Osmotic force resisting chain insertion in a colloidal suspension

We consider the problem of inserting a stiff chain into a colloidal suspension of particles that interact with it through excluded volume forces. The free energy of insertion is associated with the work of creating a cavity devoid of colloid and sufficiently large to accomodate the chain. The corresponding work per unit length is the force that resists the entry of the chain into the colloidal suspension. In the case of a hard sphere fluid, this work can be calculated straightforwardly within the scaled particle theory; for solutions of flexible polymers, on the other hand, we employ simple scaling arguments. The forces computed in these ways are shown, for nanometer chain and colloid diameters, to be of the order of tens of pN for solution volume fraction for biophysical processes such as the ejection of DNA from viral capsids into the cell cytoplasm.Comment: 16 pages,3 figures. Accepted for publication in European Physical Journal

Requirements for regional short-haul air service and the definition of a flight program to determine neighborhood reactions to small transport aircraft

An evaluation of the current status and future requirements of an intraregional short haul air service is given. A brief definition of the different types of short haul air service is given. This is followed by a historical review of previous attempts to develop short haul air service in high density urban areas and an assessment of the current status. The requirements for intraregional air service, the need for economic and environmental viability and the need for a flight research program are defined. A detailed outline of a research program that would determine urban community reaction to frequent operations of small transport aircraft is also given. Both the operation of such an experiment in a specific region (San Francisco Bay area) and the necessary design modifications of an existing fixed wing aircraft which could be used in the experiment are established. An estimate is made of overall program costs

"Swarm relaxation": Equilibrating a large ensemble of computer simulations

It is common practice in molecular dynamics and Monte Carlo computer simulations to run multiple, separately-initialized simulations in order to improve the sampling of independent microstates. Here we examine the utility of an extreme case of this strategy, in which we run a large ensemble of $M$ independent simulations (a "swarm"), each of which is relaxed to equilibrium. We show that if $M$ is of order $10^3$, we can monitor the swarm's relaxation to equilibrium, and confirm its attainment, within $\sim 10\bar\tau$, where $\bar\tau$ is the equilibrium relaxation time. As soon as a swarm of this size attains equilibrium, the ensemble of $M$ final microstates from each run is sufficient for the evaluation of most equilibrium properties without further sampling. This approach dramatically reduces the wall-clock time required, compared to a single long simulation, by a factor of several hundred, at the cost of an increase in the total computational effort by a small factor. It is also well-suited to modern computing systems having thousands of processors, and is a viable strategy for simulation studies that need to produce high-precision results in a minimum of wall-clock time. We present results obtained by applying this approach to several test cases.Comment: 12 pages. To appear in Eur. Phy. J. E, 201

Correlation of Positive and Negative Reciprocity Fails to Confer an Evolutionary Advantage: Phase Transitions to Elementary Strategies

Economic experiments reveal that humans value cooperation and fairness. Punishing unfair behavior is therefore common, and according to the theory of strong reciprocity, it is also directly related to rewarding cooperative behavior. However, empirical data fail to confirm that positive and negative reciprocity are correlated. Inspired by this disagreement, we determine whether the combined application of reward and punishment is evolutionarily advantageous. We study a spatial public goods game, where in addition to the three elementary strategies of defection, rewarding, and punishment, a fourth strategy that combines the latter two competes for space. We find rich dynamical behavior that gives rise to intricate phase diagrams where continuous and discontinuous phase transitions occur in succession. Indirect territorial competition, spontaneous emergence of cyclic dominance, as well as divergent fluctuations of oscillations that terminate in an absorbing phase are observed. Yet, despite the high complexity of solutions, the combined strategy can survive only in very narrow and unrealistic parameter regions. Elementary strategies, either in pure or mixed phases, are much more common and likely to prevail. Our results highlight the importance of patterns and structure in human cooperation, which should be considered in future experiments

The Inherent Structure Landscape Connection Between Liquids, Granular materials and the Jamming Phase Diagram

We provide a comprehensive picture of the jamming phase diagram by connecting the athermal, granular ensemble of jammed states and the equilibrium fluid through the inherent structure paradigm for a system hard discs confined to a narrow channel. The J-line is shown to be divided into packings that are thermodynamically accessible from the equilibrium fluid and inaccessible packings. The J-point is found to occur at the transition between these two sets of packings and is located at the maximum the inherent structure distribution. A general thermodynamic argument suggests that the density of the states at the configurational entropy maximum represents a lower bound on the J-point density in hard sphere systems. Finally, we find that the granular and fluid systems only occupy the same set of inherent structures, under the same thermodynamic conditions, at two points, corresponding to zero and infinite pressures, where they sample the J-point states and the most dense packing respectively.Comment: 5 pages, 3 Figure

Is Fitspiration Truly an Inspiration? Relationships between Fitspiration, Exercise, and Body Image

Young adults across the United States struggle to meet physical activity recommendations and consume healthy diets, and they often suffer from issues related to body image. Social media influencers dedicated to fitspiration (i.e., fitness inspiration) are purported to have a goal of inspiring others to lead healthier lifestyles. The purpose of this study was to explore the relationships between fitspiration and exercise and body image perceptions amongst college students. Participants (n = 361, mean age = 20.2 years, 78% female) completed surveys that included sociodemographic information, social media usage, fitspiration content engagement, exercise, and body satisfaction. An independent samples t-test assessed differences in exercise by fitspiration viewership, and a chi-square analysis determined relationships between fitspiration and body satisfaction. Participants were routinely active on social media (91% use it for \u3e 1 hour per day), and 61.5% were exposed to fitspiration content. Approximately 41% of respondents have followed exercise advice from fitspiration influencers, though only 11% reported having purchased products. No relationships were reported between following fitspiration and days per week of exercise (M∆ = .02(.20), p = .91). Participants that followed fitspiration were more likely to be dissatisfied with their bodies, X2 (1, n = 316) =7.77, p = .005, compared to participants who did not. Findings demonstrate fitspiration was not related to exercise and was related to poorer body image perceptions among college students. These results are supported by previous findings and indicate a critical misalignment between the purported purpose of fitspiration and the outcome of its viewing

