62 research outputs found
Review of "Wyznania buddyjskiego ateisty" [Confession of a Buddhist atheist] by Stephen Batchelor, trans. Berenika Janczarska, Robert SudĂłĆ, Warszawa : Wydawnictwo Czarna Owca, 2012
Widzenie pustki a doĆwiadczenie mistyczne â przypadek madhjamaki
Seeing of emptiness and mystical experience â the case of Madhyamaka: The problem of Buddhist religiosity is one of the most classic problems of Buddhist studies. A particular version of this issue is the search for mystical experience in Buddhism. This is due to the conviction that mystical experience is the essence of religious experience itself. The discovery of such an alleged experience fuels comparative speculations between Buddhism and the philosophical and religious traditions of the Mediterranean area. Madhyamaka is the Buddhist tradition which many researchers saw as the fulfillment of such mystical aspirations in Buddhism. In this paper I specify the standard parameters of mystical experience (nonâconceptuality, ineffability, paradoxicality, silence, oneness, fullness) and I conclude that they either cannot be applied to Madhyamaka or that the application is only illusory
The problem of identity of being in Buddhist philosophy
The Buddhist philosophical school of Madhyamaka is famous for its statement that things
do not have their own inherent nature, essence or selfânature (svabhÄva). As a result, it is said
that there is no objective foundation of the identity of things. Thus, the identity of things
is not grounded in things themselves but is solely imputed and externally imposed on them.
Things are what they are only for us, whereas for themselves, or from their âown sideâ they are
empty (ĆĆ«nya). That is why Madhyamaka philosophy is often compared to the philosophical
conceptions inspired by a linguistic reflection (from Ludwig Wittgenstein to Jacques Derrida)
which defines the problem of identity in terms of cognitive subjectivism and constructivism.
Starting the analysis from the Abhidharma Buddhist tradition I will show that this reading of
Madhyamaka view is too narrow. I will demonstrate that it is a result of an assumption, shared
by Parmenides and Plato and wrongly ascribed to this Buddhist school, that the identity of beâ
ing must be grounded in the selfâexisting, selfâdefined and (relatively) permanent ontological
foundation. This tacit assumption, if rejected, makes any identity a completely subjective and
relative construct. The point I am going to argue for, however, is that the Madhyamaka school
sticks to an alternative understanding of objectivity; the foundation of all things is nothing
but pure relation that precedes, in the ontological sense, all coârelated elements (i.e. things).
Therefore, the question comes up: how beingâinârelationship or ârelationalityâ may be the
foundation of identity and what kind of identity it endows. I will try to answer these questions
Zagadnienie toĆŒsamoĆci bytu w filozofii buddyjskiej
The problem of identity of being in Buddhist philosophy:
The Buddhist philosophical school of Madhyamaka is famous for its statement that things do not have their own inherent nature, essence or selfânature (svabhÄva). As a result, it is said that there is no objective foundation of the identity of things. Thus, the identity of things is not grounded in things themselves but is solely imputed and externally imposed on them. Things are what they are only for us, whereas for themselves, or from their âown sideâ they are empty (ĆĆ«nya). That is why Madhyamaka philosophy is often compared to the philosophical conceptions inspired by a linguistic reflection (from Ludwig Wittgenstein to Jacques Derrida) which defines the problem of identity in terms of cognitive subjectivism and constructivism. Starting the analysis from the Abhidharma Buddhist tradition I will show that this reading of Madhyamaka view is too narrow. I will demonstrate that it is a result of an assumption, shared by Parmenides and Plato and wrongly ascribed to this Buddhist school, that the identity of being must be grounded in the selfâexisting, selfâdefined and (relatively) permanent ontological foundation. This tacit assumption, if rejected, makes any identity a completely subjective and relative construct. The point I am going to argue for, however, is that the Madhyamaka school sticks to an alternative understanding of objectivity; the foundation of all things is nothing but pure relation that precedes, in the ontological sense, all coârelated elements (i.e. things). Therefore, the question comes up: how beingâinârelationship or ârelationalityâ may be the foundation of identity and what kind of identity it endows. I will try to answer these questions
Experimental study of radiative shocks at PALS facility
We report on the investigation of strong radiative shocks generated with the
high energy, sub-nanosecond iodine laser at PALS. These shock waves are
characterized by a developed radiative precursor and their dynamics is analyzed
over long time scales (~50 ns), approaching a quasi-stationary limit. We
present the first preliminary results on the rear side XUV spectroscopy. These
studies are relevant to the understanding of the spectroscopic signatures of
accretion shocks in Classical T Tauri Stars.Comment: 21 pages, 1 table, 7 figure
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