded in the right to respect for family life: the nuclear family idealized in some parts of Western Europe that disadvantages other forms of family life. Last, the dissertation identifies exclusions and hierarchies within sub-religious and sub-cultural ECHR subjects, namely within groups. It shows how such exclusions and hierarchies arise from elevating a particular cultural or religious practice to the norm, as if it were the group paradigmatic practice. This practice is subsequently either fixed as the "essence" of group identity or associated with negative stereotypes. The dissertation puts forward two central arguments. The first argument is that, in articulating the ECHR subject, the Court endorses various "universals" that hamper the full and equal inclusion of a range of religious and cultural "others". Though these "universals" may manifest themselves in various forms and take place at different levels, they all respond to the same exclusionary logic: the experiences of some are confused with the experiences of all and posited as the yardstick against which everyone is judged. Indeed, the hidden (and not so hidden) workings of such "universals" have not just led to the trivialization and marginalization of applicants' experiences. Most worryingly, these workings have sometimes led to the devaluation or delegitimation of these experiences. The second central argument of this dissertation is that the Court should redress the exclusionary and inegalitarian character of such "universals". To this end, the dissertation offers a multilayered framework aimed at opening up the ECHR subject at the three levels identified above: (i) within the abstract human rights subject; (ii) across religious and cultural groups; and (iii) within religious and cultural groups. In so doing, the framework intends to more fully realize religious and cultural equality in European Human Rights Convention Law

Security and Inequality: Unprotected and Targeted?

Nine out of ten persons in Paraguay believe the state does not give priority to the security concerns of the poorest segments of the population.[1] In societies affected by profound social and economic disparities such as ours, is security likely to turn into one of most unfairly distributed goods? Is security sometimes likely to be advanced in benefit of the most favored at the expense of the disfavored? In this paper, I seek to draw attention to (i) the risks that markedly structural inequalities may pose to the democratic legitimacy of the processes by which collective decisions concerning security are made and (ii) the possible unfair implications of such decisions for the most marginalized segments of society. My first claim may well be read within the framework of current efforts examining the democratic authority of laws or policies in contexts of severe socio-economic disadvantages such as the Latin American.[2] [1] United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) National Report on Human Development Paraguay 2008, at 110 [2] I will be applying a familiar analysis that brings inclusion into the democratic assessment exercise. For one of the most prominent critical examinations of criminal laws more generally from a deliberative democratic perspective see e.g., Roberto Gargarella, “De la Justicia Penal a la Justicia Social,” available at http://www.razonpracticayasuntospublicos.com/racionalidad/texto/Edicion%2012/De%20la%20Justicia%20Penal%20a%20la%20Justicia%20Social.pdf Gargarella questions the legitimacy of criminal norms adopted in such contexts, especially those resulting from punitive populist approaches. I am broadly sympathetic to the ideas of inclusion and deliberation underlying this criticism