Fiscal Responsibility Framework: International Experience and Implications for Hungary

In an effort to correct worrisome trends in discretionary fiscal policy (deficit bias, procyclicality, and structural distortions), an increasing number of countries introduced a rules-based fiscal responsibility framework (FRF), characterized by fiscal policy rules, procedural rules, transparency standards, and a surveillance and enforcement mechanism. Preliminary evidence suggests that compliance with a well-designed FRF contributes to building policy credibility, to reducing risk premia, to boosting economic growth, and to lowering output volatility. Faced with large and persistent fiscal imbalances and a sharp buildup of public indebtedness, Hungary would benefit from exploring the adoption a FRF along the following lines. The FRF should encompass the entire public sector, fully accounting for contingent liabilities, and including prudent fiscal projections. Second, it is necessary to strengthen procedural rules, including implementation of the pay-go approach to budget legislation and preparat on of a rolling three-year budget program, setting annual limits on the nominal level of primary expenditures. Third, phasing in of a primary surplus rule, calibrated to the path of desired debt reduction, should be seriously considered. Fourth, a current balance rule should be adopted for local self-governments. Finally, compliance with the FRF would need to be monitored by an independent authority.public finances, macroeconomics.

Political Economy of Fiscal Reform in Central and Eastern Europe

The reform of public finances has been at the centre of the post-socialist transition of Central and Eastern Europe since the early 1990s. At various stages of the transition, the reform process encompassed the entire gamut of public finances: the national budget, sub-national finances, extrabudgetary operations, and state-owned financial and non-financial enterprises. For the most part, fiscal reform was a non-linear stop-and-go process – often characterised by backtracking as well – and was uneven across countries. Moreover, unlike most reform experience in the rest of the world, fiscal reform in this region took place against the backdrop of a radical break, as sovereign countries emerged from a colonial past following the collapse of the Soviet Union. An important milestone was reached in 2004–2007, when all ten countries covered in this article became members of the European Union. The purpose of this article is to discuss fiscal reform in Central and Eastern Europe from the perspective of political economy. Following an overview of basic reform trends, the article focuses on the principal drivers and impediments to reform in the region. To conclude, the ingredients of successful reform are examined. The article does not provide an exhaustive inventory of reform measures, nor does it offer a survey of broad political economy issues prior to or during the transition period. Country references are intended to serve as stylised illustrations of main points, rather than as a comprehensive documentation of reform episodes. Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) classifications: H1, H3, P2, P52

Fiscal indulgence in Central Europe: loss of the external anchor?

In recent years, fiscal performance in Central Europe has steadily deteriorated, in contrast to the improvement in the Baltics. This paper explores the determinants of such differences among countries on the path to EU accession. Regression estimates suggest that economic and institutional fundamentals do not provide a full explanation. An alternative explanation lies in the political economy of the accession process, and a game-theoretic model illustrates why a country with a stronger bargaining position might have an incentive to deviate from convergence to the Maastricht criteria. The model generates alternative fiscal policy regimesallowing for regime shiftsdepending on country characteristics and EU policies. --Fiscal policy,EU economic and monetary union,game-theoretic approach

Political Economy of Fiscal Reform in Central and Eastern Europe

The reform of public finances has been at the centre of the post-socialist transition of Central and Eastern Europe since the early 1990s. At various stages of the transition, the reform process encompassed the entire gamut of public finances: the national budget, sub-national finances, extrabudgetary operations, and state-owned financial and non-financial enterprises. For the most part, fiscal reform was a non-linear stop-and-go process – often characterised by backtracking as well – and was uneven across countries. Moreover, unlike most reform experience in the rest of the world, fiscal reform in this region took place against the backdrop of a radical break, as sovereign countries emerged from a colonial past following the collapse of the Soviet Union. An important milestone was reached in 2004–2007, when all ten countries covered in this article became members of the European Union. The purpose of this article is to discuss fiscal reform in Central and Eastern Europe from the perspective of political economy. Following an overview of basic reform trends, the article focuses on the principal drivers and impediments to reform in the region. To conclude, the ingredients of successful reform are examined. The article does not provide an exhaustive inventory of reform measures, nor does it offer a survey of broad political economy issues prior to or during the transition period. Country references are intended to serve as stylised illustrations of main points, rather than as a comprehensive documentation of reform episodes. Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) classifications: H1, H3, P2, P52

Fiscal responsibility framework – International experience and implications for Hungary

In many countries around world, discretionary fiscal policymaking has been beset by both time inconsistency and common pool problems. In democratic societies, fiscal performance may reflect not only the economic cycle but also the political cycle, as a result of dynamic inconsistency. The common pool problem is prevalent especially where decentralized fiscal entities, including lower-level governments, engage in free-rider behavior neglecting its adverse impact on the general government balance. Similarly, interest groups may exhibit such behavior through their representatives within collegial or coalition governments

loss of the external anchor?

In recent years, fiscal performance in Central Europe has steadily deteriorated, in contrast to the improvement in the Baltics. This paper explores the determinants of such differences among countries on the path to EU accession. Regression estimates suggest that economic and institutional fundamentals do not provide a full explanation. An alternative explanation lies in the political economy of the accession process, and a game-theoretic model illustrates why a country with a stronger bargaining position might have an incentive to deviate from convergence to the Maastricht criteria. The model generates alternative fiscal policy regimes—allowing for regime shifts—depending on country characteristics and EU policies

Independent Fiscal Institutions: Developing Good Practices

This article presents an overview of independent fiscal institutions in OECD member countries, outlining their principal common features as well as country-specific attributes and functions, and flags the challenges they face in the surveillance of public finances. The case of the short-lived Fiscal Council in Hungary is discussed, with a comparison to the recently established Office for Budget Responsibility in the United Kingdom. The article draws upon the experience accumulated so far to propose internationally accepted good practices in this area. JEL classification: H610, H680 Keywords: surveillance of public finances, independent fiscal institutions, fiscal council, parliamentary budget office, office for budget responsibility, oversight of fiscal policy, Hungary, United Kingdom