A Radical Enactivist Account of Social Cognition

In this paper, a radical enactivist account of social cognition is given, showing how we move from neurons to mindreading skills without the need of introducing any idea of mental content or internal representation. In order to accomplish this task, a two-levels model that keeps together radical enactivism, interactive specialization and semiotics narrativity is introduced. Starting from the subpersonal action/perception/imagination matching mechanism implemented in mirror neurons and from the reward network \u2013 encouraging us to prefer the stimuli and the experiences that lead to a positive sanction \u2013 it is action with its narrative logic that turns a very general embodied matching system into a mindreading module tuned to the meaning of the actions of the others during interaction. An overview of the ontogenetic processes that lead to mindreading through joint attention, semiotic competence, deception skills, pretend play and language acquisition is also given. Our everyday practice of making sense of intentional actions in terms of reasons (beliefs, desires etc.) is a skill that comes from social narrative practices in which we manipulate others, we try to make others do things inside a shared system of values, we gain the competences needed to do those kinds of things, we act and we get judged on our actions. This kind of activity grounds the relationship between caregivers and baby before verbal language shows up and is a pattern of action that can be found not only in primates, but probably in a variety of other social animals