Partnerstwo dla Modernizacji w stosunkach niemiecko-rosyjskich

Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia has become Germany’s main Central European partner. The economic interests and hopes of gigantic contracts to modernize the Russian economy have played a colossal role in German policy. The Government of Chancellor Angela Merkel aspired to shape the Eastern policy of the European Union, and it was highly favorable towards the strategy of Russian modernization to be implemented with the participation of Western partners, as proposed by President Medvedev in 2009. However, this project never went beyond the stage of preliminary agreements, and both sides are increasingly disappointed with its progress. Germany continues to aspire to play the role of the leading EU member state involved in the transformation process in Russia, yet this is no longer treated in terms of the ‘Russia first’ attitude without any reservations. Germans are becoming increasingly aware that their efforts are doomed to fail without true Russian efforts aimed at the democratization of both their public life and economic structures

The Polish Presidency of the European Union Council: challenges and outcomes

Since the financial crunch swept Europe in late 2008, Germany has opposed a coordinated EU campaign to aid the endangered states, claiming that each case should undergo a separate analysis. It was only the collapse of public finances in Greece and the financial problems of Ireland and Portugal that made Germany agree with France that it was necessary to establish special EU financial mechanisms in order to prevent the financial crises of EU member states; Germany also agreed that an ‘economic government’of Eurozone states be created. Germany realizes very well that healing the Euro and the European economy is in its interest. Germany takes the greatest advantage of the single internal market as it sells the lion’s share of its vast industrial output without restriction there. Germany fears that abandoning the idea of the free flow of goods and capital may result in the emergence of new customs barriers and increased commercial protectionism. Finally, the collapse of the Eurozone might mean the end of the ‘project Europe’Germany has contributed so much effort and money to

Brexit w polityce europejskiej Niemiec

Since the beginning of David Cameron’s rule in the United Kingdom (2010) Eurosceptic sentiments have intensified, leading to a split in society, a referendum and, finally, Brexit. Germany was for the UK remaining in the EU, but after the referendum Germany announced the EU would negotiate hard to have its conditions met. Germany decided that Brexit provided favorable prospects for enhancing cooperation among the remaining 27 states. The most difficult negotiating items concern financial settlements between London and Brussels (ca. EUR 60 billion), the status of EU citizens employed and residing in the territory of the UK, and the North Ireland-Irish Republic border. The negotiations of a new trade agreement between the EU and the UK are also difficult

Niemcy wobec greckiego kryzysu finansowego (2009-2015)'

The author of the paper analyses the German position on the Greek crisis in public finances after 2009. He points out that providing financial aid to Greece was never questioned, even in Germany. What the government of Angela Merkel had in mind, however, was for Greece to implement strict austerity and budgetary discipline, on which the assistance from international financial institutions would rely. In its policy towards Greece, the German Chancellor had to take into account the reactions of German society, which was reluctant to make concessions and further outlays from the German budget for the defaulting partner.Autor w artykule dokonał analizy stanowiska Niemiec wobec greckiego kryzysu finansów publicznych po 2009 r. Wskazał, że finansowa pomoc dla Grecji nigdy w Niemczech nie była pod znakiem zapytania. Rządowi Merkel jednak chodziło o wdrożenie twardego programu oszczędności i dyscypliny budżetowej, od których uzależniała pomoc międzynarodowych instytucji finansowych. W swojej polityce wobec Grecji kanclerz musiała kierować się reakcjami społeczeństwa niemieckiego, które niechętnie godziło się na ustępstwa i dalsze wydatki z niemieckiego budżetu dla niesolidnego partnera

ARE WE WITNESSING THE TWILIGHT UF THE STRATEGIC GERMAN-RUSSIAN PARTNERSHIP UNDER ANGELA MERKEL?

