Effects of Intermittent IL-2 Alone or with Peri-Cycle Antiretroviral Therapy in Early HIV Infection: The STALWART Study

The Study of Aldesleukin with and without antiretroviral therapy (STALWART) evaluated whether intermittent interleukin-2 (IL-2) alone or with antiretroviral therapy (ART) around IL-2 cycles increased CD4+ counts compared to no therapy

Shareholder Primacy and the Distribution of Wealth

In recent years a growing consensus has emerged in favour of the shareholder-oriented model of the corporation. Increasingly, this model is justified not on the basis of shareholder ownership rights but on efficiency grounds: whoever the immediate and direct beneficiaries of shareholder-orientation, it is argued, it ultimately indirectly benefits everyone by ensuring the maximization of aggregate social wealth. The prevalence of this view has caused the distributional dimensions of corporate governance to be neglected. This paper examines the distribution of share ownership and financial wealth in the US and the UK. Although share ownership has become more widely spread, it argues, it remains very heavily concentrated with the result that shareholder primacy is in reality the primacy of a small privileged elite. After an exploration of the contradictions of working class shareholding and the impact of greater shareholder-orientation on the distribution of wealth, the paper concludes by re-evaluating Hansmann and Kraakman's 'end of corporate history' thesis, arguing that recent developments represent a triumph not for efficiency but for the growing power of the shareholder class

Supreme Court Amicus Brief of 22 Corporate Law Professors, Mark Janus v. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, Council 31, et al, No. 16-1466

The Supreme Court has looked to the rights of corporate shareholders in determining the rights of union members and non-members to control political spending, and vice versa. The Court sometimes assumes that if shareholders disapprove of corporate political expression, they can easily sell their shares or exercise control over corporate spending. This assumption is mistaken. Because of how capital is saved and invested, most individual shareholders cannot obtain full information about corporate political activities, even after the fact, nor can they prevent their savings from being used to speak in ways with which they disagree. Individual shareholders have no “opt out” rights or practical ability to avoid subsidizing corporate political expression with which they disagree. Nor do individuals have the practical option to refrain from putting their savings into equity investments, as doing so would impose damaging economic penalties and ignore conventional financial guidance for individual investors.Most individual shareholders cannot obtain full information about a corporation’s speech or political activities, even after the fact, nor can most shareholders prevent their savings from being used for political activity with which they disagree. More generally, the Court\u27s focus on whether union non-members are effectively forced to fund political speech or activity with which they disagree should reflect the fact that most Americans must routinely fund speech with which they disagree. While some of this compulsion is from practical reality rather than law there are numerous examples outside the union context of laws that require individuals to fund expressive activities. There is, simply put, very little way for most individuals in modern America to avoid subsidizing speech with which they disagree

Shareholders Should Welcome Knowledge Workers as Directors

The most influential approach of corporate governance, the view of shareholders’ supremacy does not take into consideration that the key task of modern corporations is to generate and transfer firm-specific knowledge. It proposes that, in order to overcome the widespread corporate scandals, the interests of top management and directors should be increasingly aligned to shareholder’ interests by making the board more responsible to shareholders, and monitoring of top management by independent outside directors should be strengthened. Corporate governance reform needs to go in another direction altogether. Firm-specific knowledge investments are, like financial investments, not ex ante contractible, leaving investors open to exploitation by shareholders. Employees therefore refuse to make firm-specific investments. To gain a sustainable competitive advantage, there must be an incentive to undertake such firm-specific investments. Three proposals are advanced to deal with this dilemma: (1) The board should rely more on insiders. (2) The insiders should be elected by those employees of the firm who are making firm-specific knowledge investments. (3) The board should be chaired by a neutral person. These proposals have major advantages: they provide incentives for knowledge investors; they countervail the dominance of executives; they encourage intrinsic work motivation and loyalty to the firm by strengthening distributive and procedural justice, and they ensure diversity on the board while lowering transaction costs. These proposals for reforming the board may help to overcome the crisis corporate governance is in. At the same time, they provide a step in the direction of a more adequate theory of the firm as a basis for corporate governance. Copyright Springer 2006corporate governance, shareholders, board directors, insiders, firm-specific knowledge, D23, D83, L14, G34, M50,