85 research outputs found
Propiedad y libertad: una crĂtica a la teorĂa de la justicia de Hume desde el pensamiento de Simone de Beauvoir y una respuesta humeana
David Hume and Simone de Beauvoir agree that human beings have a great deal of control over their moral and political lives, which is well captured in Hume’s assertion that “mankind is an inventive species”. But Hume argues
that the most important thing needed to settle our social lives and determine
justice is the agreement on rules of property, while Beauvoir thinks that the
rules of property will never be enough to establish the best life, but rather
that we should be focusing on freedom. In this article we reconstruct Hume’s
argument for property, then develop a Beauvoirian critique of Hume that brings out the weakness of any theory of property that does not prevent inequalities of property from interfering with freedom. And then we give the last word to a Humean response to Beauvoir that would insist that there can be no freedom but only violence without rules of property, which she ignores. Both thinkers appeal to humanity as an overriding goal, and perhaps that is the way to reconcile the two: we need both property and freedom to achieve our humanity.David Hume y Simone de Beauvoir están de acuerdo en que los seres humanos tienen un grado muy importante de control sobre sus vidas morales y polĂticas; lo que está muy bien captado en la afirmaciĂłn de Hume de que “la humanidad es una especie inventiva”. Pero Hume argumenta que lo más importante a la hora de constituir nuestras vidas sociales y establecer la justicia es el acuerdo sobre las reglas de la propiedad, mientras que Beauvoir piensa que las reglas de propiedad nunca serán suficientes para establecer la vida mejor, sino que más bien deberĂamos centrarnos en la libertad. En este artĂculo reconstruimos el argumento de Hume a favor de la propiedad, para desarrollar despuĂ©s una crĂtica basada en la perspectiva de Simone de Beauvoir que saca a la luz la debilidad de cualquier teorĂa de la propiedad que no evite que las desigualdades de propiedad interfieran con la
libertad, Y despuĂ©s damos la Ăşltima palabra a una respuesta humeana a Beauvoir que insistirĂa en que no puede haber libertad –sino solo violencia- sin reglas de propiedad, algo que ella ignora. Ambos pensadores recurren a la humanidad como el objetivo predominante, y quizás esta es la forma de reconciliarlos: necesitamos tanto de la propiedad como de la libertad para lograr nuestra humanidad
Scepticisme et cynisme dans l’oeuvre de Pierre de Valence
Cet article examine l’oeuvre de Pierre de Valence (1555-1620) dans le but d’établir ses implications philosophiques. Sur la base de son seul ouvrage publié, les Academica de 1596, qui ont largement circulé et ont connu deux traductions françaises au XVIIIe siècle, plusieurs auteurs ont supposé qu’il penchait vers le scepticisme académique. En se fondant sur ses traductions de Dion Chrysostome et d’Épictète et sur d’autres manuscrits imitant la littérature de la retraite propre au cynisme grec, d’autres en ont fait un cynique. En confrontant ces ouvrages à d’autres manuscrits portant sur des matières économiques ou sociales allant du coût du pain au bûcher pour les sorcières, à son érudition biblique profonde et aux polémiques qui y sont rattachées, et à son travail de chroniqueur royal durant les années 1606-1620, ses écrits sur le scepticisme antique et le cynisme s’apparentent tout au plus aux exercices scolaires d’un humaniste tardif. Scepticisme et cynisme deviennent inoffensifs si on ne les considère que comme une partie — et une partie relativement limitée — de l’arsenal des habilités scolaires et des sympathies philosophiques de ce penseur aussi instruit qu’influent au sein des débuts de la modernité.This article explores the work of Pedro de Valencia (1555-1620) with the purpose of establishing his philosophical allegiances. On the basis of his only published work, the Academica of 1596, widely circulated and translated into French twice in the eighteenth century, some authors have assumed that he was an Academic skeptic. On the basis of his translations of Dio Chrysostome and Epictetus and other manuscripts in imitation of the literature of retirement of Greek cynicism, others have taken him for a cynic. Placing this work in the context of his other manuscripts on social and economic issues from the price of bread to the burning of witches ; his serious Biblical scholarship and polemics ; and his work as Royal Chronicler in the years 1606-1620, his writings on ancient skepticism and cynicism begin to look like little more than the scholarly exercises of a late humanist. Skepticism and cynicism were rendered harmless as only a part —-and a relatively small part—- of the arsenal of scholarly skills and philosophical sympathies of this knowledgeable and influential early modern scholar
