Mind: meet network. Emergence of features in conceptual metaphor.

As a human product, language reflects the psychological experience of man (Radden and Dirven, 2007). One model of language and human cognition in general is connectionism, by many linguists is regarded as mathematical and, therefore, too reductive. This opinion trend seems to be reversing, however, due to the fact that many cognitive researchers begin to appreciate one attribute of network models: feature emergence. In the course of a network simulation properties emerge that were neither inbuilt nor intended by its creators (Elman, 1998), in other words, the whole becomes more than just the sum of its parts. Insight is not only drawn from the network's output, but also the means that the network utilizes to arrive at the output.\ud It may seem obvious that the events of life should be meaningful for human beings, yet there is no widely accepted theory as to how do we derive that meaning. The most promising hypothesis regarding the question how the world is meaningful to us is that of embodied cognition (cf. Turner 2009), which postulates that the functions of the brain evolved so as to ‘understand’ the body, thus grounding the mind in an experiential foundation. Yet, the relationship between the body and the mind is far from perspicuous, as research insight is still intertwined with metaphors specific for the researcher’s methodology (Eliasmith 2003). It is the aim of this paper to investigate the conceptual metaphor in a manner that will provide some insight with regard to the role that objectification, as defined by Szwedek (2002), plays in human cognition and identify one possible consequence of embodied cognition.\ud If the mechanism for concept formation, or categorization of the world, resembles a network, it is reasonable to assume that evidence for this is to be sought in language. Let us then postulate the existence of a network mechanism for categorization and concept formation present in the human mind and initially developed to cope with the world directly accessible to the early human (i.e. tangible). Such a network would convert external inputs to form an internal, multi modal representation of a perceived object in the brain. The sheer amount of available information and the computational restrictions of the brain would force some sort of data compression, or a computational funnel. It has been shown that a visual perception network of this kind can learn to accurately label patterns (Elman, 1998). What is more, the compression of data facilitated the recognition of prototypes of a given pattern category rather than its peripheral representations, an emergent property that supports the prototype theory of the mental lexicon (cf. Radden and Dirven, 2007).\ud The present project proposes that, in the domain of cognition, the process of objectification, as defined by Szwedek (2002), would be an emergent property of such a system, or that if an abstract notion is computed by a neural network designed to cope with tangible concepts the data compression mechanism would require the notion to be conceptualized as an object to permit further processing. The notion of emergence of meaning from the operation of complex systems is recognised as an important process in a number of studies on metaphor comprehension. Feature emergence is said to occur when a non-salient feature of the target and the vehicle becomes highly salient in the metaphor (Utsumi 2005). Therefore, for example, should objectification emerge as a feature in the metaphor KNOWLEDGE IS A TREASURE, the metaphor would be characterised as having more\ud features of an object than either the target or vehicle alone. This paper focuses on providing a theoretical connectionist network based on the Elman-type network (Elman, 1998) as a model of concept formation where objectification would be an emergent feature. This is followed by a psychological experiment whereby the validity of this assumption is tested through a questionnaire where two groups of participants are asked to evaluate either metaphors or their components. The model proposes an underlying relation between the mechanism for concept formation and the omnipresence of conceptual metaphors, which are interpreted as resulting from the properties of the proposed network system.\ud Thus, an evolutionary neural mechanism is proposed for categorization of the world, that is able to cope with both concrete and abstract notions and the by-product of which are the abstract language-related phenomena, i.e. metaphors. The model presented in this paper aims at providing a unified account of how the various types of phenomena, objects, feelings etc. are categorized in the human mind, drawing on evidence from language.\ud References:\ud Szwedek, Aleksander. 2002. Objectification: From Object Perception To Metaphor Creation. In B. Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk and K. Turewicz (eds). Cognitive Linguistics To-day, 159-175. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang.\ud Radden, Günter and Dirven, René. 2007. Cognitive English Grammar. Amsterdam/ Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company\ud Eliasmith, Chris. 2003. Moving beyond metaphors: understanding the mind for what it is. Journal of Philosophy. C(10):493- 520.\ud Elman, J. L. et al. 1998. Rethinking innateness: A connectionist perspective on development. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press\ud Turner, Mark. 2009. Categorization of Time and Space Through Language. (Paper presented at the FOCUS2009 conference "Categorization of the world through language". Serock, 25-28 February 2009).\ud Utsumi, Akira. 2005. The role of feature emergence in metaphor appreciation, Metaphor and Symbol, 20(3), 151-172

