Digital demodulator

A digital demodulator for converting pulse code modulated data from phase shift key (PSK) to non return to zero (NRZ) and to biphase data is described. The demodulator is composed of standard integrated logic circuits. The key to the demodulation function is a pair of cross coupled one shot multivibrators and which with a flip-flop produce the NRZ-L is all that is required, the circuitry is greatly simplified and the 2(v) times bit rate contraint can be removed from the carrier. A flip-flop, an OR gate, and AND gate and a binary counter generate the bit rate clock (BTCK) for the NRZ-L. The remainder of the circuitry is for converting the NRZ-L and BTCK into biphase data. The device was designed for use in the space shuttle bay environment measurements

Critical Metallicities for Second-Generation Stars

The first massive stars may influence the formation of second-generation stars, in part by their metal enrichment of the surrounding gas. We investigate the "critical metallicity", defined as the the value, Z_crit, at which primordial gas cools more efficiently by fine-structure lines of O I (63.18 microns, Si II 34.8 microns, Fe II (25.99 and 35.35 microns), and C II (157.74 microns) than by either H I or H2 line emission. We explore the time-dependent thermodynamics and fragmentation of cooling gas at redshifts z = 10-30, seeded by trace heavy elements expelled from early supernovae. Because different modes of nucleosynthesis (alpha-process, Fe-group) produce abundance ratios far from solar values, these early stellar populations are likely to be influenced by O, Si, and Fe cooling. Our models also include radiative coupling of the fine structure lines and H2 to the cosmic microwave background (CMB), which sets a temperature floor (70-80K at z = 25-30) that may increase the Jeans mass. The H2 forms from catalytic effects of electrons left over from the recombination epoch or produced during virialization. These electrons form the H^- ion (H + e -> H- + gamma), which in turn forms H2 through associative detachment (H- + H -> H2 + e). In virialized halos at z = 10-30, the gas densities (n = 1-100 cm^{-3}) are well below the critical densities, n_cr = 10^{5-6} cm^{-3}, at which (O, Si, Fe) fine-structure lines reach LTE populations and produce their most efficient cooling. Thus, Z_crit may initially exceed 0.01 Z_sun at n = 1-100 cm^{-3}, and then drop to 10^{-3.5} Z_sun at n = 10^6 cm^{-3}, where the Jeans mass may be imprinted on the stellar mass function. Primordial clouds of 10^8 M_sun at 0.01 Z_sun and 200K will produce redshifted fine structure lines, with fluxes between 10^{-22} and 10^{-21} Watts/m^2 at z = 4.Comment: From "First Stars III" Conference (6 pages incl 4 figures

\u3ci\u3eErynnis Funeralis\u3c/i\u3e (Lepidoptera: Hesperiidae) and \u3ci\u3ePolygonia Zephyrus\u3c/i\u3e (Lepidoptera: Nymphalidae) in Indiana: New State Records

(excerpt) On July 1, 1975, while collecting 18 Pieris napi oleraceal (Harris) in the famous tamarack bog near Mongo, LaGrange Co., Indiana, I collected a somewhat worn male Erynnis funeralis Scudder & Burgess when it was resting on the ground in an area between the bog and a woods

"Too Big to Fail: Motives, Countermeasures, and the Dodd-Frank Response"

Government forbearance, support, and bailouts of banks and other financial institutions deemed "too big to fail" (TBTF) are widely recognized as encouraging large companies to take excessive risk, placing smaller ones at a competitive disadvantage and influencing banks in general to grow inefficiently to a "protected" size and complexity. During periods of financial stress, with bailouts under way, government officials have promised "never again." During periods of financial stability and economic growth, they have sanctioned large-bank growth by merger and ignored the ongoing competitive imbalance. Repeated efforts to do away with TBTF practices over the last several decades have been unsuccessful. Congress has typically found the underlying problem to be inadequate regulation and/or supervision that has permitted important financial companies to undertake excessive risk. It has responded by strengthening regulation and supervision. Others have located the underlying problem in inadequate regulators, suggesting the need for modifying the incentives that motivate their behavior. A third explanation is that TBTF practices reflect the government's perception that large financial firms serve a public interest-they constitute a "national resource" to be preserved. In this case, a structural solution would be necessary. Breakups of the largest financial firms would distribute the "public interest" among a larger group than the handful that currently hold a disproportionate concentration of financial resources. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 constitutes the most recent effort to eliminate TBTF practices. Its principal focus is on the extension and augmentation of regulation and supervision, which it envisions as preventing excessive risk taking by large financial companies; Congress has again found the cause for TBTF practices in the inadequacy of regulation and supervision. There is no indication that Congress has given any credence to the contention that regulatory motivations have been at fault. Finally, Dodd-Frank eschews a structural solution, leaving the largest financial companies intact and bank regulatory agencies still with extensive discretion in passing on large bank mergers. As a result, the elimination of TBTF will remain problematic for years to come.Too Big to Fail; Banking Policy; Antitrust; Government Policy; Regulation

