`Representing and Being Represented in Turn’ - A Symposium on Hélène Landemore’s "Open Democracy"

Hélene Landemore’s Open Democracy challenges today’s democracies to meet their legitimacy deficits by opening up a wide array of participatory opportunities, from enhanced forms of direct democracy, to internet crowdsourcing, to representation through random selection to a citizens’ assembly: “representing and being represented in turn” (p. xvii).  Her aim: to replace citizen consent with citizen power.  The critics advance both praise and misgivings.  Joshua Cohen asks if Landemore's innovations are best understood as supplements or alternatives to the current system. Daniele Cammack argues for the significance of open mass meetings as well as smaller representative bodies. Peter Stone considers citizens’ assemblies inadequate for popular sovereignty.  Christopher Achen warns of problems in accurate representation, through both self-selection into the lottery and domination in the discussion. Ethan Lieb argues that particular innovations are useful only in some contexts, and that in each citizens should learn their appropriate role responsibilities. Landemore responds by agreeing, clarifying and rebutting

Defining human-machine micro-task workflows for constitution making

This paper presents a novel task-oriented approach to crowdsource the drafting of a constitution. By considering micro-tasking as a particular form of crowdsourcing, it defines a workflow-based approach based on Onto2Flow, an ontology that models the basic concepts and roles to represent workflow-definitions. The approach is then applied to a prototype platform for constitution-making where human workers are requested to contribute to a set of tasks. The paper concludes by discussing previous approaches to participatory constitution-making and identifying areas for future work.This work is part-funded by FEDER Funds, by the ERDF (European Regional Development Fund) through the COMPETE Programme (Operational Programme for Competitiveness) and by National Funds through the FCT (Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology) within the project FCOMP-01-0124-FEDER-028980 (PTDC/EEI-SII/1386/2012). The work of Nuno Luz is supported by the doctoral grant SFRH/BD/70302/2010. The work of Marta Poblet draws from previous research within the framework of the project “Crowdsourcing: instrumentos semánticos para el desarrollo de la participación y la mediación online” (DER 2012-39492-C02-01) by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio

Deliberative and epistemic approaches to democracy

Deliberative and epistemic approaches to democracy are two important dimensions of contemporary democratic theory. This chapter studies these dimensions in the emerging ecosystem of civic and political participation tools, and appraises their collective value in a new distinct concept: linked democracy. Linked democracy is the distributed, technology-supported collective decision-making process, where data, information and knowledge are connected and shared by citizens online. Innovation and learning are two key elements of Athenian democracies which can be facilitated by the new digital technologies, and a cross-disciplinary research involving computational scientists and democratic theorists can lead to new theoretical insights of democracy

A multidimensional account of democratic legitimacy: how to make robust decisions in a non-idealized deliberative context

This paper analyses the possibility of granting legitimacy to democratic decisionmaking procedures in a context of deep pluralism. We defend a multidimensional account according to which a legitimate system needs to grant, on the one hand, that citizens should be included on an equal footing and acknowledged as reflexive political agents rather than mere beneficiaries of policies, and, on the other hand, that their decisions have an epistemic quality. While Estlund\u2019s account of imperfect epistemic proceduralism might seem to embody a dualistic conception of democratic legitimacy, we point out that it is not able to recognize citizens as reflexive political agents and is grounded in an idealized model of the circumstances of deliberation. To overcome these ambiguities, we develop an account of democratic legitimacy according to which disagreement is the proper expression of citizens\u2019 reflexive agency and the attribution of epistemic authority does not stem from a major expertise or specific ability, but it comes through the public confrontation among disagreeing agents. Consequently, the epistemic value of deliberation should be derived from the reasons-giving process rather than from the reference to the alleged quality of its outcomes. In this way, we demonstrate the validity of the multidimensional perspective of legitimacy, yet abstain from introducing any outcome-oriented criterion. Finally, we argue that this account of legitimacy is well suited for modeling deliberative democracy as a decision-making procedure that respects the agency of every citizen and grants her opportunity to influence public choices

