Voting as a Credible Threat

We offer a rationale for elections that take place in the shadow of power. Factions unhappy with policy can threaten violence. But when they lack common knowledge about (i) one another's rationality, and (ii) their chances of victory at arms, mutual overconfidence can precipitate civil war. We argue that elections can clarify the likely consequences of violence, and so facilitate peaceful resolution. Our theory is based on the recognition that both voting and fighting are intrinsically correlated actions: individuals who undertake the individually irrational act of voting are unusually prone the individually irrational act of voluntary combat.

A Model of the Political Economy of the United States

We develop and test a model of joint determination of economic growth and national election results in the United States. The formal model, which combines developments in the rational choice analysis of the behavior of economic agents and voters, leads to a system of equations in which the dependent variables are the growth rate and the vote shares in presidential and congressional elections. Our estimates support the theoretical claims that growth responds to unanticipated policy shifts and that voters use both on-year and midterm elections to balance the two parties. On the other hand, we find no support for "rational" retrospective voting. We do reconfirm, in a fully simultaneous framework, the "naive" retrospective voting literate's finding that the economy has a strong effect on presidential voting. We find congressional elections unaffected by the economy, except as transmitted by presidential coattails.Economic

Voting in the bicameral Congress: large majorities as a signal of quality

publication-status: Acceptedtypes: ArticleWe estimate a model of voting in Congress that allows for dispersed information about the quality of proposals in an equilibrium context. In equilibrium, the Senate only approves House bills that receive the support of a supermajority of members of the lower chamber. We estimate this endogenous supermajority rule to be about four-fifths on average across policy areas. Our results indicate that the value of information dispersed among legislators is significant, and that in equilibrium a large fraction of House members' (40–50%) votes following their private information. Finally, we show that the probability of a type I error in Congress (not passing a good bill) is on average about twice as high as the probability of a type II error (passing a low-quality bill)

A Model of the Political Economy of the United States

We develop and test a model of joint determination of the rate of economic growth and the results of presidential and Congressional elections in the United States. In our model, economic agents and voters have rational expectations. Economic policy varies as a function of control of the White House and the two-party shares in Congress. Politics affects growth through unanticipated policy shifts following the outcome of presidential elections. The economy influences elections as voters use past realizations of growth to make rational inferences about the "competency" level of the incumbent administration. Elections are also influenced by voters using their midterm Congressional votes to moderate the policies of the incumbent administration. The theoretical model is used to generate a recursive system of equations in which the dependent variables are the growth rate and the vote shares in presidential and Congressional elections. The theory implies several restrictions on the equations. Tests of the restrictions generally support the model; however, the results support the traditional view of naive retrospective voting as well as the "rational" retrospective voting posited in the model.

Enteroendocrine Cell Regulation of the Gut-Brain Axis

Enteroendocrine cells (EECs) are an essential interface between the gut and brain that communicate signals about nutrients, pain, and even information from our microbiome. EECs are hormone-producing cells expressed throughout the gastrointestinal epithelium and have been leveraged by pharmaceuticals like semaglutide (Ozempic, Wegovy), terzepatide (Mounjaro), and retatrutide (Phase 2) for diabetes and weight control, and linaclotide (Linzess) to treat irritable bowel syndrome (IBS) and visceral pain. This review focuses on role of intestinal EECs to communicate signals from the gut lumen to the brain. Canonically, EECs communicate information about the intestinal environment through a variety of hormones, dividing EECs into separate classes based on the hormone each cell type secretes. Recent studies have revealed more diverse hormone profiles and communication modalities for EECs including direct synaptic communication with peripheral neurons. EECs known as neuropod cells rapidly relay signals from gut to brain via a direct communication with vagal and primary sensory neurons. Further, this review discusses the complex information processing machinery within EECs, including receptors that transduce intraluminal signals and the ion channel complement that govern initiation and propagation of these signals. Deeper understanding of EEC physiology is necessary to safely treat devastating and pervasive conditions like irritable bowel syndrome and obesity

Reevaluating the modernization hypothesis

We revisit and critically reevaluate the widely accepted modernization hypothesis which claims that per capita income causes the creation and the consolidation of democracy. Existing studies find support for this hypothesis because they fail to control for the presence of omitted variables. Controlling for these factors either by including country fixed effects in a linear model or by including parameterized random effects in a nonlinear double hazard model removes the correlation between income and the likelihood of transitions to and from democratic regimes. In addition, the estimated fixed effects from the linear model are related to historical factors that affect both the level of income per capita and the likelihood of democracy in a country. This evidence is consistent with the idea that events during critical historical junctures can lead to divergent political–economic development paths, some leading to prosperity and democracy, others to relative poverty and non-democracy

The Statistical Analysis of Roll Call

We develop a Bayesian estimation procedure for spatial models of roll call voting. We show how a Bayesian approach to roll call analysis overcomes shortcomings and idiosyncracies of NOMINATE (some of which are not widely recognized). Our Bayesian approach (a) applies to any legislative setting, irrespective of size, legislative extremism, or the number of roll calls available for analysis; (b) provides a mechanism for directly incorporating auxiliary information as to the dimensionality of the underlying policy space, the identity of extremist legislators, key votes and the evolution of the legislative agenda; (c) lets us integrate measurement of legislative preferences with the analysis of those preferences. Notes to NEMP, May 2002 This paper sets out our ‘‘basic setup’ ’ (a Bayesian statistical operationalization of the Euclidean spatial voting model with roll call data), and constrasts it with the NOMINATE algorithms of Poole and Rosenthal. In the talk I will be considering extensions to our model, so as to accommodate and/or test conjectures in the literature on legislative politics (most prominently, the ‘‘party discipline’ ’ hypothesis, and conjectures about legislative responsiveness to constituency interests)

Pengaruh Harga Terhadap Peningkatan Penjualan Produk Semen Tiga Roda Pada PT. Robcaga Beo Kabupaten Kepulauan Talaud

The development in business world these days is market by the competition between the business company is getting fierce. Especially in managing the company business unit. It is shown by the appearance of a company that offer a good quality product with a compete price on the market. To handle the fierce competition on the market then one from so many effort that the company do is by apply the strategic price. Which on the way of applying that strategi the company try to set a price that can be compete in the market so the increase sale of the product become maximum. With right price and controlled will result the domino effect to a company to build long term relationship with costumer so it can increase the sales volume. This research is a descriptive quantitative research by using the correlation approach and simple regression. To see relation between variable and to measure the impact to the variable itself. So the purpose of this research is to know how far the price effect and to the increase of PT. ROBCAGA in Talaud. According to the sesult of the research, can be shown as following: price has a correlation and significant determination effort to the increase sale of PT. ROBCAGA Talaud. According to the data analysis, coefficient value moment r = 0,685. That show there is a positive relation, and can be categorize as high and strong, also price coefficient determination to the increase sale is by 46,5% and 53,5% by the rest of it depends on the unknown factors that not been analyze in this research