Forbearance Patterns in the Post-Crisis Period

Using supervisory loan-level data on corporate loans, we show that banks facing high levels of non-performing loans relative to their capital and provisions were more likely to grant forbearance measures to the riskiest group of borrowers. More specifically, we find that risky borrowers are more likely to get an increase in the overall limit or the maturity of a loan product from a distressed lender. As a second step, we analyse the effectiveness of this practice in reducing the probability of default. We show that the most common measure of forbearance is effective in the short run but no forbearance measure significantly reduces the probability of default in the long run. Our evidence also suggests that forbearance and new lending are substitutes for banks, as high shares of forbearance are negatively correlated with new lending to the same group of borrowers.publishedVersio

A macroprudential contagion stress test framework

We develop a macroprudential contagion stress test framework to examine how a network of Norwegian banks can amplify a shock to bank capital at the macro level. The framework looks at how fire sales of common asset holdings can lead to valuation losses for banks (indirect contagion), and how recapitalisation of banks can lead to direct contagion. We perform Monte Carlo simulations to quantify contagion-driven systemic risk and to evaluate the importance of the mechanisms in our model. Using data for 22 banks from 2019 Q2 we find that losses due to contagion can reach 2 percentage points (pp) of the banking sector’s Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) ratio, but most likely losses are around one-fourth of this. The losses result almost exclusively from indirect contagion. Further, we find that losses are high in the cases where banks quickly run into funding problems. We also find that market liquidity and which assets banks’ fire sale first (pecking order) are important determinants of the results. Last but not least, losses due to contagion are highly correlated with losses on covered bonds.publishedVersio

“Leaning Against the Wind”, Macroprudential Policy and the Financial Cycle

Should monetary policy lean against financial stability risks? This has been a subject of fierce debate over the last decades. We contribute to the debate about “leaning against the wind” (LAW) along three lines. First, we evaluate the cost and benefits of LAW using the Svensson (2017) framework for the euro area and find that the costs outweigh the benefits. Second, we extend the framework to address a critique that Svensson does not consider the lower frequency financial cycle. Third, we use this extended framework to assess the costs and benefits of monetary and macroprudential policy. We find that macroprudential policy has net marginal benefits in addressing risks to financial stability in the euro area, whereas monetary policy has net marginal costs. This would suggest that an active use of macroprudential policies targeting financial stability risks would alleviate the burden on monetary policy to “lean against the wind”.publishedVersio

Essais sur les liens macrofinanciers

The main theme of this thesis are macro-financial linkages. I covered three different questions related to this topic. In the first chapter Gaël Giraud and I develop a model for the Euro Area answering to many of the critiques of policy models before the Global Financial Crisis and with a focus on the interaction between the financial sector and the macroeconomy. The second and third chapter focus on behaviour of the financial sector in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis and its implications for the macroeconomy. Chapter 2 investigates the practice of forbearance towards stressed borrowers. The ultimately relevant question in this chapter is to what extend there is a feedback to the real economy due to this behaviour. Finally, the third chapter sheds light on an episode of manipulation in commodity markets. This alleged manipulation was apparently only possible due to the dominant market position banks took in the run up to the crisis and thereafter. Ultimately I quantify the effects of such behaviour and provide evidence of a structural change of the manipulated market during the period of alleged manipulation. The first chapter exploits a bank level dataset, whereas in chapter 2 and 3 I develop structural macroeconomic models. Especially the dynamical system model in the second chapter is an innovation. This class of models and more specifically a model of the size we develop has never been estimated and subsequently used for policy analysis.Le thème principal de cette thèse est celui des liens macro financiers. J’ai couvert trois questions différentes liées à ce sujet. Dans le premier chapitre, Gaël Giraud et moi-même développons un modèle pour la zone euro en réponse à de nombreuses critiques des modèles de politiques avant le GFC et en mettant l’accent sur l’interaction entre le secteur financier et la macroéconomie. Les deuxième et troisième chapitres portent sur le comportement du secteur financier au lendemain de la crise financière mondiale et ses implications pour la macroéconomie. Le chapitre 2 examine la pratique de l’abstention à l’égard des emprunteurs en difficulté. La question finalement pertinente dans ce chapitre est de savoir dans quelle mesure ce comportement influe sur l’économie réelle. Enfin, le troisième chapitre met en lumière un épisode de manipulation sur les marchés des matières premières. Cette prétendue manipulation n’était apparemment possible qu’en raison de la position dominante des banques sur le marché pendant la période qui a précédé la crise et par la suite. En fin de compte, je quantifie les effets d’un tel comportement et apporte la preuve d’un changement structurel du marché manipulé au cours de la période de manipulation alléguée. Le premier chapitre exploite un ensemble de données au niveau des banques, tandis que dans les chapitres 2 et 3, je développe des modèles macroéconomiques structurels. En particulier, le modèle de système dynamique du deuxième chapitre est une innovation. Cette catégorie de modèles, et plus particulièrement un modèle de la taille que nous développons, n’a jamais été estimée et utilisée par la suite pour l’analyse des politiques

