An Economic Study of the Effect of Android Platform Fragmentation on Security Updates

Vendors in the Android ecosystem typically customize their devices by modifying Android Open Source Project (AOSP) code, adding in-house developed proprietary software, and pre-installing third-party applications. However, research has documented how various security problems are associated with this customization process. We develop a model of the Android ecosystem utilizing the concepts of game theory and product differentiation to capture the competition involving two vendors customizing the AOSP platform. We show how the vendors are incentivized to differentiate their products from AOSP and from each other, and how prices are shaped through this differentiation process. We also consider two types of consumers: security-conscious consumers who understand and care about security, and na\"ive consumers who lack the ability to correctly evaluate security properties of vendor-supplied Android products or simply ignore security. It is evident that vendors shirk on security investments in the latter case. Regulators such as the U.S. Federal Trade Commission have sanctioned Android vendors for underinvestment in security, but the exact effects of these sanctions are difficult to disentangle with empirical data. Here, we model the impact of a regulator-imposed fine that incentivizes vendors to match a minimum security standard. Interestingly, we show how product prices will decrease for the same cost of customization in the presence of a fine, or a higher level of regulator-imposed minimum security.Comment: 22nd International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security (FC 2018

Strategy bifurcation and spatial inhomogeneity in a simple model of competing sellers

We present a simple one-parameter model for spatially localised evolving agents competing for spatially localised resources. The model considers selling agents able to evolve their pricing strategy in competition for a fixed market. Despite its simplicity, the model displays extraordinarily rich behavior. In addition to ``cheap'' sellers pricing to cover their costs, ``expensive'' sellers spontaneously appear to exploit short-term favorable situations. These expensive sellers ``speciate'' into discrete price bands. As well as variety in pricing strategy, the ``cheap'' sellers evolve a strongly correlated spatial structure, which in turn creates niches for their expensive competitors. Thus an entire ecosystem of coexisting, discrete, symmetry-breaking strategies arises.Comment: 6 pages, 6 figures, epl2; 1 new figure, include nash equilibrium analysis, typo fixe

Complementary Patents and Market Structure

Many high technology goods are based on standards that require several essential patents owned by different IP holders. This gives rise to a complements and a double mark-up problem. We compare the welfare effects of two different business strategies dealing with these problems. Vertical integration of an IP holder and a downstream producer solves the double mark-up problem between these firms. Nevertheless, it may raise royalty rates and reduce output as compared to non-integration. Horizontal integration of IP holders solves the complements problem but not the double mark-up problem. Vertical integration discourages entry and reduces innovation incentives, while horizontal integration always benefits from entry and innovatio

On the informational content of wage offers

This article investigates signaling and screening roles of wage offers in a single-play matching model with two-sided unobservable characteristics. It generates the following predictions as matching equilibrium outcomes: (i) “good” jobs offer premia if “high-quality” worker population is large; (ii) “bad” jobs pay compensating differentials if the proportion of “good” jobs to “low-quality” workers is large; (iii) all firms may offer a pooling wage in markets dominated by “high-quality” workers and firms; or (iv) Gresham’s Law prevails: “good” types withdraw if “bad” types dominate the population. The screening/signaling motive thus has the potential of explaining a variety of wage patterns

A CTMC study of collisions between protons and H2+H_2^+ molecular ions

We study numerically collisions between protons and $H_2^+$ molecular ions at intermediate impact energies by using the Classical Trajectory Monte Carlo method (CTMC). Total and differential cross sections are computed. The results are compared with: a) the standard one electron--two nucleon scattering, and b) the quantum mechanical treatment of the $H^{+} - H^{+}_{2}$ scattering.Comment: ReVTeX, 5 pages + 5 figs. (EPS) To be published in Physica Script

Ion Collisions in Very Strong Electric Fields

A Classical Trajectory Monte Carlo (CTMC) simulation has been made of processes of charge exchange and ionization between an hydrogen atom and fully stripped ions embedded in very strong static electric fields ($O(10^{10}$ V/m$)$), which are thought to exist in cosmic and laser--produced plasmas. Calculations show that the presence of the field affects absolute values of the cross sections, enhancing ionization and reducing charge exchange. Moreover, the overall effect depends upon the relative orientation between the field and the nuclear motion. Other features of a null-field situation, such as scaling laws, are revisited.Comment: Latex, 13 pages, 11 figures (available upon request), to be published in Journal of Physics

A Model of Vertical Oligopolistic Competition

This paper develops a model of successive oligopolies with endogenous market entry, allowing for varying degrees of product differentiation and entry costs in both markets. Our analysis shows that the downstream conditions dominate the overall profitability of the two-tier structure while the upstream conditions mainly affect the distribution of profits. We compare the welfare effects of upstream versus downstream deregulation policies and show that the impact of deregulation may be overvalued when ignoring feedback effects from the other market. Furthermore, we analyze how different forms of vertical restraints influence the endogenous market structure and show when they are welfare enhancing

Vertical integration, market foreclosure and quality investment

We study incentives to vertically integrate in an industry with verti- cally differentiated downstream firms. Vertical integration by one of the firms increases production costs for the rival. Increased production costs negatively affects quality investment both by the integrated firm and the unintegrated rival. Quality investment by both firms decreases under any (vertical inte- gration) scenario. The decrease in quality invesment by both firms softens competition among downstream firms. By integrating first, a firm always produces the high quality good and earns higher profits. A fully integrated industry, with increased product differentiation, is observed in equilibrium. Due to increase in firm profits, social welfare under this structure is greater than under no integration.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio

Parametrically excited surface waves: Two-frequency forcing, normal form symmetries, and pattern selection

Motivated by experimental observations of exotic standing wave patterns in the two-frequency Faraday experiment, we investigate the role of normal form symmetries in the pattern selection problem. With forcing frequency components in ratio m/n, where m and n are co-prime integers, there is the possibility that both harmonic and subharmonic waves may lose stability simultaneously, each with a different wavenumber. We focus on this situation and compare the case where the harmonic waves have a longer wavelength than the subharmonic waves with the case where the harmonic waves have a shorter wavelength. We show that in the former case a normal form transformation can be used to remove all quadratic terms from the amplitude equations governing the relevant resonant triad interactions. Thus the role of resonant triads in the pattern selection problem is greatly diminished in this situation. We verify our general results within the example of one-dimensional surface wave solutions of the Zhang-Vinals model of the two-frequency Faraday problem. In one-dimension, a 1:2 spatial resonance takes the place of a resonant triad in our investigation. We find that when the bifurcating modes are in this spatial resonance, it dramatically effects the bifurcation to subharmonic waves in the case of forcing frequencies are in ratio 1/2; this is consistent with the results of Zhang and Vinals. In sharp contrast, we find that when the forcing frequencies are in ratio 2/3, the bifurcation to (sub)harmonic waves is insensitive to the presence of another spatially-resonant bifurcating mode