Self-interest And Public Interest: The Motivations Of Political Actors

Self-Interest and Public Interest in Western Politics showed that the public, politicians, and bureaucrats are often public spirited. But this does not invalidate public-choice theory. Public-choice theory is an ideal type, not a claim that self-interest explains all political behavior. Instead, public-choice theory is useful in creating rules and institutions that guard against the worst case, which would be universal self-interestedness in politics. In contrast, the public-interest hypothesis is neither a comprehensive explanation of political behavior nor a sound basis for institutional design

How Ordinary Elimination Became Gaussian Elimination

Newton, in notes that he would rather not have seen published, described a process for solving simultaneous equations that later authors applied specifically to linear equations. This method that Euler did not recommend, that Legendre called "ordinary," and that Gauss called "common" - is now named after Gauss: "Gaussian" elimination. Gauss's name became associated with elimination through the adoption, by professional computers, of a specialized notation that Gauss devised for his own least squares calculations. The notation allowed elimination to be viewed as a sequence of arithmetic operations that were repeatedly optimized for hand computing and eventually were described by matrices.Comment: 56 pages, 21 figures, 1 tabl

HIV prevention costs and program scale: data from the PANCEA project in five low and middle-income countries

<p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>Economic theory and limited empirical data suggest that costs per unit of HIV prevention program output (unit costs) will initially decrease as small programs expand. Unit costs may then reach a nadir and start to increase if expansion continues beyond the economically optimal size. Information on the relationship between scale and unit costs is critical to project the cost of global HIV prevention efforts and to allocate prevention resources efficiently.</p> <p>Methods</p> <p>The "Prevent AIDS: Network for Cost-Effectiveness Analysis" (PANCEA) project collected 2003 and 2004 cost and output data from 206 HIV prevention programs of six types in five countries. The association between scale and efficiency for each intervention type was examined for each country. Our team characterized the direction, shape, and strength of this association by fitting bivariate regression lines to scatter plots of output levels and unit costs. We chose the regression forms with the highest explanatory power (R²).</p> <p>Results</p> <p>Efficiency increased with scale, across all countries and interventions. This association varied within intervention and within country, in terms of the range in scale and efficiency, the best fitting regression form, and the slope of the regression. The fraction of variation in efficiency explained by scale ranged from 26% – 96%. Doubling in scale resulted in reductions in unit costs averaging 34.2% (ranging from 2.4% to 58.0%). Two regression trends, in India, suggested an inflection point beyond which unit costs increased.</p> <p>Conclusion</p> <p>Unit costs decrease with scale across a wide range of service types and volumes. These country and intervention-specific findings can inform projections of the global cost of scaling up HIV prevention efforts.</p

Three (Potential) Pillars of Transnational Economic Justice: The Bretton Woods Institutions as Guarantors of Global Equal Treatment and Market Completion

This essay aims to bring two important lines of inquiry and criticism together. It first lays out an institutionally enriched account of what a just world economic order will look like. That account prescribes, via the requisites to that mechanism which most directly instantiate the account, three realms of equal treatment and market completion - the global products, services, and labor markets; the global investment/financial markets; and the global preparticipation opportunity allocation. The essay then suggests how, with minimal if any departure from familiar canons of traditional international legal mandate interpretation, each of the Bretton Woods institutions - particularly the GATT/WTO and the IMF - can be viewed at least in part as charged with the task of fostering equal treatment and ultimate market completion within one of those three realms. The piece then argues that one of the institutions in particular - the World Bank - has, for reasons of at best negligent and at worst willful injustice on the part of influential state actors in the world community, fallen farthest short in pursuit of what should be viewed as its proper mandate. The article accordingly concludes that a fuller empowerment of the Bank to effect its ideal mission will press the Bretton Woods system more nearly into ethical balance, and with it the world into justice; and that full empowerment of the GATT/WTO and IMF should be partly conditioned upon the fuller empowerment of the Bank