R&D Investments with Competitive Interactions

In this article we develop a model to analyze patent-protected R&D investment projects when there is (imperfect) competition in the development and marketing of the resulting product. The competitive interactions that occur substantially complicate the solution of the problem since the decision maker has to take into account not only the factors that affect her/his own decisions, but also the factors that affect the decisions of the other investors. The real options framework utilized to deal with investments under uncertainty is extended to incorporate the game theoretic concepts required to deal with these interactions. Implementation of the model shows that competition in R&D, in general, not only increases production and reduces prices, but also shortens the time of developing the product and increases the probability of a successful development. These benefits to society are countered by increased total investment costs in R&D and lower aggregate value of the R&D investment projects.

Guaranteed investment contracts: distributed and undistributed excess return

Annual minimum rate of return guarantees are analyzed together with rules for distribution of positive excess return, i.e. investment returns in excess of the guaranteed minimum return. Together with the level of the annual minimum rate of return guarantee both the customer's and the insurer's fractions of the positive excess return are determined so that the market value of the insurer's capital inflow (determined by the fraction of the positive excess return) equals the market value of the insurer's capital outflow (determined by the minimum rate of return guarantee) at the inception of the contract. The analysis is undertaken both with and without a surplus distribution mechanism. The surplus distribution mechanism works through a bonus account that serves as a buffer in the following sense: in ("bad") years when the investment returns are lower than the minimum rate of return guarantee, funds are transferred from the bonus account to the customer's account. In ("good") years when the investment returns are above the minimum rate of return guarantee, a part of the positive excess return is credited to the bonus account. In addition to characterizations of fair combinations of the level of the annual minimum rate of return guarantee and the sharing rules of the positive excess return, our analysis indicates that the presence of a surplus distribution mechanism allows the insurer to offer a much wider menu of contracts to the customer than without a surplus distribution mechanism

Dynamic Capital Structure with Callable Debt and Debt Renegotiations

We consider a dynamic trade-off model of a firm’s capital structure with debt renegotiation. Debt holders only accept restructuring offers from equity holders backed by threats which are in the equity holders’ own interest to execute. Our model shows that in a complete information model in which taxes and bankruptcy costs are the only frictions, violations of the absolute priority rule (APR) are typically optimal. The size of the bankruptcy costs and the equity holders’ bargaining power affect the size of APR violations, but they have only a minor impact on the choice of capital structure

Guaranteed investment contracts: distributed and undistributed excess return

Annual minimum rate of return guarantees are analyzed together with rules for distribution of positive excess return, i.e. investment returns in excess of the guaranteed minimum return. Together with the level of the annual minimum rate of return guarantee both the customer's and the insurer's fractions of the positive excess return are determined so that the market value of the insurer's capital inflow (determined by the fraction of the positive excess return) equals the market value of the insurer's capital outflow (determined by the minimum rate of return guarantee) at the inception of the contract. The analysis is undertaken both with and without a surplus distribution mechanism. The surplus distribution mechanism works through a bonus account that serves as a buffer in the following sense: in ("bad") years when the investment returns are lower than the minimum rate of return guarantee, funds are transferred from the bonus account to the customer's account. In ("good") years when the investment returns are above the minimum rate of return guarantee, a part of the positive excess return is credited to the bonus account. In addition to characterizations of fair combinations of the level of the annual minimum rate of return guarantee and the sharing rules of the positive excess return, our analysis indicates that the presence of a surplus distribution mechanism allows the insurer to offer a much wider menu of contracts to the customer than without a surplus distribution mechanism

Pricing rate of return guarantees in a Heath-Jarrow-Morton framework

Rate of return guarantees are included in many financial products, for example life insurance contracts or guaranteed investment contracts issued by investment banks. The holder of such a contract is guaranteed a fixed periodically rate of return rather than - or in addition to - a fixed absolute amount at expiration. We consider rate of return guarantees where the underlying rate of return is either (i) the rate of return on a stock investment or (ii) the short-term interest rate. Various types of these rate of return guarantees are priced in a general no-arbitrage Heath-Jarrow-Morton framework. We show that despite fundamental differences in the underlying rate of return processes ((i) or (ii)), the resulting pricing formulas for the guarantees are remarkably similar. Finally, we show how the term structure models of Vasicek (1977) and Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985) occur as special cases in our more general framework based on the model of Heath, Jarrow, and Morton (1992)

R&D investments with competitive interactions

In this article we develop a model to analyze patent-protected R&D investment projects when there is (imperfect) competition in the development and marketing of the resulting product. The competitive interactions that occur substantially complicate the solution of the problem since the decision maker has to take into account not only the factors that affect her/his own decisions, but also the factors that affect the decisions of the other investors. The real options framework utilized to deal with investments under uncertainty is extended to incorporate the game theoretic concepts required to deal with these interactions. Implementation of the model shows that competition in R&D not only increases production and reduces prices, but also shortens the time of developing the product and increases the probability of a successful development. These benefits to society are countered by increased total investment costs in R&D and lower aggregate value of the R&D investment projects

Commodity price modelling that matches current observables: A new approach,” Quantitative Finance

Abstract. We develop a stochastic model of the spot commodity price and the spot convenience yield such that the model matches the current term structure of forward and futures prices, the current term structure of forward and futures volatilities, and the inter-temporal pattern of the volatility of the forward and futures prices. We let the underlying commodity price be a geometric Brownian motion and we let the spot convenience yield have a mean-reverting structure. The flexibility of the model, which makes it possible to simultaneously obtain all these goals, comes from allowing the volatility of the spot commodity price, the speed of mean-reversion parameter, the mean-reversion parameter, and the diffusion parameter of the spot convenience yield all to be time-varying deterministic functions. 1