Negative Network Externalities in Two-Sided Markets: A Competition Approach

Consider a firm advertising in a job matching agency with the aim of employing the most qualified workers. Its chances of success would be higher for a smaller number of competitor firms advertising in the same job matching agency, i.e. careerbuilder.com. How would the resulting competitive behavior among the firms which are advertising to this job matching agency affect the agency’s optimal pricing behavior? I analyze the optimal market structures and pricing strategies of a monopolist platform in a two-sided market setup in which the agents on each side prefer the platform to be less competitive on their side; that is, a market with negative intra-group network externalities. I find that the equilibrium market structure varies with the extent of negative externalities. If the market’s negative network externalities are substantial, that is, if an agent’s disutility given the size of the agent pool on his side is high (enough), then the profit-maximizing strategy for the matchmaker will be to match the highest types of one side with all of the agents on the other side, by charging a relatively high price from the former side and allowing free entrance for the agents of the latter side. However, if the network externalities on one side are not substantial, then the matchmaker will maximize profits by matching an equal number of agents from each side. This paper thus provides an explanation of the asymmetric pricing schedules in two-sided markets where the matchmaker uses a one-program pricing schedule.two-sided market; externalities

Negative Network Externalities in Two-Sided Markets: A Competition Approach

Consider a firm advertising in a job matching agency with the aim of employing the most qualified workers. Its chances of success would be higher for a smaller number of competitor firms advertising in the same job matching agency, i.e. careerbuilder.com. How would the resulting competitive behavior among the firms which are advertising to this job matching agency affect the agency’s optimal pricing behavior? I analyze the optimal market structures and pricing strategies of a monopolist platform in a two-sided market setup in which the agents on each side prefer the platform to be less competitive on their side; that is, a market with negative intra-group network externalities. I find that the equilibrium market structure varies with the extent of negative externalities. If the market’s negative network externalities are substantial, that is, if an agent’s disutility given the size of the agent pool on his side is high (enough), then the profit-maximizing strategy for the matchmaker will be to match the highest types of one side with all of the agents on the other side, by charging a relatively high price from the former side and allowing free entrance for the agents of the latter side. However, if the network externalities on one side are not substantial, then the matchmaker will maximize profits by matching an equal number of agents from each side. This paper thus provides an explanation of the asymmetric pricing schedules in two-sided markets where the matchmaker uses a one-program pricing schedule

Negative Network Externalities in Two-Sided Markets: A Competition Approach

Consider a firm advertising in a job matching agency with the aim of employing the most qualified workers. Its chances of success would be higher for a smaller number of competitor firms advertising in the same job matching agency, i.e. careerbuilder.com. How would the resulting competitive behavior among the firms which are advertising to this job matching agency affect the agency’s optimal pricing behavior? I analyze the optimal market structures and pricing strategies of a monopolist platform in a two-sided market setup in which the agents on each side prefer the platform to be less competitive on their side; that is, a market with negative intra-group network externalities. I find that the equilibrium market structure varies with the extent of negative externalities. If the market’s negative network externalities are substantial, that is, if an agent’s disutility given the size of the agent pool on his side is high (enough), then the profit-maximizing strategy for the matchmaker will be to match the highest types of one side with all of the agents on the other side, by charging a relatively high price from the former side and allowing free entrance for the agents of the latter side. However, if the network externalities on one side are not substantial, then the matchmaker will maximize profits by matching an equal number of agents from each side. This paper thus provides an explanation of the asymmetric pricing schedules in two-sided markets where the matchmaker uses a one-program pricing schedule

Robustness of buffer allocation in multi-product multi-batch deterministic flow lines

Ankara : Department of Management and Graduate School of Business Administration of Bilkent University, 1993.Thesis (Master's) -- Bilkent University, 1993.Includes bibliographical references leaves 83-87.Today in industry flow lines are not just for a single end product. There is a stochasticity, such that there are various demand scenarios at hand, to be satisfied by the flow line. The performance of the flow line should not be very sensitive to demand changes. Aim of this study is to develop buffer allocation guidelines to help flow line designers.Kurucu, A AkınM.S

İstanbul

Taha Toros Arşivi, Dosya No: 120-Saraylarİstanbul Kalkınma Ajansı (TR10/14/YEN/0033) İstanbul Development Agency (TR10/14/YEN/0033)Şehit Ali Paşa'nın Sarayıİstanbul Sevdas

Orta Karadeniz’den Örneklenen Merlangius merlangus‘un Dört Otolit Karakterinin Dalgalı Asimetrisinin İncelenmesi

Fluctuating asymmetry was calculated for the otolith width, length, area and perimeter of Merlangius merlangus caught in the Middle Black Sea. In the present study, M. merlangus samples were divided nine-total length groups. All total length groups were examined for asymmetry values in the otolith characters, the highest asymmetry values were found in the Group III. The lowest asymmetry values in four otolith characters such as area, length, perimeter, and width were calculated in the Group I and Group IX. In this study, it was determined that the otolith asymmetry levels of M. merlangus in the Middle Black Sea were varied between the four otolith characters, the otolith area has the highest and the otolith length has the lowest asymmetric feature. In addition, there was no significant relationship between the asymmetry values of the four otolith characters and total length. The asymmetry in these otolith characters may be a result of the stress from different pollutants in the Black Sea.Orta Karadeniz'den yakalanan Merlangius merlangus’un otolit genişliği, uzunluğu, alanı ve çevresi için dalgalı asimetri değerleri hesaplanmıştır. Bu çalışmada elde edilen M. merlangus örnekleri dokuz total boy grubuna ayrılmıştır. Tüm total boy grupları, otolit karakterlerindeki asimetri değerleri açısından incelenmiş ve en yüksek asimetri değerleri Grup III'de bulunmuştur. Alan, uzunluk, çevre ve genişlik gibi dört otolit karakterindeki en düşük asimetri değerleri Grup I ve Grup IX'de hesaplanmıştır. Bu çalışmada, Orta Karadeniz'deki M. merlangus'un otolit asimetri düzeylerinin bu dört otolit karakteri arasında farklılık gösterdiği, otolit alanının en yüksek ve otolit boyunun ise en düşük asimetrik özelliğe sahip oluğu belirlenmiştir. Ayrıca bu dört otolit karakterinin asimetri değerleri ile total boy grupları arasında anlamlı bir ilişki yoktur. Bu türün otolit karakterlerinde gözlenen asimetri Karadeniz’deki farklı kirleticilerden kaynaklı stresin bir sonucu olabilir