thorek1/MacroModelling.jl: v0.1.31+docfix

Macros and functions to work with DSGE models

A macroprudential contagion stress test framework

We develop a macroprudential contagion stress test framework to examine how a network of Norwegian banks can amplify a shock to bank capital at the macro level. The framework looks at how fire sales of common asset holdings can lead to valuation losses for banks (indirect contagion), and how recapitalisation of banks can lead to direct contagion. We perform Monte Carlo simulations to quantify contagion-driven systemic risk and to evaluate the importance of the mechanisms in our model. Using data for 22 banks from 2019 Q2 we find that losses due to contagion can reach 2 percentage points (pp) of the banking sector’s Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) ratio, but most likely losses are around one-fourth of this. The losses result almost exclusively from indirect contagion. Further, we find that losses are high in the cases where banks quickly run into funding problems. We also find that market liquidity and which assets banks’ fire sale first (pecking order) are important determinants of the results. Last but not least, losses due to contagion are highly correlated with losses on covered bonds

“Leaning Against the Wind”, Macroprudential Policy and the Financial Cycle

Should monetary policy lean against financial stability risks? This has been a subject of fierce debate over the last decades. We contribute to the debate about “leaning against the wind” (LAW) along three lines. First, we evaluate the cost and benefits of LAW using the Svensson (2017) framework for the euro area and find that the costs outweigh the benefits. Second, we extend the framework to address a critique that Svensson does not consider the lower frequency financial cycle. Third, we use this extended framework to assess the costs and benefits of monetary and macroprudential policy. We find that macroprudential policy has net marginal benefits in addressing risks to financial stability in the euro area, whereas monetary policy has net marginal costs. This would suggest that an active use of macroprudential policies targeting financial stability risks would alleviate the burden on monetary policy to “lean against the wind”

Forbearance Patterns in the Post-Crisis Period

Using supervisory loan-level data on corporate loans, we show that banks facing high levels of non-performing loans relative to their capital and provisions were more likely to grant forbearance measures to the riskiest group of borrowers. More specifically, we find that risky borrowers are more likely to get an increase in the overall limit or the maturity of a loan product from a distressed lender. As a second step, we analyse the effectiveness of this practice in reducing the probability of default. We show that the most common measure of forbearance is effective in the short run but no forbearance measure significantly reduces the probability of default in the long run. Our evidence also suggests that forbearance and new lending are substitutes for banks, as high shares of forbearance are negatively correlated with new lending to the same group of borrowers

thorek1/MacroModelling.jl: v0.1.31+docfix

Macros and functions to work with DSGE models

“Leaning Against the Wind”, Macroprudential Policy and the Financial Cycle

Should monetary policy lean against financial stability risks? This has been a subject of fierce debate over the last decades. We contribute to the debate about “leaning against the wind” (LAW) along three lines. First, we evaluate the cost and benefits of LAW using the Svensson (2017) framework for the euro area and find that the costs outweigh the benefits. Second, we extend the framework to address a critique that Svensson does not consider the lower frequency financial cycle. Third, we use this extended framework to assess the costs and benefits of monetary and macroprudential policy. We find that macroprudential policy has net marginal benefits in addressing risks to financial stability in the euro area, whereas monetary policy has net marginal costs. This would suggest that an active use of macroprudential policies targeting financial stability risks would alleviate the burden on monetary policy to “lean against the wind”.publishedVersio