Ethnic Conflict: An Organizational Perspective

To talk about the behavior of others is to generalize especially if that behavior is perceived to be negative. As researchers who have studied ethnic discrimination and ethnic conflict for close to two decades, we have noticed, anecdotally at least, that this penchant for generalization is rampant in discussions of ethnic politics. Journalists and academics tend to talk about one or another ethnic group’s involvement in violence without specifying a political organizational agent. This kind of generalization is a serious obstacle to understanding conflicts and identifying solutions because it prevents policymakers and academics from getting at the messy reality of ethnic politics—especially when they become contentious or violent. This article explores how organizations often change their policies and shift back and forth between violent and nonviolent strategies, occasionally adopting both at the same time. In the process, this article provides a counter-balance to generally accepted wisdom concerning the relationship between ethnicity and conflict

Estimating the Reproducibility of Experimental Philosophy

Responding to recent concerns about the reliability of the published literature in psychology and other disciplines, we formed the X-Phi Replicability Project (XRP) to estimate the reproducibility of experimental philosophy (osf.io/dvkpr). Drawing on a representative sample of 40 x-phi studies published between 2003 and 2015, we enlisted 20 research teams across 8 countries to conduct a high-quality replication of each study in order to compare the results to the original published findings. We found that x-phi studies – as represented in our sample – successfully replicated about 70% of the time. We discuss possible reasons for this relatively high replication rate in the field of experimental philosophy and offer suggestions for best research practices going forward

Ethnic Conflict: An Organizational Perspective

To talk about the behavior of others is to generalize especially if that behavior is perceived to be negative. As researchers who have studied ethnic discrimination and ethnic conflict for close to two decades, we have noticed, anecdotally at least, that this penchant for generalization is rampant in discussions of ethnic politics. Journalists and academics tend to talk about one or another ethnic group’s involvement in violence without specifying a political organizational agent. This kind of generalization is a serious obstacle to understanding conflicts and identifying solutions because it prevents policymakers and academics from getting at the messy reality of ethnic politics—especially when they become contentious or violent. This article explores how organizations often change their policies and shift back and forth between violent and nonviolent strategies, occasionally adopting both at the same time. In the process, this article provides a counter-balance to generally accepted wisdom concerning the relationship between ethnicity and conflict

Multiagent negotiation under time constraints

Research in distributed artificial intelligence (DAI) is concerned with how automated agents can be designed to interact effectively. Negotiation is proposed as a means for agents to communicate and compromise to reach mutually beneficial agreements. The paper examines the problems of resource allocation and task distribution among autonomous agents which can benefit from sharing a common resource or distributing a set of common tasks. We propose a strategic model of negotiation that takes the passage of time during the negotiation process itself into account. A distributed negotiation mechanism is introduced that is simple, efficient, stable, and flexible in various situations. The model considers situations characterized by complete as well as incomplete information, and ones in which some agents lose over time while others gain over time. Using this negotiation mechanism autonomous agents have simple and stable negotiation strategies that result in efficient agreements without delays even when there are dynamic changes in the environment

Minorities at Risk Organizational Behavior (MAROB) Middle East, 1980-2004

The Minorities at Risk Organizational Behavior (MAROB) dataset is a subsidiary of the Minorities at Risk (MAR) Project. The purpose of this project is to answer fundamental questions focusing on the identification of those factors that motivate some members of ethnic minorities to become radicalized, to form activist organizations, and to move from conventional means of politics and protest into violence and terrorism. Focusing initially on the Middle East and North Africa, the MAROB project provides information on the characteristics of those ethnopolitical organizations most likely to employ violence and terrorism in the pursuit of their perceived grievances with local, national, or international authority structures. The project has identif ied 118 organizations representing the interests of all 22 ethnopolitical groups in 16 countries of the Middle East and North Africa, operating between 1980 and 2004

Relative Rebel Strength and the Onset and Outcome of Civil War Mediation

To what extent does the relative strength of a rebel movement impact upon the likelihood of a peace settlement in civil conflict? This paper argues that relatively stronger rebels are more likely to overcome the strategic bargaining problems that can prevent the resolution of war. Relatively strong insurgents are better equipped to significantly challenge core government interests, and fundamentally threaten the survival a regime. The incumbent’s fear of future violence therefore makes mediation more likely to be undertaken in high-stakes conflicts between states and strong rebel groups. Relatively strong insurgencies are also those with the greatest leverage to negotiate enforcement mechanisms, and the best equipped to defend themselves in the event that the government reneges on an agreement. This reduces the scale of the commitment problem and increases the probability of relatively strong rebel groups agreeing to a settlement with an incumbent. This argument is tested using dyadic data that captures the relative position of insurgents in civil war from 1946 to 2004. This represents an important methodological shift within the mediation literature, which has in the past largely relied upon aggregate country-level data. The results suggest that relatively stronger insurgents are more likely to force the state to open a mediation process and eventually concede some form of settlement. This is further evidence of the need to capture the dyadic relations between actors with fine-grained disaggregated data

GPNEG: General Purpose Negotiation Training Tool

Negotiation is an important mechanism for resolving conflicts between people. Many tasks in day-to-day life involve interactions among several people. Many of these interactions involve negotiating over a desired outcome. Negotiation in and of itself is not an easy task, and it becomes more complex under conditions of incomplete information. Therefore, training people in negotiation is beneficial, yet difficult. In this paper an innovative general purpose tool for negotiation training is proposed and demonstrated experimentally. The experiments demonstrate the ease of use and the general applicability of the proposed tool. Thus, our work contributes to the automation of negotiation in general, and to negotiation training in particular