Una interpretación de los regímenes autoritarios

Once años después de la elaboración de sus conocidas tesis sobre el «régimen autoritario» (elaboración impresa en un multirreproducido artículo: «An Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Spain», 1964), el autor del presente ensayo intenta de nuevo, desde la perspectiva de 1975, comentar coherentemente aquellas tesis abundando en algunas de las críticas escritas que se le han formulado y madurándolas con sus experiencias de investigador de las diversas fuerzas que rigen lo que él llama «regímenes autoritarios», principalmente el caso del franquismo. El nivel de abstracción que presentan estas líneas en nada desmerece, sino al contrario, la expresividad de su construcción ligada a una forma muy definida de ver la sociedad y practicar la ciencia social

“Nation State” or “State Nation”?: Conceptual Reflections and Some Spanish, Belgian and Indian Data

human development, culture

Three waves of semi-presidential studies

This article reviews the scholarship on semi-presidentialism since the early 1990s. We identify three waves of semi-presidential studies. The first wave focused on the concept of semi-presidentialism, how it should be defined, and what countries should be classified as semi-presidential. The second wave examined the effect of semi-presidential institutions on newly democratized countries. Does semi-presidentialism help or hinder the process of democratic consolidation? The third wave examines the effect of semi-presidential institutions on both recent and consolidated democracies. Third-wave studies have been characterized by three questions: to what extent does the direct election of the president make a difference to outcomes; to what extent does variation in presidential power make a difference; and what other factors interact with presidential power to help to bring about differential outcomes? The article argues that the concept of semi-presidentialism remains taxonomically valid, but that the empirical scholarship on countries with semi-presidential institutions needs to respond to broader developments within the discipline if it is to remain relevant

Categories as Archives: From Silence to Social Justice: An Interview with Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra

Dr. Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra is the Alice Drysdale Sheffield Professor of History at the University of Texas at Austin. He is the author of several books, including How to Write the History of the New World: Histories, Epistemologies, and Identities in the Eighteenth-century Atlantic World (2001), Puritan Conquistadors: Iberianizing the Atlantic, 1550-1700 (2006), and Nature, Empire, and Nation: Explorations of the History of Science in the Iberian World (2007). Cañizares-Esguerra is currently working on two book-length projects: Categories as Prisons, which explores how historiographical categories organize what questions about the past are permissible and therefore how archives and narratives are organized; and The Radical Spanish Empire, coauthored with Adrian Masters, which challenges the Anglo-American liberal notion that parliamentary democracy, humanitarianism, print culture, and the public sphere were the crucibles of modernity, arguing that sixteenth-century Spanish America witnessed massive popular participation in the creation of new laws and radical forms of antislavery and abolitionism, as well as the creation of vast archives of new social and natural knowledge and the rise of systematic skepticism and philosophical pragmatism in governance

Estados em vias de integração e de desintegração

In the above article, the authors present the following thesis: multi-ethnic federations in transition from authoritarian regimes to democracy have a much better chance of maintaining its political unity if the initial elections during such transitional period are all-union elections as opposed to regional or provincial elections. The thesis is argued thru the comparative analysis of the Spain, ex URSS and Yugoslavia cases.Neste artigo os autores levantam a seguinte tese: os países constituídos por federações multiétnicas, em processo de transição de autoritarismo para a democracia, têm maior probabilidade de manter sua união política se as primeiras eleições e tomadas de voto, desse período transacional, forem eleições de caráter nacional (geral, de toda a União) ao invés de eleições regionais ou provinciais. A tese apresentada é defendida pela análise comparada dos casos de Espanha e de ex-União Soviética e Iugoslávia

Duverger, semi-presidentialism and the supposed French archetype

The concept of semi-presidentialism was first operationalised by Maurice Duverger. There are now 17 countries with semi-presidential constitutions in Europe. Within this set of countries France is usually considered to be the archetypal example of semi-presidentialism. This article maps the main institutional and political features of European semi-presidentialism on the basis of Duverger’s original three-fold schema. The most striking feature is the diversity of practice within this set of countries. This means that semi-presidentialism should not be operationalised as a discrete explanatory variable. However, there are ways of systematically capturing the variation within semi-presidentialism to allow cross-national comparisons. This diversity also means that France should not be considered as the archetypal semi-presidential country. At best, France is an archetypal example of a particular type of semi-presidentialism. Overall, Duverger’s main contribution to the study of semi-presidentialism was the original identification of the concept and his implicit insight that there are different types of semi-presidentialism. In the future, the study of semi-presidentialism would benefit from the development of theory-driven comparative work that avoids a reliance on France as the supposed semi-presidential archetype

Formal Versus Functional Method in Comparative Constitutional Law

In the field of comparative constitutional law, the dominant approach to concept formation and research design is formal. That is, comparative projects generally identify what counts as the supreme law that can be enforced against all other sources of law based on the “constitutional” label of the positive law (written constitutions and the jurisprudence of constitutional courts) and the law books. This formal method, however, has significant limitations when compared with the functional method used in the field of comparative law more generally speaking. After a brief exposition of the functional method, this article explores the advantages of the functional method as applied to comparative constitutional law with the problem of judicial review (based on the supreme law) of social and economic policy-making in France, the United States, and Germany. Only in Germany is this law contained in constitutional law. In France, the supreme law is to be found largely in administrative law, because the constitutional court faces an institutional competitor, some would say superior, in the highest administrative court (Conseil d’État). In the United States, the supreme law is to be found in administrative law because economic and social rights—the rights that most directly affect this area of state activity—have largely been read out of constitutional law. Based on the functional method, the article proceeds to identify the similarities that unite the law of France and Germany and that set it apart from the law of the United States. It also outlines the important avenues of theoretical inquiry triggered by these similarities and differences in judicial review. The article concludes by sketching a functional agenda for empirical research in comparative constitutional law

How European Union Membership Can Undermine the Rule of Law in Emerging Democracies

The European Union views the spread of economic prosperity and rule of law to countries emerging from dictatorship as among its primary goals when considering countries as candidates for membership. Existing literature often suggests that EU membership confers significant benefits on the accession countries, and these countries are willing to undergo costly and difficult reforms to reap these benefits. Through strict membership conditions, member states force accession countries to commit to democracy. Drawing on theoretical work in the fields of law, politics, and economics, this article reassesses the conventional wisdom. It argues that, under certain conditions, the reforms required of would-be members could have the perverse effect of undermining the establishment of legitimate law in transitional democracies. Using an agent-based model, the article elucidates a theory in which placing laws on the books around which no societal consensus exists can create perverse incentives for citizens and government officials and may lead to an erosion of the rule of law