"Too Big to Fail in Financial Crisis: Motives, Countermeasures, and Prospects"

Regulatory forbearance and government financial support for the largest U.S. financial companies during the crisis of 2007–09 highlighted a "too big to fail" problem that has existed for decades. As in the past, effects on competition and moral hazard were seen as outweighed by the threat of failures that would undermine the financial system and the economy. As in the past, current legislative reforms promise to prevent a reoccurrence. This paper proceeds on the view that a better understanding of why too-big-to-fail policies have persisted will provide a stronger basis for developing effective reforms. After a review of experience in the United States over the last 40 years, it considers a number of possible motives. The explicit rationale of regulatory authorities has been to stem a systemic threat to the financial system and the economy resulting from interconnections and contagion, and/or to assure the continuation of financial services in particular localities or regions. It has been contended, however, that such threats have been exaggerated, and that forbearance and bailouts have been motivated by the "career interests" of regulators. Finally, it has been suggested that existing large financial firms are preserved because they serve a public interest independent of the systemic threat of failure they pose—they constitute a "national resource." Each of these motives indicates a different type of reform necessary to contain too-big-to-fail policies. They are not, however, mutually exclusive, and may all be operative simultaneously. Concerns about the stability of the financial system dominate current legislative proposals; these would strengthen supervision and regulation. Other kinds of reform, including limits on regulatory discretion, would be needed to contain "career interest" motivations. If, however, existing financial companies are viewed as serving a unique public purpose, then improved supervision and regulation would not effectively preclude bailouts should a large financial company be on the brink of failure. Nor would limits on discretion be binding. To address this motivation, a structural solution is necessary. Breakups through divestiture, perhaps encompassing specific lines of activity, would distribute the "public interest" among a larger group of companies than the handful that currently hold a disproportionate and growing concentration of financial resources. The result would be that no one company, or even a few, would appear to be irreplaceable. Neither economies of scale nor scope appear to offset the advantages of size reduction for the largest financial companies. At a minimum, bank merger policy that has, over the last several decades, facilitated their growth should be reformed so as to contain their continued absolute and relative growth. An appendix to the paper provides a review of bank merger policy and proposals for revision."Too Big to Fail; Banking Policy; Antitrust; Government Policy; Regulation

"The Limits of Prudential Supervision: Economic Problems, Institutional Failure and Competence"

Bank supervision typically receives little if any attention when banks are operating without difficulty. But when banks fail in large numbers, or large banks fail, and the system itself is threatened, supervision becomes a focal point for criticism and reform (see, for example, Conference Report, 1998, Title I, IX; Pecchioli, 1987, pp. 11 ff.; and Comptroller General of the U.S., 1977). On such occasions, institutional changes may take equal billing with the "improvement" of supervision. But as often as not, the only thing Congress can agree on is that supervision needs to be better. This usually translates into more supervisors operating with more authority. The repeated augmentation of bank supervision may give the impression that it is a solution rather that a symptom of recurring banking problems; and it is in the interest of supervisors to suggest that this is the case. Repeated disappointments about past performances never seem to undermine the promise that more and better supervisors, with more authority, will make things better in the future. The historical record suggests that this is not true. There are, however, independent reasons for questioning whether, in and of itself, more supervisors with more restrictive authority will help very much. It is argued below that the promise of supervisory enhancement is an illusion traceable to the belief that ignores the limitations of supervision in dealing with the problems that actually exist. These limitations include: (1) the existence of an intractable economic problem confronting depository institutions; (2) at least two distinct institutional failures, a fragmented regulatory system composed of multiple agencies and the growth of opportunism among banking organizations, that make it difficult to formulate and implement appropriate policies; and, finally, (3) the inability of the existing supervisory establishment to deal with these economic and structural issues. The nature of supervision is discussed. The limitations are reviewed in Section III, and the inadequacy of the current supervisory establishment to deal with the problems it must deal with to be successful is considered in Section IV. Some proposals to remedy the existing difficulties are presented in Section V. These include the consolidation of the "stand-alone" supervisory agencies with the monetary authority.

FINANCIAL MODERNIZATION LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES. BACKGROUND AND IMPLICATIONS

The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act went into effect in the United States in1999. The Act establishes a new framework for affiliations among commercial banks, insurance companies and securities firms through "financial holding companies" and "financial subsidiaries", and establishes guidelines for entry into merchant banking. It moves financial institutions in the United States towards a system of conglomeration that has long existed in continental Europe and elsewhere in the world. This paper reviews important provisions of the new law, provides some comparisons with other countries, and draws some implications for future developments. The immediate effects of the law are not likely to be great, either in the United States or elsewhere. With respect to the integration of financial activities, it merely supports recent trends. At the same time, it requires a continued "separation of banking and commerce", precluding the establishment of true universal banks. Longer-run effects are likely to be more important. If the past is a guide to the future, whatever lines are now drawn by law and regulation between financial and commercial activities are likely to erode in the coming years.