Impact of generalized benefit functions on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games with continuous strategies

Cooperation and defection may be considered as two extreme responses to a social dilemma. Yet the reality is much less clear-cut. Between the two extremes lies an interval of ambivalent choices, which may be captured theoretically by means of continuous strategies defining the extent of the contributions of each individual player to the common pool. If strategies are chosen from the unit interval, where 0 corresponds to pure defection and 1 corresponds to the maximal contribution, the question is what is the characteristic level of individual investments to the common pool that emerges if the evolution is guided by different benefit functions. Here we consider the steepness and the threshold as two parameters defining an array of generalized benefit functions, and we show that in a structured population there exist intermediate values of both at which the collective contributions are maximal. However, as the cost-to-benefit ratio of cooperation increases the characteristic threshold decreases, while the corresponding steepness increases. Our observations remain valid if more complex sigmoid functions are used, thus reenforcing the importance of carefully adjusted benefits for high levels of public cooperation.Comment: 8 two-column pages, 8 figures; accepted for publication in Physical Review

Test of classical nucleation theory on deeply supercooled high-pressure simulated silica

We test classical nucleation theory (CNT) in the case of simulations of deeply supercooled, high density liquid silica, as modelled by the BKS potential. We find that at density $\rho=4.38$~g/cm$^3$, spontaneous nucleation of crystalline stishovite occurs in conventional molecular dynamics simulations at temperature T=3000 K, and we evaluate the nucleation rate J directly at this T via "brute force" sampling of nucleation events. We then use parallel, constrained Monte Carlo simulations to evaluate $\Delta G(n)$, the free energy to form a crystalline embryo containing n silicon atoms, at T=3000, 3100, 3200 and 3300 K. We find that the prediction of CNT for the n-dependence of $\Delta G(n)$ fits reasonably well to the data at all T studied, and at 3300 K yields a chemical potential difference between liquid and stishovite that matches independent calculation. We find that $n^*$, the size of the critical nucleus, is approximately 10 silicon atoms at T=3300 K. At 3000 K, $n^*$ decreases to approximately 3, and at such small sizes methodological challenges arise in the evaluation of $\Delta G(n)$ when using standard techniques; indeed even the thermodynamic stability of the supercooled liquid comes into question under these conditions. We therefore present a modified approach that permits an estimation of $\Delta G(n)$ at 3000 K. Finally, we directly evaluate at T=3000 K the kinetic prefactors in the CNT expression for J, and find physically reasonable values; e.g. the diffusion length that Si atoms must travel in order to move from the liquid to the crystal embryo is approximately 0.2 nm. We are thereby able to compare the results for J at 3000 K obtained both directly and based on CNT, and find that they agree within an order of magnitude.Comment: corrected calculation, new figure, accepted in JC

Conditional strategies and the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games

The fact that individuals will most likely behave differently in different situations begets the introduction of conditional strategies. Inspired by this, we study the evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods game, where besides unconditional cooperators and defectors, also different types of conditional cooperators compete for space. Conditional cooperators will contribute to the public good only if other players within the group are likely to cooperate as well, but will withhold their contribution otherwise. Depending on the number of other cooperators that are required to elicit cooperation of a conditional cooperator, the latter can be classified in as many types as there are players within each group. We find that the most cautious cooperators, such that require all other players within a group to be conditional cooperators, are the undisputed victors of the evolutionary process, even at very low synergy factors. We show that the remarkable promotion of cooperation is due primarily to the spontaneous emergence of quarantining of defectors, which become surrounded by conditional cooperators and are forced into isolated convex "bubbles" from where they are unable to exploit the public good. This phenomenon can be observed only in structured populations, thus adding to the relevance of pattern formation for the successful evolution of cooperation.Comment: 7 two-column pages, 7 figures; accepted for publication in Physical Review

Evolutionary Roots of Property Rights; The Natural and Cultural Nature of Human Cooperation

Debates about the role of natural and cultural selection in the development of prosocial, antisocial and socially neutral mechanisms and behavior raise questions that touch property rights, cooperation, and conflict. For example, some researchers suggest that cooperation and prosociality evolved by natural selection (Hamilton 1964, Trivers 1971, Axelrod and Hamilton 1981, De Waal 2013, 2014), while others claim that natural selection is insufficient for the evolution of cooperation, which required in addition cultural selection (Sterelny 2013, Bowles and Gintis 2003, Seabright 2013, Norenzayan 2013). Some scholars focus on the complexity and hierarchical nature of the evolution of cooperation as involving different tools associated with lower and the higher levels of competition (Nowak 2006, Okasha 2006); others suggest that humans genetically inherited heuristics that favor prosocial behavior such as generosity, forgiveness or altruistic punishment (Ridley 1996, Bowles and Gintis 2004, Rolls 2005). We argue these mechanisms are not genetically inherited; rather, they are features inherited through cultural selection. To support this view we invoke inclusive fitness theory, which states that individuals tend to maximize their inclusive fitness, rather than maximizing group fitness. We further reject the older notion of natural group selection - as well as more recent versions (West, Mouden, Gardner 2011) – which hold that natural selection favors cooperators within a group (Wynne-Edwards 1962). For Wynne-Edwards, group selection leads to group adaptations; the survival of individuals therefore depends on the survival of the group and a sharing of resources. Individuals who do not cooperate, who are selfish, face extinction due to rapid and over-exploitation of resources