Per una caratterizzazione formale della conoscenza di individui concreti. Un'analisi del problema di onniscienza logica

Questa tesi intende proporre una caratterizzazione formale della conoscenza di individui concreti, vale a dire di agenti con risorse computazionali limitate. Si mostra che le logiche epistemiche classiche non sono adeguate a raggiungere questo scopo: esse considerano il ragionamento di agenti deduttivamente onniscienti. Un'analisi storico-filosofica porta a identificare la causa del problema dell'onniscienza nel principio di analiticità della logica. Tuttavia quest’ultimo è incompatibile con la probabile intrattabilità del calcolo proposizionale classico. Si esamina la recente proposta delle logiche booleane a profondità limitata di D'Agostino e Floridi che distinguono tra inferenze proposizionali analitiche e sintetiche a priori, sulla base delle risorse computazionali necessarie alla deduzione. Si propone quindi una versione modale di quest'approccio: la logica epistemica a profondità limitata caratterizza la conoscenza di individui concreti dal momento che assume soltanto che i suoi agenti conoscano le conseguenze analitiche di ciò che sanno. Infine, si suggerisce un'applicazione di questa caratterizzazione degli agenti concreti al contesto sociale dell'aggregazione di giudizi

The principle of analyticity of logic : a philosophical and formal Perspective

The subject of the present work is the principle of analyticity of logic. In order for the question \u2018Is logic analytic?\u2019 to make sense and before trying to \ufb01nd an answer to this problem, it is obviously necessary to specify two preliminary issues, namely, the meaning of the term \u2018analytic\u2019 and the meaning of the term \u2018logic\u2019. The former issue is somehow justi\ufb01ed and expected: after all, analyticity represents one of the philosophical concepts par excellence and, as such, it has been at the core of a lively debate throughout the history of the discipline. But, despite possible appearances to the contrary, the second issue is probably more decisive than the former in determining the answer to the initial question: both the contents and the philosophical conceptions of logic play a fundamental role in the study of the epistemological status of this discipline. We could even say that the clari\ufb01cation of the concepts of analyticity and of logic constitutes in itself the decision on the analyticity of logic. This thesis studies the principle of analyticity of logic through two di\ufb00erent, but related, methodologies, which individuate the two main parts of the work: the former o\ufb00ers a historical and philosophical reconstruction of the problem; the latter proposes two formal characterizations of the analytic-synthetic distinction. The reconstruction of the \ufb01rst part does not presume to be exhaustive and is restricted to the theories of the following philosophers: Kant, Bolzano, Frege and Hintikka. The material has been chosen according to the following criteria. First, this work aims at showing the \u2018historical\u2019 nature of the principle of analyticity of logic, which has a certain genealogy and a precise starting point. Although after the Vienna Circle this tenet has been taken for granted, there are many and signi\ufb01cant conceptions that criticize it. Theories holding that logic is either not analytic or synthetic are the main characters of our reconstruction. This explains, for example, why we have dedicated great attention to Bolzano, while leaving little margin to the logical empiricist movement, despite the fact that analyticity is probably more fundamental for the latter\u2019s thought than for the former\u2019s philosophical construction. As a result of this choice, theories of meaning and their connection to analyticity are completely overlooked, since they belong to the logical empiricists\u2019 interpretation of the analytic-synthetic distinction. In other words, the principle of analyticity of logic and the philosophers arguing for it are taken as a critical target, but the true focus is on the varieties of reactions against them. [...

Una teoria della razionalità: il modello BDI

In quest’articolo propongo un’analisi di una teoria della razionalità, il modello Belief-Desire-Intention (BDI), con l’obiettivo di stabilirne la fecondità teoretica. Interpreto il modello come il risultato dell’indebolimento di alcuni principi cardine della teoria della scelta razionale: se questa è di natura normativa e considera agenti altamente idealizzati, il modello BDI è invece motivato dallo scopo di dare una caratterizzazione cognitivamente plausibile delle azioni degli individui e inserisce nella definizione di razionalità aspetti non normativi. Per questa ragione, la teoria BDI introduce il concetto di intenzione e complica la propria ontologia: le intenzioni pongono dei vincoli di consistenza sulla componente motivazionale dell’individuo e fungono da filtro di ammissibilità sulla selezione di altre intenzioni (Bratman, 1987). Presento ed analizzo di seguito due formalizzazioni, sviluppatesi in due diverse aree di ricerca (logica e intelligenza artificiale), dei principi filosofici della teoria: il sistema BDICTL*-W3 (Georgeff e Rao, 1998) ed un esempio di Agent Control Loop (Wooldridge, 2000). La discussione vuole rilevare le peculiarità dei vari approcci alla teoria in oggetto, individuare i nodi concettuali comuni ma anche le specificità di ciascun apporto. Concludo quindi con alcune osservazioni di carattere epistemologico sui vantaggi di un approccio plurale

