Long-term investigation of the ‘soft flesh’ condition in Northeast Atlantic mackerel induced by the myxosporean parasite Kudoa thyrsites (Cnidaria, Myxozoa). Temporal trends and new molecular epidemiological observations

Northeast Atlantic (NEA) mackerel (Scomber scombrus, Scombridae) represents an economically important target for the Norwegian pelagic fishing industry. Despite the commercial significance of NEA mackerel, little is known about the infections with the myxosporean parasite Kudoa thyrsites (Kudoidae). The parasite may cause post-mortem myoliquefaction of the fish skeletal muscle and therefore reduce the quality of the fish product. In this study, we examined 'soft flesh' occurrence in commercial size groups of NEA 'autumn mackerel' caught between 2007 and 2020, and investigated the prevalence and density of K. thyrsites (qPCR) and how they related to the occurrence of 'soft flesh'. The present study is the first long-term investigation of the occurrence of K. thyrsites-induced 'soft flesh' in NEA mackerel. After appearing stable for over a decade, the 'soft flesh' occurrence increased three-to six-fold in 2019 and 2020. This increase, together with the findings that 'soft flesh' seems primarily to affect the commercially most valuable mackerel size group (>400 g), may have important implications for the fishing industry and the fishery management. Molecular analysis (qPCR) suggests that the prevalence of K. thyrsites is substantially higher than 'soft flesh' occurrence. The majority (87.4%, n = 76/87) of infected mackerel did not develop 'soft flesh' and only individuals with high parasite density in the musculature (12.6%, n = 11/87) showed the condition. Therefore, qPCR analyses should be used for estimating the prevalence of K. thyrsites in fish. The method may also be used to assess the risk of NEA mackerel to develop post-mortem 'soft flesh'

New Orleans and Hurricane Katrina. III: The 17th Street Drainage Canal

The failure of the levee and floodwall section on the east bank of the 17th Street drainage canal was one of the most catastrophic breaches that occurred during Hurricane Katrina. It produced a breach that rapidly scoured a flow pathway below sea level, so that after the storm surge had largely subsided, floodwaters still continued to stream in through this breach for the next two and a half days. This particular failure contributed massively to the overall flooding of the Metropolitan Orleans East Bank protected basin. Slightly more than half of the loss of life, and a similar fraction of the overall damages, occurred in this heavily populated basin. There are a number of important geotechnical and geoforensic lessons associated with this failure. Accordingly, this paper is dedicated solely to investigating this single failure. Geological and geotechnical details, such as a thin layer of sensitive clay that was laid down by a previous hurricane, proper strength characterization of soils at and beyond the toe of the levee, and recognition of a water-filled gap on the inboard side of the sheet pile cutoff wall are judged to be among the most critical factors in understanding this failure. The lessons learned from this study are of importance for similar flood protection systems throughout other regions of the United States and the world

Investigation of the Performance of the New Orleans Flood Protection System in Hurricane Katrina on August 29, 2005: Volume 1

This report presents the results of an investigation of the performance of the New Orleans regional flood protection system during and after Hurricane Katrina, which struck the New Orleans region on August 29, 2005. This event resulted in the single most costly catastrophic failure of an engineered system in history. Current damage estimates at the time of this writing are on the order of $100 to$200 billion in the greater New Orleans area, and the official death count in New Orleans and southern Louisiana at the time of this writing stands at 1,293, with an additional 306 deaths in nearby southern Mississippi. An additional approximately 300 people are currently still listed as “missing”; it is expected that some of these missing were temporarily lost in the shuffle of the regional evacuation, but some of these are expected to have been carried out into the swamps and the Gulf of Mexico by the storm’s floodwaters, and some are expected to be recovered in the ongoing sifting through the debris of wrecked homes and businesses, so the current overall regional death count of 1,599 is expected to continue to rise a bit further. More than 450,000 people were initially displaced by this catastrophe, and at the time of this writing more than 200,000 residents of the greater New Orleans metropolitan area continue to be displaced from their homes by the floodwater damages from this storm event. This investigation has targeted three main questions as follow: (1) What happened?, (2) Why?, and (3) What types of changes are necessary to prevent recurrence of a disaster of this scale again in the future? To address these questions, this investigation has involved: (1) an initial field reconnaissance, forensic study and data gathering effort performed quickly after the arrival of Hurricanes Katrina (August 29, 2005) and Rita (September 24, 2005), (2) a review of the history of the regional flood protection system and its development, (3) a review of the challenging regional geology, (4) detailed studies of the events during Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, as well as the causes and mechanisms of the principal failures, (4) studies of the organizational and institutional issues affecting the performance of the flood protection system, (5) observations regarding the emergency repair and ongoing interim levee reconstruction efforts, and (6) development of findings and preliminary recommendations regarding changes that appear warranted in order to prevent recurrence of this type of catastrophe in the future. In the end, it is concluded that many things went wrong with the New Orleans flood protection system during Hurricane Katrina, and that the resulting catastrophe had it roots in three main causes: (1) a major natural disaster (the Hurricane itself), (2) the poor performance of the flood protection system, due to localized engineering failures, questionable judgments, errors, etc. involved in the detailed design, construction, operation and maintenance of the system, and (3) more global “organizational” and institutional problems associated with the governmental and local organizations responsible for the design, construction, operation, maintenance and funding of the overall flood protection system

Conditions for Nordic harmonisation offire classification of cables : Proposal of implementation of the newEuropean classification system in the building regulations

This report has been prepared for the building authorities in Denmark, Sweden and Norway in cooperation between the fire laboratories in Denmark, Sweden and Norway. The main goal of the project has been to propose how the new European system of reaction to fire classes forelectric cables can be implemented in the Nordic building regulations. This has been approached by exploring the present fire safety status regarding electric cables in the Nordic countries based on different activities. The report gives an overview over fire safety requirements that must be met by cables in the present Nordi cbuilding regulations and in the Nordic regulations for electric installations, and available information on which classes the most used cables will satsfy in the new system. Statistics and experience from fires where cables have been involved in the fire development are also presented. Based on this background, the following proposal of how the euroclass-system for electric cables can be implemented in Nordic building regulations is given: [Graphics][!

Risk assessment and management for interconnected critical infrastructure systems at the site and regional levels in California's Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta

This article summarises research-in-progress for improved risk assessment and management (RAM) of critical infrastructures that interconnect across California's Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta. The need for improved RAM is patent in the Delta as elsewhere: a 'patch and pray' stalemate has developed which focuses on short-term reactive marginal maintenance and emergency response and recovery systems, all pushing infrastructures - and their engineers, designers and operators - increasingly to their performance edges and beyond. The research focuses on water supply, transportation, energy and flood protection systems, all of which are embedded in a dynamic ecosystem and showing clear signs of deterioration. Provisional findings of research activities are discussed. This article addresses critical infrastructure modelling uncertainties and ways to better understand, reduce or otherwise accommodate human/organisational and informational uncertainties in any RAM focused at the interconnected critical infrastructure system level