Multinational business groups

This paper provides a primer on European multinational business groups (BGs) and their subsidiaries. Firms in these BGs appear to have higher sales performance than firms in domestic groups (15% higher). This leads us to investigate which elements increase the likelihood that a group will transition towards multinational status. BGs’ characteristics matter for foreign acquisition: groups becoming multinational are usually larger, have a more hierarchical structure with respect to the number of layers in a group, and are more diverse in terms of sectors. Groups tend to expand into bordering countries or countries providing particular advantages, such as a large internal market. The first acquisition is a corporate-level decision that appears to be made by the group’s controlling firm and is often a diversification into a different industry

Towards a New Architecture for Financial Stability: Seven Principles

This is a pre-copy-editing, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in Journal of International Economic Law following peer review. The definitive publisher-authenticated version [Journal of International Economic Law 13(3):597-621 2010] is available online at: http://jiel.oxfordjournals.org/content/13/3/597.full.pdf+html

Production Hierarchies in Sweden

I study the internal organization of firms using occupation data on workers in Swedish manufacturing firms. Firms with more layers are larger in size, in value added, and they pay higher wages. Firms are hierarchal in that lower layers have more workers and lower mean wage than higher layers. Adding layers is associated with increases in mean firm size/value added and decreases in mean firm wages (at pre-existing layers). The reverse holds for removing layers. This result also holds for layer by layer mean size and wages for a majority of pre-existing layers

Occupational choice, number of entrepreneurs and output: theory and empirical evidence with Spanish data

This paper extends the (Lucas, Bell J Econ 9:508–523,1978) model of occupational choices by individuals with different skills, beyond the simple options of self-employment or wage-employment, by including a second choice for the self-employed. That is, an option to hire employees and so become self-employed with employees (SEWEs), or to be self-employed without employees (SEWNEs). We solve for the market equilibrium and examine the sensitivity of relative sizes of occupational groups, and of the level of productivity, to changes in the exogenous parameters. The results show that the positive (negative) association between number of SEWEs (SEWNEs) and productivity, observed in the Spanish data, can be explained, under certain conditions, as the result of cross-region and time differences in average skills. These findings point to the importance of distinguishing between SEWEs and SEWNEs in drawing valid conclusions concerning any link between entrepreneurship and economic development

Optimal network topologies for local search with congestion

The problem of searchability in decentralized complex networks is of great importance in computer science, economy and sociology. We present a formalism that is able to cope simultaneously with the problem of search and the congestion effects that arise when parallel searches are performed, and obtain expressions for the average search cost--written in terms of the search algorithm and the topological properties of the network--both in presence and abscence of congestion. This formalism is used to obtain optimal network structures for a system using a local search algorithm. It is found that only two classes of networks can be optimal: star-like configurations, when the number of parallel searches is small, and homogeneous-isotropic configurations, when the number of parallel searches is large.Comment: 4 pages. Final version accepted in PR

Heterogeneity and the dynamics of technology adoption

We estimate the demand for a videocalling technology in the presence of both network effects and heterogeneity. Using a unique dataset from a large multinational firm, we pose and estimate a fully dynamic model of technology adoption. We propose a novel identification strategy based on post-adoption technology usage to disentangle equilibrium beliefs concerning the evolution of the network from observed and unobserved heterogeneity in technology adoption costs and use benefits. We find that employees have significant heterogeneity in both adoption costs and network benefits, and have preferences for diverse networks. Using our estimates, we evaluate a number of counterfactual adoption policies, and find that a policy of strategically targeting the right subtype for initial adoption can lead to a faster-growing and larger network than a policy of uncoordinated or diffuse adoption

Sabotage in Contests: A Survey

A contest is a situation in which individuals expend irretrievable resources to win valuable prize(s). ‘Sabotage’ is a deliberate and costly act of damaging a rival’s' likelihood of winning the contest. Sabotage can be observed in, e.g., sports, war, promotion tournaments, political or marketing campaigns. In this article, we provide a model and various perspectives on such sabotage activities and review the economics literature analyzing the act of sabotage in contests. We discuss the theories and evidence highlighting the means of sabotage, why sabotage occurs, and the effects of sabotage on individual players and on overall welfare, along with possible mechanisms to reduce sabotage. We note that most sabotage activities are aimed at the ablest player, the possibility of sabotage reduces productive effort exerted by the players, and sabotage may lessen the effectiveness of public policies, such as affirmative action, or information revelation in contests. We discuss various policies that a designer may employ to counteract sabotage activities. We conclude by pointing out some areas of future research

Relational Contracts and Organizational Capabilities

A large literature identifies unique organizational capabilities as a potent source of competitive advantage, yet our knowledge of why capabilities fail to diffuse more rapidly—particularly in situations in which competitors apparently have strong incentives to adopt them and a well-developed understanding of how they work—remains incomplete. In this paper we suggest that competitively significant capabilities often rest on managerial practices that in turn rely on relational contracts (i.e., informal agreements sustained by the shadow of the future). We argue that one of the reasons these practices may be difficult to copy is that effective relational contracts must solve the twin problems of credibility and clarity and that although credibility might, in principle, be instantly acquired, clarity may take time to develop and may interact with credibility in complex ways so that relational contracts may often be difficult to build