Insight out : making creativity visible

Models of creative problem solving are predicated upon mental states to explain everything from the outcome of problem‐solving experiments to the emergence of artistic creativity. We present two converging perspectives that describe a profoundly different ontological description of creativity. Our analysis proceeds from a distinction between first‐order problem solving, where the agent interacts with a physical model of the problem and second‐order problem solving, where the agent must cogitate a solution to a problem that is presented as a verbal description of a state of the world but where the agent does not or cannot transform physical elements of a problem. We acknowledge the recent evidence that foregrounds the importance of working memory in problem solving, including insight problem solving. However, we stress that the impressive psychometric success is obtained with a methodology that only measures second‐order problem solving; we question whether first‐order problem solving is equally well predicted by measures of cognitive or dispositional capacities. We propose that if mental simulation is replaced by the opportunity to engage with a physical model of a problem then the environment can provide affordances that help the participant to solve problems. In the second part of the paper, we present the subjective experience of an artist as he monitors the microdecisions that occur during the morphogenesis of a large, clay, sculptural installation. The testimony is a vivid demonstration that creative action occurs, not in the brain, but in the movement between the hand and the clay. Insight becomes outsight

Risk factors for hospital morbidity and mortality after the Norwood procedure: A report from the Pediatric Heart Network Single Ventricle Reconstruction trial

ObjectivesWe sought to identify risk factors for mortality and morbidity during the Norwood hospitalization in newborn infants with hypoplastic left heart syndrome and other single right ventricle anomalies enrolled in the Single Ventricle Reconstruction trial.MethodsPotential predictors for outcome included patient- and procedure-related variables and center volume and surgeon volume. Outcome variables occurring during the Norwood procedure and before hospital discharge or stage II procedure included mortality, end-organ complications, length of ventilation, and hospital length of stay. Univariate and multivariable Cox regression analyses were performed with bootstrapping to estimate reliability for mortality.ResultsAnalysis included 549 subjects prospectively enrolled from 15 centers; 30-day and hospital mortality were 11.5% (63/549) and 16.0% (88/549), respectively. Independent risk factors for both 30-day and hospital mortality included lower birth weight, genetic abnormality, extracorporeal membrane oxygenation (ECMO) and open sternum on the day of the Norwood procedure. In addition, longer duration of deep hypothermic circulatory arrest was a risk factor for 30-day mortality. Shunt type at the end of the Norwood procedure was not a significant risk factor for 30-day or hospital mortality. Independent risk factors for postoperative renal failure (n = 46), sepsis (n = 93), increased length of ventilation, and hospital length of stay among survivors included genetic abnormality, lower center/surgeon volume, open sternum, and post-Norwood operations.ConclusionsInnate patient factors, ECMO, open sternum, and lower center/surgeon volume are important risk factors for postoperative mortality and/or morbidity during the Norwood hospitalization

An Investigation into the Cognition Behind Spontaneous String Pulling in New Caledonian Crows

The ability of some bird species to pull up meat hung on a string is a famous example of spontaneous animal problem solving. The “insight” hypothesis claims that this complex behaviour is based on cognitive abilities such as mental scenario building and imagination. An operant conditioning account, in contrast, would claim that this spontaneity is due to each action in string pulling being reinforced by the meat moving closer and remaining closer to the bird on the perch. We presented experienced and naïve New Caledonian crows with a novel, visually restricted string-pulling problem that reduced the quality of visual feedback during string pulling. Experienced crows solved this problem with reduced efficiency and increased errors compared to their performance in standard string pulling. Naïve crows either failed or solved the problem by trial and error learning. However, when visual feedback was available via a mirror mounted next to the apparatus, two naïve crows were able to perform at the same level as the experienced group. Our results raise the possibility that spontaneous string pulling in New Caledonian crows may not be based on insight but on operant conditioning mediated by a perceptual-motor feedback cycle

Dynamical Evolution of Planetary Systems

Planetary systems can evolve dynamically even after the full growth of the planets themselves. There is actually circumstantial evidence that most planetary systems become unstable after the disappearance of gas from the protoplanetary disk. These instabilities can be due to the original system being too crowded and too closely packed or to external perturbations such as tides, planetesimal scattering, or torques from distant stellar companions. The Solar System was not exceptional in this sense. In its inner part, a crowded system of planetary embryos became unstable, leading to a series of mutual impacts that built the terrestrial planets on a timescale of ~100 My. In its outer part, the giant planets became temporarily unstable and their orbital configuration expanded under the effect of mutual encounters. A planet might have been ejected in this phase. Thus, the orbital distributions of planetary systems that we observe today, both solar and extrasolar ones, can be different from the those emerging from the formation process and it is important to consider possible long-term evolutionary effects to connect the two.Comment: Review to appear as a chapter in the "Handbook of Exoplanets", ed. H. Deeg & J.A. Belmont

Toward an Anthropology of Mathematizing

This essay investigates the practical ways that artists and craftspeople cultivate mathematical sensibilities through their practical immersion in making and problem-solving. Mathematical sensibilities refer to skilled kinds of perception and heightened levels of attention and discernment regarding the qualitative properties of an object or composition, such as its shape, proportion, balance, symmetry, centredness, alignment or levelness. It also includes an ‘intuitive’ quantitative sense of volume, mass, weight, thickness and dimension. The objective of the investigation is not to describe the ways that a maker’s existing knowledge and training in formal mathematics is put into practice, but rather to elucidate the ways that their practices of making produce kinds of ‘non-formalised’, context-dependent mathematical understanding and knowledge. The starting point for exploring embodied mathematizing is therefore not from the cognitive or neurosciences, psychology or formal mathematics, it is argued, but rather from a phenomenological approach – ‘an opening on the world’ – that attends to person, materials, tools and other physical and qualitative features that make up the total environment in which activity unfolds

The psychology of memory, extended cognition, and socially distributed remembering

This paper introduces a new, expanded range of relevant cognitive psychological research on collaborative recall and social memory to the philosophical debate on extended and distributed cognition. We start by examining the case for extended cognition based on the complementarity of inner and outer resources, by which neural, bodily, social, and environmental resources with disparate but complementary properties are integrated into hybrid cognitive systems, transforming or augmenting the nature of remembering or decision-making. Adams and Aizawa, noting this distinctive complementarity argument, say that they agree with it completely: but they describe it as “a non-revolutionary approach” which leaves “the cognitive psychology of memory as the study of processes that take place, essentially without exception, within nervous systems.” In response, we carve out, on distinct conceptual and empirical grounds, a rich middle ground between internalist forms of cognitivism and radical anti-cognitivism. Drawing both on extended cognition literature and on Sterelny’s account of the “scaffolded mind” (this issue), we develop a multidimensional framework for understanding varying relations between agents and external resources, both technological and social. On this basis we argue that, independent of any more “revolutionary” metaphysical claims about the partial constitution of cognitive processes by external resources, a thesis of scaffolded or distributed cognition can substantially influence or transform explanatory practice in cognitive science. Critics also cite various empirical results as evidence against the idea that remembering can extend beyond skull and skin. We respond with a more principled, representative survey of the scientific psychology of memory, focussing in particular on robust recent empirical traditions for the study of collaborative recall and transactive social memory. We describe our own empirical research on socially distributed remembering, aimed at identifying conditions for mnemonic emergence in collaborative groups. Philosophical debates about extended, embedded, and distributed cognition can thus make richer, mutually beneficial contact with independently motivated research programs in the cognitive psychology of memory.40 page(s