Are abstract concepts like dinosaur feathers? Objectification as a conceptual tool: evidence from language and gesture of English and Polish native speakers

Studies based on the Contemporary Theory of Metaphor (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 1999) usually identify conceptual metaphors by analysing linguistic expressions and creating a post hoc interpretation of the findings. This method has been questioned for a variety of reasons, including its circularity (Müller, 2008), lack of falsifiability (Vervaeke & Kennedy, 1996, 2004), and lack of predictive power (Ritchie, 2003). It has been argued that CTM requires additional constraints to improve its applicability for empirical research (Gibbs, 2011; Ritchie, 2003). This paper sets out to propose additional methodological structure to CTM, a theory of conceptual metaphor in which much of abstract thought is generated by metaphorical mapping from embodied experience (Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez & Pérez Hernández, 2011). Introducing Objectification Theory defined by Szwedek (2002, 2007, 2011) ameliorates a number of methodological issues in CTM. First, the embodiment claim of CTM in its current form cannot be empirically proven incorrect (Vervaeke & Kennedy, 2004) as any mapping within it is possible (although only some actually happen). Objectification introduces pre-metaphorical structure of the kind suggested by Glucksberg (2001), constraining source and target domain selection, predicting which mappings are more likely to happen. Second, while many claim that metaphors trace back to a literal concept based on embodied physical experience (Gibbs, Costa Lima, & Francozo, 2004), it is unclear what criteria are used to define „physical”. Metaphorical domains are often described using the terms „abstract” and „concrete”, Objectification proposes objective criteria for deciding whether a concept is experientially grounded. Finally, Objectification provides grounds for introducing a hierarchical framework for metaphor typology, preventing post-hoc addition of metaphor types if and when suitable for the explanation of a phenomenon; thus increasing the consistency of the CTM framework, both internally and with other cognitive science disciplines. This thesis focuses on providing evidence for Objectification Theory and identifying its applications in metaphor and gesture research

Are abstract concepts like dinosaur feathers?

Ewolucja ludzkiego układu nerwowego pozwoliła nam na wykonywanie niezwykle skomplikowanych czynności takich jak obliczenia matematyczne, analizy gospodarcze czy choćby napisanie tej książki. Mimo to wciąż nie jesteśmy pewni jak i dlaczego człowiek nabył zdolność abstrakcyjnego myślenia. Jedna z teorii sugeruje, że myślenie abstrakcyjne i konkretne opierają się na tym samym mechanizmie: doświadczeniu. Według tej teorii, nazwanej teorią ucieleśnionego poznania, świat rozumiemy dzięki doświadczeniom fizycznym. Kiedy opisujemy jakiś argument jako "chwiejny" albo pogląd jako "bezpodstawny" to korzystamy z doświadczeń, które zdobyliśmy bawiąc się kolckami jako dzieci. W tej książce zadaję postawione przez psychologa Daniela Casasanto pytanie: „czy pojęcia abstrakcyjne są jak pióra dinozaurów”. Jakie procesy ewolucyjne doprowadziły do tego, że jesteśmy w stanie opisać nawet bardzo abstrakcyjne zagadnienia w odniesieniu do konkretnych zjawisk? Przedstawiając wyniki badań nad mową i gestem osób widzących, słabowidzących oraz niewidomych, staram się pokazać, że podstawy zrozumienia wielu pojęć abstrakcyjnych szukać można w geście

Investigating the dual function of gesture in blind and visually impaired children. (Poster)