Una teoria della razionalità: il modello BDI

In quest’articolo propongo un’analisi di una teoria della razionalità, il modello Belief-Desire-Intention (BDI), con l’obiettivo di stabilirne la fecondità teoretica. Interpreto il modello come il risultato dell’indebolimento di alcuni principi cardine della teoria della scelta razionale: se questa è di natura normativa e considera agenti altamente idealizzati, il modello BDI è invece motivato dallo scopo di dare una caratterizzazione cognitivamente plausibile delle azioni degli individui e inserisce nella definizione di razionalità aspetti non normativi. Per questa ragione, la teoria BDI introduce il concetto di intenzione e complica la propria ontologia: le intenzioni pongono dei vincoli di consistenza sulla componente motivazionale dell’individuo e fungono da filtro di ammissibilità sulla selezione di altre intenzioni (Bratman 1987). Presento ed analizzo di seguito due formalizzazioni, sviluppatesi in due diverse aree di ricerca (logica e intelligenza artificiale), dei principi filosofici della teoria: il sistema BDICTL*-W3 (Georgeff e Rao 1998) ed un esempio di Agent Control Loop (Wooldridge 2000). La discussione vuole rilevare le peculiarità dei vari approcci alla teoria in oggetto, individuare i nodi concettuali comuni ma anche le specificità di ciascun apporto. Concludo quindi con alcune osservazioni di carattere epistemologico sui vantaggi di un approccio plurale

Towards depth-bounded natural deduction for classical first-order logic

In this paper we lay the foundations of a new proof-theory for classical first-order logic that allows for a natural characterization of a notion of inferential depth. The approach we propose here aims towards extending the proof-theoretical framework presented in [6] by combining it with some ideas inspired by Hin-tikka’s work [18]. Unlike standard natural deduction, in this framework the inference rules that fix the meaning of the logical operators are symmetrical with respect to assent and dissent and do not involve the discharge of formulas. The only discharge rule is a classical dilemma rule whose nested applications provide a sensible measure of inferential depth. The result is a hierarchy of decidable depth-bounded approximations of classical first-order logic that ex-pands the hierarchy of tractable approximations of Boolean logic investigated in [11, 10, 7].</p

Proceedings of the 5th Workshop on Advances in Argumentation in Artificial Intelligence 2021 co-located with the 20th International Conference of the Italian Association for Artificial Intelligence (AIxIA 2021), Milan, Italy, November 29th, 2021

The 5th Workshop on Advances in Argumentation in Artificial Intelligence (AI3 2021), co- located with the 20th International Conference of the Italian Association for Artificial Intelli- gence (AIxIA 2021), was held as an online event on the 29th of September 2021, and it brought together the Italian community working in the field of Argumentation. Argumentation is the study of the processes and activities involving the production and exchange of arguments, where arguments are attempts to persuade someone or something by giving reasons for accepting a particular conclusion as evident. As such, argumentation provides procedures for making and explaining decisions and is able to capture diverse kinds of reasoning and dialogue activities in a formal but still intuitive way, enabling the integration of different specific techniques and the development of trustable applications

The Planet in 2050

In 2050, the billions of people living on Earth have found a way to manage the planetary system effectively. Everyone has access to adequate food, shelter, and clean water. Human health is no longer considered outside of the health of the ecosystems in which people live. Ecological awareness is an integral part of education. People respond effectively to social and environmental hazards, and societies care for the most vulnerable amongst them. The economy, too, has shifted. Carbon dioxide management is under control, and energy efficiency is the norm. The remaining rainforests have been preserved. Coral reefs are recovering. Fish stocks are thriving. Is any of this really possible? How can our complex social and economic systems interact with a complex planetary system undergoing rapid change to create a future we all want? This book is a contextualised collation of ideas articulated by the 50 participants of the Planet 2050 workshop held in Lund in October 2008, as part of The Planet in 2050, an interdisciplinary Fast Track Initiative of the International Geosphere-Biosphere Programme. Participants were selected from academia and the sustainability practice community to give a wide-ranging, multi-cultural, trans-disciplinary set of perspectives. This collection explores four broad sectoral themes: energy and technologies; development, economies and culture; environment; and land use change. By doing so, this book emphasises the importance of a social dialogue on our collective future, and our responsibility to the Earth. It makes strong statements about what needs to happen to the global economy for a sustainable future and documents a new kind of scholarly discussion, engaging people from diverse knowledge communities in a spirit of exploration and reflexivity. The book provides a focus for dialogue and further study for postgraduates and researchers interested in global change as a multi-faceted, socio-environmental phenomenon, and as the book is written in an accessible scholarly style, assuming no prior specialist knowledge, it is also suitable for those involved in sustainability initiatives and polic