The author of this paper analyzes the policy of strategic partnership between Germany and Russia, especially in the field of the economy, which originated after the reunification of Germany in 1990. He stresses that it was the government of Angela Merkel after 2005 that began to emphasize the authoritarian rule of President Vladimir Putin and human rights breaches in Russia. Nevertheless, economic cooperation continued under the pressure from business circles. The author’s main hypothesis is that it was only Russia’s aggression towards Ukraine that undermined German-Russian collaboration, which is no longer given priority. Germany is the foremost advocate of the EU’s maintaining its sanctions against Russia. Angela Merkel’s third and fourth governments have tried to ‘Europeanize’ Germany’s policy towards the Russian Federation to a greater extent. Both Germany and the EU need Russia as a strategic partner to resolve problems in the Middle East and combat international terrorism. Russia is also a significant supplier of strategic resources to Germany and the EU. This paper employs the descriptive research method, the method of source analysis and decision-making analysis

Wpływ Niemiec i Francji na rozwój wspólnej polityki zagranicznej i bezpieczeństwa oraz europejskiej polityki bezpieczeństwa i obrony Unii Europejskiej w XXI w.

In the early twenty-first century. France and Germany closely work together to strengthen the effectiveness of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the. European Security and Defence Policy They led to their treaty and institutional strengthening. Governments Chancellor Angela Merkel focused on the ”culture of moderation“ in foreign policy and ill-considered reform of the Bundeswehr weakened the role of Germany in the area of foreign policy, security and defense policy of the European Union. After the return France to NATO’s integrated structures in 2009. It took place a close military cooperation A with the United Kingdom. Arab revolutions and the crisis in the Ukraine is not caused reevaluations so far in German-French cooperation to strengthen the defence of the European Union and its foreign policy. Key words: France-Germany, Common Foreign and Security Policy, European Security and Defence Policy, 21 st. centur

Niemcy i Polska wobec Europejskiej Polityki Zagranicznej, Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony Unii Europejskiej

"Po II wojnie światowej, w początkowym okresie rozwoju integracji europejskiej zdecydowanie największy nacisk położony został na kwestie ekonomiczne i budowę silnych powiązań gospodarczych pomiędzy państwami Europy Zachodniej: Kwestie integracji politycznej i wojskowej znajdowały się na dalszym planie. Po niepowodzeniu francuskiej koncepcji z lat 1950-1954, związanej z budową Europejskiej Wspólnoty Obronnej, jej rolę częściowo przejęła utworzona w październiku 1954 r. Unia Zachodnioeuropejska. Od 1970 r. zaczęła funkcjonować Europejska Współpraca Polityczna EWP (European Political Cooperation - EPC), w ramach której dochodziło do regularnych konsultacji ministrów spraw zagranicznych państw członkowskich EWG i wypracowywania wspólnego stanowiska."(...

Europejski kontekst stosunków polsko-niemieckich w okresie rządów koalicji PO-PSL (2007–2009)

European Context of Polish-German Relations under the PO-PSL Coalition (2007–2009)Europejski kontekst stosunków polsko-niemieckich w okresie rządów koalicji PO-PSL (2007–2009

Jadwiga Kiwerska, Partnerstwo w przywództwie? Stany Zjednoczone i Niemcy (1989—2016). Perspektywa polska, Wydawnictwo Instytutu Zachodniego, Poznań 2017, ss. 398.

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BEZPIECZEŃSTWO POLSKI W OKRESIE ZIMNEJ WOJNY

Yalta-Potsdam system emerged fromWorldWar II turned Poland into the orbit of the Soviet Union. It was economically dependent (CMEA) and the military-political (the Warsaw Pact) from the eastern neighbor. Taken attempts too independent to strengthen Polish security (Rapacki Plan, Gomulka Plan, Polish-German Agreement of December 1970) ended in failure. Martial law in 1981, the international isolation deepened in Polish and also became addicted to from Moscow. Moving away from confrontation between East and West at the end of the years 80. resulted in the signing of the border treaty with Germany (1990) and the reorientation of the Polish on the cooperation with the Western World.System jałtańsko-poczdamski powstały w wyniku II wojny światowej włączył Polskę w orbitę wpływów Związku Radzieckiego. Została ona uzależniona gospodarczo (RWPG) i militarno-politycznie (Układ Warszawski) od wschodniego sąsiada. Podejmowane próby zbyt samodzielnego wzmocnienia bezpieczeństwa Polski (plan Rapackiego, plan Gomułki, układ grudniowy w 1970 r. z RFN) kończyły się niepowodzeniem. Stan wojenny w 1981 r. pogłębił izolację międzynarodową Polski i dodatkowo uzależnił ją od Moskwy. Odejście od konfrontacji międzyblokowej w końcu lat 80. spowodowało podpisanie traktatu granicznego w Niemcami i reorientację Polski na współpracę ze światem zachodnim