Co-speech gesture research explores the role of gesture in communication, i.e. whether gestures are intended for the listener/audience (e.g. Mol et al. 2009; Alibali et al., 2001; Holler & Beattie, 2003) or support the process of speech production (Kita & Davies, 2009; Hostetter et al. 2007). To investigate the role of gesture in communication we turn to blind and visually impaired speakers whose opportunities to learn gestures visually are limited (cf. Iverson & Goldin-Meadow 1998; 2001). The present study aims at providing insight into the nature and occurrence of co-speech gestures in spontaneous speech: between blind, severely visually impaired and sighted individuals. Participants were asked to read a short story (either in print or in Braille) and to re-tell it to the interviewer. Care was taken to establish an environment in which the participants would feel safe and would not refrain from gesturing for fear of hurting themselves or others. We predicted that if blind speakers did not gesture as much as their visually impaired peers it would suggest that gesture is to some extent acquired through visual instruction. However, following Iverson et al. (2000) and Iverson and Goldin-Meadow (1998) we hypothesized that despite the absence of visual gestural stimuli during the language-learning process gesture is present in the language of the blind participants - but there would be differences in gesture form, types and functions. The present study aims at exploring and categorizing these differences, with regard to how sensory references are visible in the gestures of participants with various degrees of sight impairment. Regardless of dissimilarities, the presence of gesture in both the blind and impaired individuals points towards a dual function of co-speech gestures, i.e. a device for both the speaker and their interlocutor

Znaczenie badawcze gestu w analizie procesów poznawczych osób niewidomych i niedowidzących

Gestykulacja jest wszechobecną cechą komunikacji wśród ludzi, choć występuje również u małp człekokształtnych. Gest daleki jest jednak od bycia przypadkową serią ruchów rąk. Według teoretyków nauk kognitywnych gest i język to dwa uzupełniające się źródła wiedzy na temat procesów umysłowych leżących u ich podstawy. Jeżeli więc gest, podobnie jak język, jest odzwierciedleniem struktury umysłowej człowieka, z której się wywodzi można założyć, iż analiza gestu stanowić będzie istotne źródło danych potwierdzających lub obalających teorie na temat natury konceptualizacji oraz kategoryzacji; w szczególności teorię ucieleśnionego poznania oraz opartą na niej kognitywną teorię metafory. Badanie języka jako ekspresji procesów rozgrywających się na poziomie umysłu — dokładniej rzecz biorąc — ucieleśnionego umysłu jest fundamentalnym założeniem lingwistyki kognitywnej. Niniejszy artykuł przygląda się powiązaniu gestu, języka oraz zjawisk umysłowych, ze szczególną uwagą traktując metaforyczny gest osób niewidomych oraz niedowidzących. Pokazując konceptualne oraz społeczne konotacje występowania różnych typów gestu autorki starają się wykazać, iż jego analiza stanowić może istotny przyczynek do rozwoju kognitywnej teorii poznania.Narodowe Centrum Nauki (grant 2011/01/N/HS6/04050

What is metaphorical about metaphorical gestures?

Celem artykułu jest próba odpowiedzi na wciąż dyskutowane w literaturze pytanie, jakie zależności występują między gestami a mową podczas spontanicznych wypowiedzi. Za gesty towarzyszące mowie uznano cztery ich typy – gesty metaforyczne, ikoniczne, batutowe oraz deiktyczne (za: McNeill 1992), przy czym uwaga badawcza została skierowana ku gestom ikonicznym, których szczególny przypadek stanowią gesty metaforyczne. Zauważono, że w odniesieniu do gestów towarzyszących mowie (gesticulation w terminologii McNeilla) można wyróżnić kilka różnych relacji łączących oba tryby semiotyczne tworzące znaczenie. Synchronia czasowa, proponowana przez McNeilla (2016), jest jednym z typów takiej relacji, inni badacze wskazują jednak, że gest często wyprzedza pojęcie, do którego się odnosi (Antas 2013). Z kolei Graziano i in. (2020) zauważają, że zbieżność między gestami a werbalną warstwą wypowiedzi można badać, biorąc pod uwagę dopasowanie na poziomie prozodii i semantyki. W artykule zaproponowano trzy typy zbieżności. Są nimi: pełna zbieżność czasowa i semantyczna, która występuje wówczas, gdy gest i mowa pojawiają się w tym samym czasie, jednocześnie odnosząc się do tego samego pojęcia; zbieżność tylko czasowa oraz zbieżność tylko semantyczna, która nie wymaga wystąpienia słowa i gestu w tym samym czasie. Jako jednostkę służącą do badania dopasowania gestów i mowy przyjęto mikronarrację (zob. Jelec i Fabiszak 2019), która ma zastosowanie w naturalnej, spontanicznej komunikacji. Analiza jakościowa materiału badawczego, którym są dialogiczne wypowiedzi polityków i innych osób publicznych zaczerpnięte z wybranych programów telewizyjnych o tematyce społeczno‑ politycznej, pozwoliła także na ustalenie relacji, jakie mogą występować między obrazowanym pojęciem a gestem – wyróżniono tu relacje ikoniczne, metonimiczne oraz metaforyczne. Tym samym wykazano, że metaforyczność gestu może mieć kilka różnych wymiarów.This paper investigates the types of relationships occurring between spontaneous gestures and speech, aiming to answer the question: how do we know the meaning of gestures that co-occur with speech. Out of the four types of gestures accompanying speech (metaphorical, iconic, beats, and deictic gestures, after McNeill 1992), we focused on iconic and metaphoric referential gestures. The relationship between co-speech gestures (or gesticulation in McNeill’s terminology) and speech happens on several levels, linking the two semiotic modes that create meaning. Temporal synchrony, proposed by McNeill (2016), is one such type of relationship: we assume that the gesture refers to a word or phrase with which it co-occurs in time. However, other researchers point out that a gesture can precede the concept to which it refers (Antas 2013). Grazino (2019) proposes that gesture-speech alignment can be studied at the level of prosody and semantics. Hence, this article proposes three types of gesture-speech alignment: full temporal and semantic alignment (when gesture and speech occur at the same time and refer to the same concept); temporal alignment (gesture and speech co-occur in time but have different referents); and semantic alignment, which does not require the word and gesture to occur at the same time. We used the micronarrative (see Fabiszak, Jelec 2019) as the unit of analysis to study gesture and speech alignment in spontaneous dialogues. The qualitative analysis of the research material (recordings of TV interviews with politicians and other public figures), allowed us to illustrate the relationship between the concept and the gesture. We propose that the nature of this relationship can be iconic, metonymic, or metaphorical, thus showing that the metaphoricity of a gesture can have several different dimensions

