It is Hobbes, not Rousseau:an experiment on voting and redistribution

We perform an experiment which provides a laboratory replica of some important features of the welfare state. In the experiment, all individuals in a group decide whether to make a costly effort, which produces a random (independent) outcome for each one of them. The group members then vote on whether to redistribute the resulting and commonly known total sum of earnings equally amongst themselves. This game has two equilibria, if played once. In one of them, all players make effort and there is little redistribution. In the other one, there is no effort and nothingWe thank Iris Bohnet, Tim Cason, David Cooper, John Duffy, Maia Guell, John Van Huyck and Robin Mason for helpful conversations and encouragement. The comments of the Editor and two referees helped improve the paper. We gratefully acknowledge the financial support from Spain’s Ministry of Science and Innovation under grants CONSOLIDER INGENIO 2010 CSD2006-0016 (all authors), ECO2009-10531 (Cabrales), ECO2008-01768 (Nagel) and the Comunidad de Madrid under grant Excelecon (Cabrales), the Generalitat de Catalunya and the CREA program (Nagel), and project SEJ2007-64340 of Spain’s Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia (Rodríguez Mora).Publicad

Multiple shifts and fractional integration in the us and uk unemployment rates

This paper analyses the long-run behaviour of the US and UK unemployment rates by testing for possibly fractional orders of integration and multiple shifts using a sample of over 100 annual observations. The results show that the orders of integration are higher than 0 in both series, which implies long memory. If we assume that the underlying disturbances are white noise, the values are higher than 0.5, i.e., nonstationary. However, if the disturbances are autocorrelated, the orders of integration are in the interval (0, 0.5), implying stationarity and mean-reverting behaviour. Moreover, when multiple shifts are taken into account, unemployment is more persistent in the US than in the UK, implying the need for stronger policy action in the former to bring unemployment back to its original level

Cooperation, Norms, and Revolutions: A Unified Game-Theoretical Approach

Cooperation is of utmost importance to society as a whole, but is often challenged by individual self-interests. While game theory has studied this problem extensively, there is little work on interactions within and across groups with different preferences or beliefs. Yet, people from different social or cultural backgrounds often meet and interact. This can yield conflict, since behavior that is considered cooperative by one population might be perceived as non-cooperative from the viewpoint of another. To understand the dynamics and outcome of the competitive interactions within and between groups, we study game-dynamical replicator equations for multiple populations with incompatible interests and different power (be this due to different population sizes, material resources, social capital, or other factors). These equations allow us to address various important questions: For example, can cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma be promoted, when two interacting groups have different preferences? Under what conditions can costly punishment, or other mechanisms, foster the evolution of norms? When does cooperation fail, leading to antagonistic behavior, conflict, or even revolutions? And what incentives are needed to reach peaceful agreements between groups with conflicting interests? Our detailed quantitative analysis reveals a large variety of interesting results, which are relevant for society, law and economics, and have implications for the evolution of language and culture as well

A Top Dog Tale with Preference Complementarities

The emergence of a winner-take-all (top dog) outcome is generally due to political or institutional constraints or to specific technological features which favour the performance of just one individual. In this paper we provide a different explanation for the occurrence of a top-dog equilibrium in exchange economies. We show that once heterogeneous complementarities (i.e. Scarf’s preferences) are analysed with general endowment distributions, a variety of equilibria different from the well-known symmetric outcome with full utilisation of resources can emerge. Specifically, we show that stable corner equilibria with a winner-take-all (top dog) individual arise that are Pareto optima although the remaining individuals are no better off than with zero consumption and resources can be unused. Because of heterogenous complementarities, market mechanisms are weak and cannot overcome the top dog’s power. Voting mechanisms or taxation policies can reduce the top dog’s privileged position

Evidence and Ideology in Macroeconomics: The Case of Investment Cycles

The paper reports the principal findings of a long term research project on the description and explanation of business cycles. The research strongly confirmed the older view that business cycles have large systematic components that take the form of investment cycles. These quasi-periodic movements can be represented as low order, stochastic, dynamic processes with complex eigenvalues. Specifically, there is a fixed investment cycle of about 8 years and an inventory cycle of about 4 years. Maximum entropy spectral analysis was employed for the description of the cycles and continuous time econometrics for the explanatory models. The central explanatory mechanism is the second order accelerator, which incorporates adjustment costs both in relation to the capital stock and the rate of investment. By means of parametric resonance it was possible to show, both theoretically and empirically how cycles aggregate from the micro to the macro level. The same mathematical tool was also used to explain the international convergence of cycles. I argue that the theory of investment cycles was abandoned for ideological, not for evidential reasons. Methodological issues are also discussed

Salience of social security contributions and employment

Social security contributions in most countries are split between employers and employees. According to standard incidence analysis, social security contributions affect employment negatively, but it is irrelevant how they are divided between employers and employees. This paper considers the possibility that (i) workers perceive a linkage between current contributions and future benefits, and (ii) they value employer’s contributions less than own contributions, as the former are less “salient.” Under these assumptions, I find that employers’ contributions have a stronger (negative) effect on employment than employees’ contributions. Furthermore, a change in how contributions are divided, which reduces the share of employers, is beneficial for employment. Finally, making employers’ contributions more visible to workers also has a positive effect on employment.Financial support from Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, Generalitat Valenciana (Prometeo/2013/037) and Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (ECO2012-34928) are gratefully acknowledged

Expenditure Reform in Industrialised Countries: A Case Study Approach

This study examines reforms of public expenditure in industrialised countries over the past two decades. We distinguish ambitious and timid reformers and analyse in detail reform experiences in eight case studies of ambitious reform episodes. We find that ambitious reform countries reduce spending on transfers, subsidies and public consumption while largely sparing education spending. Such expenditure retrenchment is also typically part of a comprehensive reform package that includes improvements in fiscal institutions as well as structural and other macroeconomic reforms. The study finds that ambitious expenditure retrenchment and reform coincides with large improvements in fiscal and economic growth indicators