22 research outputs found
On the existence of the true value of a probability. Part 2: The representation theorem and the ergodic theory
Some authors, basing their ideas on the exchangeability property, on the postulates of the representation theorem and on its interpretation in the ambit of ergodic theory, believed to find a counterexample to the subjectivist model through the theoretical justification of the existence of an objective probability. As a proof of the inconsistency of this reasoning, the representation theorem allows to assert that the convergence of the relative frequency on a âtrue valueâ of the probability is only a metaphysical illusion motivated by an asymptotic behaviour of the personal assessments of initial probabilities, leading to intersubjective assignment. With regard to the ergodic theory, its assimilation to the propensity model allows the demonstration of its metaphysical character and the resulting subjectivity in the assignment f probabilities.
On the existence of the true value of a probability. Part I: Determinism versus aleatorism
Objetivist models are based on the deterministic hypothesis that postulates the existence of probability, which is cognoscible only in an asymptotic manner. On the other hand, subjectivist models consider the aleatoristic hypothesis according to which there is no truth about probability. However, both hypotheses may only be compared through stochastic models, which are not strictly falsifiable. Therefore, neither the hypothesis stating the existence of a true value regarding the probability of occurrence of an event nor de FinettiÂŽs postulate which sustains that âprobability does not existâ are strictly verifiable.
On the existence of the true value of a probability. Part 1: Determinism versus aleatorism
Objetivist models are based on the deterministic hypothesis that postulates the existence of probability, which is cognoscible only in an asymptotic manner. On the other hand, subjectivist models consider the aleatoristic hypothesis according to which there is no truth about probability. However, both hypotheses may only be compared through stochastic models, which are not strictly falsifiable. Therefore, neither the hypothesis stating the existence of a true value regarding the probability of occurrence of an event nor de Finetti's postulate which sustains that probability does not exist are strictly verifiable
On the existence of the true value of a probability. Part 2: The representation theorem and the ergodic theory
Some authors, basing their ideas on the exchangeability property, on the postulates of the representation theorem and on its interpretation in the ambit of ergodic theory, believed to find a counterexample to the subjectivist model through the theoretical justification of the existence of an objective probability. As a proof of the inconsistency of this reasoning, the representation theorem allows to assert that the convergence of the relative frequency on a true value of the probability is only a metaphysical illusion motivated by an asymptotic behaviour of the personal assessments of initial probabilities, leading to intersubjective assignment. With regard to the ergodic theory, its assimilation to the propensity model allows the demonstration of its metaphysical character and the resulting subjectivity in the assignment of probabilities
CRITERIOS DE INFORMACIĂN Y COMPLEJIDAD ESTOCĂSTICA
The objective criteria for the selection of the order of an autoregressive model can be classified into non-Bayesians, which are those based on the minimization of the prediction error and on the information measures, and Bayesians. The former group assume the validity of the hypothesis that every process is affected by its infinite past and provides asymptotically efficient estimators, while the Bayesians rely on the denial of the Church-Turing thesis and provide consistent estimators. To avoid the disjunctive generated by this classification, it is proposed to characterize the model through the definition of stochastic complexity. The application of this concept and the postulates of the convergence theorems of the complexity measures allow in addition to demonstrate the optimal condition of the penalty term of the Schwarz selection criterion.Los criterios objetivos de selección del orden de un modelo autorregresivo pueden ser clasificados en no-Bayesianos -basados en la minimización del error de predicción y las medidas de información- y Bayesianos. La diferencia entre ambos radica en que los primeros asumen como punto de partida la validez de la hipótesis de que todo proceso estå afectado por su infinito pasado y proporcionan estimadores asintóticamente eficientes en tanto que los Bayesianos se basan en la negación de la tesis de Church-Turing y proporcionan estimadores consistentes. A fin de evitar la disyuntiva que genera esta clasificación, en este trabajo se propone caracterizar al modelo utilizando la definición de complejidad estocåstica. La aplicación de este concepto y los postulados de los teoremas de convergencia de las medidas de complejidad permiten demostrar, ademås, la condición de óptimo del término de penalización del criterio de selección de Schwarz
Acerca del criterio de optimizaciĂłn basado en la maximizaciĂłn de la utilidad esperada
Se analizan la validez y los alcances de la definiciĂłn de esperanza matemĂĄtica y las condiciones formales que debe satisfacer la funciĂłn de utilidad a fin de garantizar la validez del criterio de optimizaciĂłn basado en la maximizaciĂłn de la utilidad esperada. En particular, se realiza un anĂĄlisis crĂtico de las justificaciones de la aparente preferencia por la violaciĂłn del axioma de independencia de Von Neumman-Morgenstern y una correcciĂłn a los postulados del teorema de Menger a partir de las funciones de preferencias suavizadas
Acerca del "regellosigkeitsaxiom" de von Mises
Se propone realizar una objeciĂłn formal al axioma de irregularidad de von Mises y postular la posibilidad de aproximar los conceptos de aleatorio y demostrable, a partir de la consideraciĂłn de procesos dinĂĄmicos con atractores complejos
Acerca de la probabilidad: Parte 1: la interpretaciĂłn del concepto de azar y la definiciĂłn de probabilidad
Fil: Landro, Alberto H.
El concepto de probabilidad en la obra de Lord Keynes
La interpretaciĂłn logicista propuesta por Keynes condujo a un modelo en el que la probabilidad se traduce en un grado de creencia racional concebido como una relaciĂłn entre un cuerpo de conocimiento y una proposiciĂłn o conjunto de\nproposiciones. Un anĂĄlisis detenido del "Treatise on probability" permite concluir: i) que el modelo Keynesiano no sĂłlo es una consecuencia, sino que constituye una extensiĂłn de los "Principia mathematica" y los "Problems of philosophy" en la que la aproximaciĂłn al concepto de probabilidad es perfectamente asimilable a la aproximaciĂłn de Russell y Whitehead a la matemĂĄtica y ii) que, mĂĄs allĂĄ de la naturaleza innegablemente metafĂsica, la representaciĂłn numĂ©rica de la probabilidad logicista comprende un nĂșmero muy restringido de casos, debido a la calidad de heurĂstico del principio de indiferencia. En lo que respecta al "Treatise on money" y a la "General theory", es posible concluir que el tratamiento "quasi" probabilĂstico delas relaciones causales que vinculan a las variables demuestra que la descripciĂłn de Keynes sobre la naturaleza del "sistema econĂłmico" revela una confusa interpretaciĂłn de las nociones de modelo econĂłmico y modelo estocĂĄstico
Elementos de econometrĂa de los fenĂłmenos dinĂĄmicos: parte 1, los procesos estocĂĄsticos lineales unidimensionales
Fil: Landro, Alberto H..Fil: GonzĂĄlez, Mirta Lidia