Evidence for capacity sharing when stopping

ArticleCopyright © 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.Research on multitasking indicates that central processing capacity is limited, resulting in a performance decrement when central processes overlap in time. A notable exception seems to be stopping responses. The main theoretical and computational accounts of stop performance assume that going and stopping do not share processing capacity. This independence assumption has been supported by many behavioral studies and by studies modeling the processes underlying going and stopping. However, almost all previous investigations of capacity sharing between stopping and going have manipulated the difficulty of the go task while keeping the stop task simple. In the present study, we held the difficulty of the go task constant and manipulated the difficulty of the stop task. We report the results of four experiments in which subjects performed a selective stop-change task, which required them to stop and change a go response if a valid signal occurred, but to execute the go response if invalid signals occurred. In the consistent-mapping condition, the valid signal stayed the same throughout the whole experiment; in the varied-mapping condition, the valid signal changed regularly, so the demands on the rule-based system remained high. We found strong dependence between stopping and going, especially in the varied-mapping condition. We propose that in selective stop tasks, the decision to stop or not will share processing capacity with the go task. This idea can account for performance differences between groups, subjects, and conditions. We discuss implications for the wider stop-signal and dual-task literature.ESRCUniversity of ExeterERCNational Eye Institut

A cautionary note on evidence-accumulation models of response inhibition in the stop-signal paradigm

The stop-signal paradigm is a popular procedure to investigate responseinhibition–the ability to stop ongoing responses. It consists of a choice responsetime (RT) task that is occasionally interrupted by a stop stimulussignaling participants to withhold their response. Performance in the stopsignalparadigm is often formalized as race between a set of go runners triggeredby the choice stimulus and a stop runner triggered by the stop signal.We investigated whether evidence-accumulation processes, which have beenwidely used in choice RT analysis, can serve as the runners in the stop-signalrace model and support the estimation of psychologically meaningful parameters.We examined two types of the evidence-accumulation architectures:the racing Wald model (Logan, Van Zandt, Verbruggen, & Wagenmakers, 2014) and a novel proposal based on the Lognormal race (Heathcote & Love,2012). Using a series of simulation studies and fits to empirical data, wefound that these models are not measurement models in the sense that thedata-generating parameters cannot be recovered in realistic experimentaldesigns

On the ability to inhibit thought and action: General and special theories of an act of control.

types: Journal ArticleThis is a postprint of an article published in Journal of Abnormal Psychology © 2014 copyright American Psychological Association. This article may not exactly replicate the final version published in the APA journal. It is not the copy of record. Psychological Review is available online at: http://www.apa.org/pubs/journals/rev/Response inhibition is an important act of control in many domains of psychology and neuroscience. It is often studied in a stop-signal task that requires subjects to inhibit an ongoing action in response to a stop signal. Performance in the stop-signal task is understood as a race between a go process that underlies the action and a stop process that inhibits the action. Responses are inhibited if the stop process finishes before the go process. The finishing time of the stop process is not directly observable; a mathematical model is required to estimate its duration. Logan and Cowan (1984) developed an independent race model that is widely used for this purpose. We present a general race model that extends the independent race model to account for the role of choice in go and stop processes, and a special race model that assumes each runner is a stochastic accumulator governed by a diffusion process. We apply the models to 2 data sets to test assumptions about selective influence of capacity limitations on drift rates and strategies on thresholds, which are largely confirmed. The model provides estimates of distributions of stop-signal response times, which previous models could not estimate. We discuss implications of viewing cognitive control as the result of a repertoire of acts of control tailored to different tasks and situations. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2014 APA, all rights reserved)

Should I stop or should I go? The role of associations and expectancies

Datasets available in ORE at http://hdl.handle.net/10871/17735This article may not exactly replicate the final version published in the APA journal. It is not the copy of record.Following exposure to consistent stimulus-stop mappings, response inhibition can become automatized with practice. What is learned is less clear, even though this has important theoretical and practical implications. A recent analysis indicates that stimuli can become associated with a stop signal or with a stop ‘goal’. Furthermore, expectancy may play an important role. Previous studies that have used stop or no-go signals to manipulate stimulus-stop learning cannot distinguish between stimulus-signal and stimulus-goal associations, and expectancy has not been measured properly. In the present study, participants performed a task that combined features of the go/no-go task and the stop- signal task in which the stop-signal rule changed at the beginning of each block. The go and stop signals were superimposed over forty task-irrelevant images. Our results show that participants can learn direct associations between images and the stop goal without mediation via the stop signal. Exposure to the image-stop associations influenced task performance during training, and the expectancies measured following task completion or measured within the task. But, despite this, we found an effect of stimulus-stop associations on test performance only when the task increased the task-relevance of the images. This could indicate that the influence of stimulus-stop learning on go performance is strongly influenced by attention to both task-relevant and task-irrelevant stimulus features. More generally, our findings suggest a strong interplay between ‘automatic’ and ‘controlled’ processes.Economic and Social Research CouncilEuropean Research Counci

No-go trials can modulate switch cost by interfering with effects of task preparation

It has recently been shown that the cost associated with switching tasks is eliminated following ‘no-go’ trials, in which response selection is not completed, suggesting that the switch cost depends on response selection. However, no-go trials may also affect switch costs by interfering with the effects of task preparation that precede response selection. To test this hypothesis we evaluated switch costs following standard go trials with those following two types of non-response trials: no-go trials, for which a stimulus is presented that indicates no response should be made (Experiment 1); and cue-only trials in which no stimulus is presented following the task cue (Experiment 2). We hypothesized that eliminating no-go stimuli would reveal effects of task preparation on the switch cost in cue-only trials. We found no switch cost following no-go trials (Experiment 1), but a reliable switch cost in cue-only trials (i.e., when no-go stimuli were removed; Experiment 2). We conclude that no-go trials can modulate the switch cost, independent of their effect on response selection, by interfering with task preparation, and that the effects of task preparation on switch cost are more directly assessed by cue-only trials

The QWERTY Effect: How typing shapes the meanings of words.