Escepticismo inofensivo en la Alemania ilustrada
El escepticismo filosĂłfico ha sido acusado a menudo de conducir al conservadurismo polĂtico o al radicalismo. Sin embargo, en algunos momentos y lugares, no llevĂł a nada de esto, más bien fue domado y domesticado y convertido en algo inofensivo tanto para la iglesia como para el estado. Uno de esos lugares fue la Alemania de la segunda mitad del siglo XVIII, donde autores como Louis de Beausobre, Jean Bernard MĂ©rian, Louis FrĂ©dĂ©ric Ancillon y Carl Friedrich Stäudlin exploraron el escepticismo de autores como Sexto EmpĂrico, David Hume e Immanuel Kant, llegando a la conclusiĂłn de que era inocuo para la polĂtica y la religiĂłnPhilosophical skepticism has often been accused of leading to political conservatism or to radicalism. But in some times and places, it led to neither. Rather, it was tamed and domesticated, rendered harmless to church and state. One of those places was late eighteenth century Germany, where authors such as Louis de Beausobre, Jean Bernard MĂ©rian, Louis FrĂ©dĂ©ric Ancillon, and Carl Friedrich Stäudlin explored the skepticism of thinkers like Sextus Empiricus, David Hume, and Immanuel Kant, concluding that it was harmless for politics and religion
La renuncia de Thomas Mann a la ironĂa en la polĂtica
Thomas Mann developed one of the most subtle theories of irony during World War I, concluding that the best irony was irony against both sides of any issue. Such irony was not inconsistent with love for humanity, and even for both sides. He may well have been justified in using irony against both sides in that war. But with the rise of the Nazis, he abandoned two-sided irony and used his irony mostly against them. One the one hand, this meant a better political position, but on the other hand irony was almost absent from many of his wartime essays and declarations. That may have been justified in such a time of danger, but it meant less art and subtlety in his political writings.Thomas Mann desarollĂł una de las teorĂas más sĂştiles de la ironĂa durante la Primera Guerra Mundial, declarando que la mejor ironĂa era la ironĂa contra los dos lados de cualquier asunto. Tal ironĂa no era incompatible con el amor por la humanidad, y aun por ambas partes. PodrĂa justificarse a Mann por usar la ironĂa contra ambos bandos de esa guerra. Pero tras el ascenso nazi, Mann abandonĂł la ironĂa contra los dos bandos e ironizĂł solo contra el de los Nazis. De una parte, fue esa una posiciĂłn polĂtica mejor, pero de otra perdiĂł casi todo el uso del tropo de la ironĂa en sus escritos polĂticos y declaraciones durante la guerra. CabĂa justificaciĂłn, cierto, a causa de la gravedad del momento, pero sus escritos polĂticos perdieron en arte y sutileza
Denis Diderot on War and Peace: Nature and Morality
Las ideas de Denis Diderot sobre la guerra y la paz revelan muchos de las contradiciones que el identificĂł en el mundo. Por un lado, la guerra es un producto natural de contradiciones entre la ley de la natura y las instituciones humanas. Por otro lado, sDenis Diderot's ideas about war and peace crystalize many of the contradictions in the world that he identified. On the one hand, war is a natural product of contradictions between natural law and human developments. On the other hand, it can and should
Northern Declarations of Freedom of the Press : The Relative Importance of Philosophical Ideas and of Local Politics
In recent works on the Enlightenment and the origin of modern Western thought, there is often a dichotomy between Moderate versus Radical Enlightenment. This essay evaluates the early experiences of freedom of print in Sweden and Denmark against the backdrop of such assertions. Sweden and Denmark were widely diverging polities but they obtained officially recognized freedom of the press at almost the same time. The conclusion is that by the second half of the eighteenth century, the Enlightenment, whether “Radical” or “Moderate,” had created a universal paradigm shift
George Santayana and emotional distance in philosophy and politics
George Santayana (1863-1952) appears emotionally distant and personally uncommitted in many of his writings. In what may have been a related phenomenon, he does not seem to have committed to any school of philosophy, but rather to draw from many of the available schools when it suited him. In this article, we assess his constantly changing use of different philosophies and its implications for both philosophy and politics
When Can You Think Something?
A review essay on what some scholars have said about heterodox thinking in Spain in the eighteenth century, contrasted with evidence from the reviewed book, which is on the Galician inquisition
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