The choice of efficiencies and the necessity of politics

Efficiency requires legislative political institutions. There are many ways efficiency can be promoted, and so an ongoing legislative institution is necessary to resolve this choice in a politically sustainable and economically flexible way. This poses serious problems for classical liberal proposals to constitutionally protect markets from government intervention, as seen in the work of Ilya Somin, Guido Pincione & Fernando Tesón and others. The argument for the political nature of efficiency is set out in terms of both Pareto optimality and aggregate welfare maximisation, and similar arguments can be generalised to other social values

Social Participation Network: Linking things, services and people to support participatory processes

International audienceDigital technologies have impacted almost every aspect of our society, including how people participate in activities that matter to them. Indeed, digital participation allows people to be involved in different societal activities at an unprecedented scale through the use of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT). Still, enabling participation at scale requires making it seamless for people to: interact with a variety of software platforms, get information from connected physical objects and software services, and communicate and collaborate with their peers. Toward this objective, this paper introduces and formalizes the concept of Social Participation Network, which captures the diverse participation relationships-between people, digital services and connected things-supporting participatory processes. The paper further presents the design of an associated online service to support the creation and management of Social Participation Networks. The design advocates the instantiation of Social Participation Networks within distinct participation contexts-spanning, e.g., private institutions, neighbor communities, and governmental institutions-so that the participants' information and contributions to participation remain isolated and private within the given context

Rethinking Radical Democracy

Over the course of three decades, vocabularies of radical democracy have pressed their stamp on democratic thought. Trading on the intuition that there is more to democracy than elections, they have generated critical insights into the important role that practices of pluralisation and critique play in bettering institutional politics. As a result, few would today deny the radical democratic contribution to democratic thought. What many might question, however, is its continuing traction. The paper probes this question, focusing on the nuanced place of democracy in contemporary radical work. It grapples with the difficulties that this poses for radical democrats and it suggests that a way of overcoming these difficulties – that threaten to undermine the coherence of radical democracy – is to rethink and reconstruct the distinctiveness of its vocabulary. The paper attempts such a reconstruction. It develops the idea of the promissory rule of the many and it discusses the ways it rejuvenates broader democratic thought

Self-Censorship for Democrats

On the face of it, self-censorship is profoundly subversive of democracy, particularly in its talk-centric forms, and undermines the culture of openness and publicity on which it relies. This paper has two purposes. The first is to develop a conception of self-censorship that allows us to capture what is distinctive about the concept from a political perspective and which allows us to understand the democratic anxiety about self-censorship: if it is not obvious that biting our tongues is always wrong, we need a fuller account of the moral sensibility that finds it so troubling and this is elaborated here. The second is to develop an argument to the effect that this sensibility should not have the last, or only, word, but instead that self-censorship should be viewed as an ‘ordinary vice’ of democratic societies. The grounds for tolerating it rest on the democratic values that critics believe it threatens

Language Proficiency and Migration: An Argument Against Testing

This paper aims at questioning the rationale for language testing in immigration policies. Although we consider knowledge of the host country’s language(s) useful and desirable for both the migrant and the host society, we argue that mandatory language testing cannot be justified. Our purpose is to offer justifications for rejecting language as a legitimate tool for controlling state borders and to regulate (access to) citizenship of a liberal democracy

Empathetic Understanding and Deliberative Democracy

Epistemic democracy is standardly characterized in terms of “aiming at truth”. This presupposes a veritistic conception of epistemic value, according to which truth is the fundamental epistemic goal. I will raise an objection to the standard (veritistic) account of epistemic democracy, focusing specifically on deliberative democracy. I then propose a version of deliberative democracy that is grounded in non‐veritistic epistemic goals. In particular, I argue that deliberation is valuable because it facilitates empathetic understanding. I claim that empathetic understanding is an epistemic good that doesn't have truth as its primary goal