Thoughts on the table: Gesture as a tool for thinking in blind and visually impaired children

The theory of embodiment (Lakoff and Johnson 2003; Gibbs et al. 2004) explains the origin of meaning by postulating that thought is influenced by sensorimotor experience (Robbins and Aydede 2009). However, the relation between the body, mind and environment is not unidirectional. Not only do we derive information from the world, but we are also able to use it as an extension of the mind through epistemic actions, strategies that minimize the cognitive load by offloading it onto the environment (Kirsh and Maglio 1994). This paper investigates the potential of gesture as epistemic action. 12 blind and severely visually impaired children and young adults, as well as a control group of 7 young adults were interviewed for the purpose of the study. Participants were asked to explain a set of abstract and concrete concepts while their speech and gestures were recorded. If gesture indeed plays a role in reducing the mental load by externalizing thought, more gestures should be produced for concepts that are more difficult to describe (in this case: abstract, intangible concepts). Qualitative data analysis, as well as simple statistical analyses of gesture type, number and gesture per word rates show that abstract concepts do not generate more gestures, but do prompt blind and visually impaired speakers to use simulation gestures. These gestures constitute reenactments of situations associated with a given concept by the respondent. They are also thought to confirm the embodied cognition hypothesis (Hostetter and Alibali 2008). A number of examples demonstrates that abstract concepts in blind children are strongly grounded in their experience of real-world situations. Findings suggest that gesture is not merely a tool for communication, but a way of extending the capabilities of the mind

Different phonological mechanisms facilitate vocabulary learning at early and late stages of language acquisition : evidence from Polish 9-year-olds learning English

To acquire a new word, learners need to create its representation in phonological short-term memory (STM) and then encode it in their long-term memory. Two strategies can enable word representation in STM: universal segmentation and phonological mapping. Universal segmentation is language uni- versal and thus should predict word learning in any language, while phonological mapping is language specific. This study investigates the mechanisms of vocabulary learning through a comparison of vo- cabulary learning task results in multiple languages. We tested 44 Polish third graders learning English on phonological STM, phonological awareness in Polish and in English, and on three tasks, which involved learning novel word forms in Polish (first language), in English (second language), and in a language that did not resemble any language known to participants (an unknown language). Partic- ipants’ English proficiency was controlled through a vocabulary task. The results suggest that word learning engages different mechanisms for familiar and unfamiliar languages. Phonological awareness in English predicted learning second language and unknown language words, and phonological STM predicted learning words of the unknown language. We propose that universal segmentation facilitates word learning only in an unfamiliar language, while in familiar languages speakers use phonological mapping in order to learn new words