The QWERTY keyboard mediates communication for millions of language users. Here, we investigated whether differences in the way words are typed correspond to differences in their meanings. Some words are spelled with more letters on the right side of the keyboard and others with more letters on the left. In three experiments, we tested whether asymmetries in the way people interact with keys on the right and left of the keyboard influence their evaluations of the emotional valence of the words. We found the predicted relationship between emotional valence and QWERTY key position across three languages (English, Spanish, and Dutch). Words with more right-side letters were rated as more positive in valence, on average, than words with more left-side letters: the QWERTY effect. This effect was strongest in new words coined after QWERTY was invented and was also found in pseudowords. Although these data are correlational, the discovery of a similar pattern across languages, which was strongest in neologisms, suggests that the QWERTY keyboard is shaping the meanings of words as people filter language through their fingers. Widespread typing introduces a new mechanism by which semantic changes in language can arise

A habituation account of change detection in same/different judgments

We investigated the basis of change detection in a short-term priming task. In two experiments, participants were asked to indicate whether or not a target word was the same as a previously presented cue. Data from an experiment measuring magnetoencephalography failed to find different patterns for “same” and “different” responses, consistent with the claim that both arise from a common neural source, with response magnitude defining the difference between immediate novelty versus familiarity. In a behavioral experiment, we tested and confirmed the predictions of a habituation account of these judgments by comparing conditions in which the target, the cue, or neither was primed by its presentation in the previous trial. As predicted, cue-primed trials had faster response times, and target-primed trials had slower response times relative to the neither-primed baseline. These results were obtained irrespective of response repetition and stimulus–response contingencies. The behavioral and brain activity data support the view that detection of change drives performance in these tasks and that the underlying mechanism is neuronal habituation

The Role of Stimulus Salience and Attentional Capture Across the Neural Hierarchy in a Stop-Signal Task

Inhibitory motor control is a core function of cognitive control. Evidence from diverse experimental approaches has linked this function to a mostly right-lateralized network of cortical and subcortical areas, wherein a signal from the frontal cortex to the basal ganglia is believed to trigger motor-response cancellation. Recently, however, it has been recognized that in the context of typical motor-control paradigms those processes related to actual response inhibition and those related to the attentional processing of the relevant stimuli are highly interrelated and thus difficult to distinguish. Here, we used fMRI and a modified Stop-signal task to specifically examine the role of perceptual and attentional processes triggered by the different stimuli in such tasks, thus seeking to further distinguish other cognitive processes that may precede or otherwise accompany the implementation of response inhibition. In order to establish which brain areas respond to sensory stimulation differences by rare Stop-stimuli, as well as to the associated attentional capture that these may trigger irrespective of their task-relevance, we compared brain activity evoked by Stop-trials to that evoked by Go-trials in task blocks where Stop-stimuli were to be ignored. In addition, region-of-interest analyses comparing the responses to these task-irrelevant Stop-trials, with those to typical relevant Stop-trials, identified separable activity profiles as a function of the task-relevance of the Stop-signal. While occipital areas were mostly blind to the task-relevance of Stop-stimuli, activity in temporo-parietal areas dissociated between task-irrelevant and task-relevant ones. Activity profiles in frontal areas, in turn, were activated mainly by task-relevant Stop-trials, presumably reflecting a combination of triggered top-down attentional influences and inhibitory motor-control processes

Impaired decisional impulsivity in pathological videogamers

Abstract Background Pathological gaming is an emerging and poorly understood problem. Impulsivity is commonly impaired in disorders of behavioural and substance addiction, hence we sought to systematically investigate the different subtypes of decisional and motor impulsivity in a well-defined pathological gaming cohort. Methods Fifty-two pathological gaming subjects and age-, gender- and IQ-matched healthy volunteers were tested on decisional impulsivity (Information Sampling Task testing reflection impulsivity and delay discounting questionnaire testing impulsive choice), and motor impulsivity (Stop Signal Task testing motor response inhibition, and the premature responding task). We used stringent diagnostic criteria highlighting functional impairment. Results In the Information Sampling Task, pathological gaming participants sampled less evidence prior to making a decision and scored fewer points compared with healthy volunteers. Gaming severity was also negatively correlated with evidence gathered and positively correlated with sampling error and points acquired. In the delay discounting task, pathological gamers made more impulsive choices, preferring smaller immediate over larger delayed rewards. Pathological gamers made more premature responses related to comorbid nicotine use. Greater number of hours played also correlated with a Motivational Index. Greater frequency of role playing games was associated with impaired motor response inhibition and strategy games with faster Go reaction time. Conclusions We show that pathological gaming is associated with impaired decisional impulsivity with negative consequences in task performance. Decisional impulsivity may be a potential target in therapeutic management

Impaired Inhibitory Control in Recreational Cocaine Users

Chronic use of cocaine is associated with impairment in response inhibition but it is an open question whether and to which degree findings from chronic users generalize to the upcoming type of recreational users. This study compared the ability to inhibit and execute behavioral responses in adult recreational users and in a cocaine-free-matched sample controlled for age, race, gender distribution, level of intelligence, and alcohol consumption. Response inhibition and response execution were measured by a stop-signal paradigm. Results show that users and non users are comparable in terms of response execution but users need significantly more time to inhibit responses to stop-signals than non users. Interestingly, the magnitude of the inhibitory deficit was positively correlated with the individuals lifetime cocaine exposure suggesting that the magnitude of the impairment is proportional to the degree of cocaine consumed